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Executive summary
This is the Finnish National Report, in accordance with the provisions of the Article 32 
of the Joint Convention, to the 4th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties in May 
2012. The aim of this report is to present the recent developments of waste management 
in Finland, to describe waste management facilities and practices in Finland and, for 
discussion and review among contracting parties, to describe how the obligations under the 
Convention are fulfilled in Finland.
There were major developments in safety of spent fuel managements and safety of 
radioactive waste management in Finland during the reporting period 2008–2010. The 
main focus of activities was the spent fuel disposal project, where preparedness for the 
submittal of a construction license application is approaching. This has required extensive 
effort, from both the regulator and the implementer, in research, technical development 
and development of organizations.
As spent fuel is defined in legislation as radioactive waste in Finland, the nuclear power 
plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto are the main generators of radioactive waste. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy operates two VVER units at the Loviisa site and Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj two plant units at Olkiluoto. The Loviisa units 1 and 2 were commissioned in 1977 
and 1981, and the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respectively. In addition, a 
new nuclear power plant unit is being constructed at the Olkiluoto site. The Decision-in-
Principle, the first step in licensing decisions, was made by the Government for two new 
reactors, one for Teollisuuden Voima Oyj at the Olkiluoto site and one for Fennovoima 
Oy, which will make a decision between two alternative sites in 2011. At the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa sites there are interim storages for spent fuel as well as final repositories for 
medium and low level radioactive wastes. Furthermore, a Triga Mark II research reactor is 
operated in Espoo by the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. During the reporting 
period, the Finnish fuel cycle policy continued to be based on the once-through option.
During the reporting period the Finnish NPPs operated and produced spent fuel 
and radioactive waste as expected. The level of safety in spent fuel management and 
radioactive waste management was high. Activities and programs continued to be 
developed and improved in accordance with the Finnish national strategy, milestones 
and timetable. The licensees and Posiva Oy, the Decision-In-Principle holder for a spent 
nuclear fuel disposal facility, have shown good safety performance and safety management 
practices in carrying out their responsibilities in spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management in existing NPP’s as well as in developing the final disposal project further.
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During the reporting period, the highlights in Finland were as follows:
Spent nuclear fuel disposal project progressed as planned
•	 The	project	proceeded	as	planned	with	good	progress	in	underground	rock	characterization	
facility construction, encapsulation and disposal facility design, technical development 
and the development of the safety case. Despite the complexity of the work and the 
challenges involved, no unexpected delays or problems were encountered. The regulatory 
approach is presented in Annex L.1 and the implementation of the project in Annex L.2.
•	 The	construction	of	the	underground	rock	characterisation	facility,	ONKALO,	which	
started in July 2004, progressed to disposal depth. The access tunnel reached the 
length (chainage) of 4560 m and the depth of 433 m, and two ventilation shafts for 
ventilation and a personnel shaft each reached the depth of 290 m at the end of 2010.
•	 Regulatory	oversight	procedures	for	ONKALO,	as	described	in	Annex	L.1,	have	been	
established.	Regulatory	oversight	of	ONKALO	construction	continues	with	the	depth	
and detail that would allow the use of the facility as a part of the disposal facility.
•	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority	(STUK)	continued	the	review	of	the	evolving	Safety	
Case for the disposal facility. During the latter part of 2009, Posiva Oy, the implementer, sent 
drafts of main licensing documents to the authorities. Posiva also submitted their triennial 
Research,	Development	and	Design	plans	report	for	the	years	2010–2012.	During	2010	STUK	
reviewed this documentation, compiled a draft safety evaluation, and gave, as requested by 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, statements on the maturity of the project 
and on the research, development and design plans. There has been considerable progress by 
Posiva, but work is still needed in several areas to achieve the level required for a construction 
licence application. The application is expected to be submitted at the end of 2012.
The regulatory system was strengthened
•	 STUK	continued	to	increase	its	resources	and	activities	in	response	to	expanding	
operations	of	Posiva	in	constructing	the	ONKALO	and	in	preparing	the	review	the	
disposal facility (encapsulation facility and repository) construction license application. 
STUK’s	planning	for	the	review	of	the	construction	license	application	for	the	spent	fuel	
disposal facility started and the planned procedures were used during the 2010 review 
of Posiva’s draft licensing material. This exercise was valuable feedback to planning.
•	 The	Finnish	nuclear	legislation	and	regulatory	guidance	were	developed	further.	
This included a revised Government Decree on the safety of disposal of nuclear 
waste and advanced drafts of revised Regulatory Guides on waste management 
were available at the end of 2010. International guidance such as IAEA safety 
standards and WENRA recommendations were taken into account in this work.
•	 In	2009	STUK	organized	a	Peer	Review	of	STUK’s	waste	management	
related	activities.	All	EU	member	states	were	invited	and	representatives	
from 11 countries participated in the peer review.
Progress was made in the spent fuel management
•	 Spent	nuclear	fuel	from	the	Finnish	NPPs	is	stored	at	the	power	plant	sites	until	it	will	
be disposed of. In Loviisa NPP, the installation of dense fuel racks was started in 2007 and 
will continue until 2018. The operating licence issued in 2007 allows storing spent fuel up 
to	1100	tU	and	this	capacity	will	be	adequate	until	the	start	of	disposal	of	the	spent	fuel.
•	 At	Olkiluoto,	where	the	construction	of	Olkiluoto	3	unit	is	ongoing,	the	
construction of the extension of the spent fuel storage facility started in 2010. 
Protection against large airplane crash is included in the design of the extension.
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of the existing part of the facility will also be improved. In addition, spent fuel pool 
cooling water systems will be modified to enable water feed from outside.
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities was improved
•	 Improved	facilities	for	LILW	operations	at	Loviisa	NPP	were	commissioned	in	2010.
•	 The	LLW	disposal	section	of	the	Loviisa	LILW	disposal	facility	was	taken	in	operation	in	1998.	
The construction of the second stage of the facility – the cementation facility for solidification 
of wet ILW, and the ILW disposal cavern – was completed in 2007. Technical problems during 
commissioning tests of the solidification facility have delayed the start of the facility until 
the next reporting period. The construction to enlarge the LILW repository with a new 
room for waste handling and a tunnel facilitating disposal operations started in 2010.
•	A part of the small user’s waste – small amount of nuclear material and a few 
high activity sources – can not be disposed of in the Olkiluoto facility. Actions 
have been started to find an alternative disposal route for these wastes.
•	 During	the	reporting	period,	no	spent	fuel	or	radioactive	waste	
incidents in the Finnish NPPs were reported.
Technical support and competence were developed
•	 VTT	Technical	Research	Centre	of	Finland	continued	to	support	effectively	the	regulatory	
body in safety assessment work, providing safety analysis capabilities and tools e.g. via 
the regulatory research programmes, and performing reviews of safety analyses.
•	Management	of	competence,	taking	into	account	retirement	of	large	post-war	age	groups	
born in late 1940’s and early 1950’s, is a concern also in Finland. During the reporting 
period, the Finnish nuclear safety community has succeeded well in recruiting new staff 
in response to the needs of the expanding nuclear sector. However, challenges remain 
in providing sufficient post-graduate education and training as well as funding for 
comprehensive knowledge transfer between the expert generations. A pilot project for 
enhanced joint education and training concerning spent fuel disposal was launched for 
newcomers in the field in 2010, with the intention to set up a program similar to that 
for the nuclear reactor safety. More advanced familiarisation continues to be obtained 
through extensive on-job training and tutoring at the different organisations.
•	 International	cooperation	and	transparency	belong	to	the	cornerstones	of	
the development of the national solutions for spent fuel and waste safety in 
Finland. In addition to active participation in international and bilateral 
forums	(IAEA,	EU,	WENRA,	OECD/NEA),	foreign	consultants	continued	to	
participate both in regulatory reviews and Posiva’s development work.
Challenges for future work
•	Main	challenges	are	related	to	keeping	up	with	the	timely	progress	made	with	the	Olkiluoto	
spent fuel disposal project. Research and development programs have a major challenge 
to produce results related to the Olkiluoto site, the engineered barrier system and the 
safety case, which are needed to justify the construction licence application planned to be 
submitted	in	2012.	Posiva	and	STUK	invest	in	their	processes	and	resources	to	ensure	that	
all safety related regulatory and implementation tasks can be performed with high quality 
and without undue delay. Still more research and development and more resources are 
needed	as	the	project	proceeds.	To	develop	and	maintain	competence	in	nuclear	safety,	STUK	
provides guidance to the national research programmes on operational safety of nuclear 
power plants and on the safety of nuclear waste management and geological disposal.
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•	 In	Olkiluoto,	a	new	NPP	is	under	construction	and	two	new	reactors	have	passed	the	
first licensing step, Decision-in-Principle. One of the decisions was for Fennovoima Oy, 
a new company in this field. The Olkiluoto disposal project covers currently spent fuel 
from the four reactors in operation, from the one under construction (Olkiluoto 3) and 
from one under planning (Olkiluoto 4). As Fennovoima Oy is not an owner of Posiva, the 
plans of Posiva do not cover spent fuel from Fennovoima’s future NPP unit. According 
to the Decision-in Principle Fennovoima must improve its plan for the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel by 2016 by submitting to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
either an agreement on nuclear waste management in cooperation with Posiva as outlined 
in the application for a Decision-in Principle or an environmental impact assessment 
program for a spent duel disposal facility to be operated by Fennovoima itself.
•	 The	European	Commission	promotes	worldwide	co-operation	to	further	develop	nuclear,	
radiation and waste safety through its INSC program and its predecessors. Finland 
has been and will be a supporter of this European development and involvement. 
During	the	reporting	period,	three	fourths	of	STUK’s	service	volume	comprised	
promotion of radiation and nuclear safety, including waste safety, in Eastern European 
countries.The retirement of large post-war age groups will affect the organizations 
responsible for waste management and also the regulators and require efforts from 
them so that they will have enough competence and manpower available.
•	 Communication	will	become	an	increasingly	important	success	factor	for	STUK,	
Posiva and power companies. Interest in radiation and nuclear safety topics will 
continue to increase. The media plays an important role in communication.
•	While	most	radioactive	waste	streams	have	a	disposal	solution,	a	part	of	
the small user’s waste – small amount of nuclear material and a few high 
activity sources – can not be disposed of in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility. A disposal route for these wastes is currently being negotiated.
From the 3rd Review Meeting
The 3rd Review Meeting in 2009 identified challenges and items for follow-up, and recorded 
some planned measures to improve safety of nuclear waste management in Finland. On 
request of the Review Meeting these issues are included and responded in this 4th National 
Report of Finland. These items were (in brackets the articles, in which the issues are 
addressed):
•	 Keeping	up	with	the	timely	progress	made	with	the	in-situ	rock	characterisation	project	at	
the	spent	fuel	disposal	site	in	Olkiluoto	(ONKALO)	(see	Articles	13–15,	Annexes	L.1	and	L.2	)
•	Managing	the	waste	that	will	arise	from	new	NPPs	under	construction	and	Decision-
in-Principle applications for 3 new NPPs submitted (See Articles 32, 12, 16)
•	 The	retirement	of	large	age	group	will	affect	STUK,	nuclear	power	utilities	
and	waste	management	organisation	(Articles	20	and	22,	Section	K)
•	 Communication	will	become	an	increasingly	important	success	factor	for	STUK	
as interest in radiation and nuclear safety continue to increase (Article 20).
Conclusion: In conclusion, Finland complies with the obligations and objectives of 
the Joint Convention. Challenges for the future are recognized, regularly reviewed and 
addressed. Efforts for continuous improvements are needed and taken.
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List of acronyms
BWR  Boiling water reactor
DiP Decision-in-Principle by the Government
EIA Environmental impact assessment
EPR European pressurized water reactor
FPH Fortum Power and Heat Oy (NPP utility)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
ILW Intermediate level waste
LILW Low and intermediate level waste
LLW Low level waste
MEE*  Ministry of Employment and the Economy
MSAH  Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
MTI* Ministry of Trade and Industry
NORM  Naturally occurring radioactive materials
NPP Nuclear power plant
ONKALO	 Underground	rock	characterisation	facility	for	spent	fuel	disposal	at	Olkiluoto
Posiva Posiva Oy (company for spent fuel disposal)
PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
PWR Pressurized water reactor
ST	guide	 Safety	regulation	issued	by	STUK	subject	to	radiation	legislation	
STUK	 Radiation	and	Nuclear	Safety	Authority
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (NPP utility)
VLLW Very low level waste
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
VVR Russian type of pressurized water reactor
yVL	guide	 STUK	guides	containing	detailed	requirements	set	for	the	safety	of	nuclear	power	plants.	
There’s	a	large	restructuring	project	going	on,	the	new	yVL	guides	should	replace	old	
ones	by	the	end	of	2011.	The	last	old	style	yVL	guides	with	number-only	id’s	were	issued	
in 2008.
*) The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) was reorganized and since the 1st of January 2008 the con-
tact authority concerning nuclear waste management is the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(MEE).
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The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 
1997 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. Finland 
signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and de-
posited the tools of acceptance on 10 February 
2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 June 
2001.
The fulfilment of the obligations of the 
Convention and the developments after the third 
Review Meeting are assessed in this report. The 
self-assessment is mainly based on the Finnish 
legislation and regulations, on the status of exist-
ing and projected spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management facilities, and on the activities to 
develop and improve operational and long term 
safety of the facilities. The plans for decommission-
ing of nuclear facilities are discussed shortly as 
well. The regulation and management of radioac-
tive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle 
is discussed as appropriate.
Main regulations in the field of spent nuclear 
fuel management as well as nuclear and other 
radioactive waste management are the Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, the Radiation Act and 
Decree, the Government Decrees on nuclear safe-
ty,	 and	 the	 regulatory	 guides	 (yVL	 guides	 and	
ST Guides) issued by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety	Authority	(STUK).	The	most	essential	safe-   
ty regulations are listed in Section L.5.
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 5) requires that 
the use of nuclear energy, taking into account its 
various impacts, has to be in line with the overall 
good of the society. It provides (Section 6) that 
the use of nuclear energy must be safe; it shall 
not cause harmful effects to humans, or damage 
to the environment or property. Section 7 further 
requires that sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
SECTION A Introduction
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
A new Chapter 2a of the Act gives general 
nuclear safety and security principles, including 
some principles to be followed in nuclear waste 
management. Nuclear waste shall be managed 
so that after disposal of the waste no radiation 
exposure is caused, which would exceed the level 
considered acceptable at the time the disposal is 
implemented. The disposal of nuclear waste in a 
manner intended as permanent shall be planned 
giving priority to safety and so that ensuring long-
term safety does not require the surveillance of the 
final disposal site.
Radiation Act (Section 2) provides that the 
benefits accruing from the use of radiation and 
practices involving exposure to radiation shall 
exceed the detriment it causes; that the practice 
shall be organized in such a way that the resulting 
exposure to radiation hazardous to health is kept 
as low as reasonably achievable and that no per-
son’s exposure shall exceed the maximum values 
prescribed in the Radiation Decree.
These general safety principles, included in 
the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act, 
apply to management of spent nuclear fuel and of 
other radioactive waste arising from the use of nu-
clear energy and the associated nuclear fuel cycle. 
Radioactive waste produced in other activities is 
regulated solely by the Radiation Act.
Finland is a member state of the European 
Union.	Thus,	 the	 regulations	 of	 the	Union	 are	 in	
force in Finland. When necessary, the Finnish reg-
ulations have been modified to take into account 
the	EU	regulations.	The	EC	Directives	 relate	e.g.	
to radiation protection and transboundary move-
ments of radioactive waste and spent fuel, whereas 
there are so far no regulations pertaining directly 
14
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to safe management of spent nuclear fuel and ra-
dioactive waste.
In Finland, two NPPs, with a total capacity of 
2 716 MWe(net) at the end of 2010, are currently in 
operation. The Loviisa plant includes two 488 MWe 
PWR (VVER) units, operated by Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy (FPH) and the Olkiluoto plant two 880 
MWe BWR units, operated by Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj (TVO). Olkiluoto 2 has been upgraded on July 
1, 2011 to the same power output as Olkiluoto 
1. Olkiluoto 2 will be upgrated to approximately 
same power output as Olkiluoto 1. The NPP units 
were connected to the electrical network as follows: 
Loviisa 1 in 1977, Loviisa 2 in 1981, Olkiluoto 1 
in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. A construction li-
cence for a new PWR unit, Olkiluoto 3 of 1600 MWe 
was granted by the Government in February 2005. 
The unit is planned to be operational in 2013.
In 2010, the Finnish Parliament endorsed the 
Governments Decision-in Principle to build two 
more NPP units, one by TVO at the Olkiluoto site 
and the other by Fennovoima Oy at a new site, 
Pyhäjoki or Simo (Figure 1). The construction of 
these units is expected to start within a couple 
of years. The nuclear power plant of Fennovoima 
may consist of one nuclear power plant unit with 
a maximum reactor thermal output of 4,900 MW. 
The TVO plant unit incorporating a light water 
reactor with a reactor thermal output of 4,600 MW 
would be the fourth reactor unit of the nuclear 
power plant.
Both NPPs in operation have storage facili-
ties for spent fuel and facilities for treatment and 
storage of low and intermediate level radioactive 
waste (LILW). The disposal facility for LILW was 
taken into operation at the Olkiluoto site in 1992 
and for LLW at the Loviisa site in 1998. At Loviisa 
site the cementation facility for solidification of wet 
LILW and the extension of the disposal facility for 
cemented waste are under commissioning.
All spent fuel generated at the Olkiluoto plant 
is stored on-site. Previously the spent fuel of the 
Loviisa plant was transported to the Mayak facili-
ties in the Russian Federation, after interim stor-
age of a few years. An amendment to the Nuclear 
Energy Act was passed in 1994, stating that spent 
fuel and all other nuclear wastes generated by the 
Finnish NPPs have to be treated, stored and dis-
posed of in Finland. Spent fuel shipments to the 
Russia were terminated at the end of 1996, and 
since then the spent fuel generated at the Loviisa 
plant has been stored at the plant. In 1995, a joint 
waste management company Posiva Oy was es-
tablished by FPH and TVO for taking care of the 
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units – ABB BWRs
• OL3 (EPR) under construction
• DiP for OL4 Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
• 2 operating units – VVERs
Fennovoima Ltd
• New utility, no operating 
reactors,  DiP for FV1 
(2 alternative sites)
Figure 1. The nuclear power plants in Finland.
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SECTION A Introduction
disposal of spent fuel of the nuclear power plants 
they operate.
The Finnish fuel cycle policy is in practice 
based on the once-through option. In 1999 Posiva 
proposed, in a Decision-in Principle (DiP) ap-
plication, to site a disposal facility for spent nu-
clear fuel (Figure 2) at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki, a 
couple of kilometres from the NPP. This application 
was reviewed and approved from safety viewpoint 
by	 STUK	 and	 approved	 by	 the	 municipality	 of	
Eurajoki in January 2000, the Finnish Government 
made the DiP in December 2000. The Parliament 
endorsed it in May 2001.
Later, the Parliament has ratified two Decision-
in Principles on the extension of the disposal fa-
cility to provide capacity for spent fuel from new 
NPP units. The first one took place in 2002 and it 
concerned the Olkiluoto 3 unit, and the second one 
concerning the Olkiluoto 4 unit was made in 2010. 
Fennovoima Oy is not an owner of Posiva and con-
sequently the extension plans do not cover spent 
fuel from Fennovoima’s future NPP unit.
According to the Decision-in Principle Fenno-
voima must improve its plan for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel by 2016 by submitting to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy ei-
ther an agreement on nuclear waste management 
cooperation as outlined in the application for a 
Decision-in Principle, or an environmental impact 
assessment program for a spent duel disposal facil-
ity operated by Fennovoima itself.
The DiP of 2001 authorized Posiva to construct 
a	 rock	 characterization	 facility	 “ONKALO”	 down	
to	the	actual	disposal	depth.	ONKALO	is	intended	
to be used as a part of the repository and it is 
constructed under pertinent regulatory control. 
The application for the construction licence for the 
main parts of the repository and for the spent fuel 
encapsulation plant is scheduled to be submitted to 
the authorities by the end of 2012 and the operat-
ing licence application around the year 2018.
A research reactor FiR 1 (TRIGA Mark II, 
250 kW) is situated in Espoo and operated by the 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. It was 
taken into operation in 1962. VTT has also radio-
chemical laboratories and a hot-cell for studies of 
pressure vessel materials of Loviisa NPP and other 
radioactive materials. Radiochemical and particle 
accelerator laboratories are also located at the uni-
versities of Helsinki, Turku and Jyväskylä.
Two pilot-scale uranium mining and milling 
facilities were operational in late 1950’s – early 
Figure 2. The access tunnel to the disposal facility of spent fuel under construction at Olkiluoto (POSIVA).
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1960’s. In 2010, Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy submit-
ted an application for recovery of uranium around 
350–500 tonnes per year as byproduct in nickel 
and other metal mining and milling.
 Small amounts of radioactive wastes arise from 
a number of facilities using radioactive sources in 
medical, research and industrial applications.
During 2006–2010 several radioactive sources 
containing Am-241 were accidentally melted in 
Outokumpu Stainless Oy’s steel foundry in Tornio, 
Finland. The sources entered the foundry among 
imported scrap metal despite of state of art ra-
diation monitoring; Am-241 is physically almost 
impossible to detect if even slightly shielded by 
scrap metal. As a consequence of these incidents 
there were created about 640 tons of slag contain-
ing about 20 GBq and about 1500 tons of other 
waste (flue gas dusts and decommissioning waste) 
containing about 300 MBq of Am-241. Outokumpu 
Stainless Oy prepared a specific plan to dispose of 
these wastes at its own disposal site in the vicinity 
of	the	foundry.	The	plan	was	approved	by	STUK	in	
2008. However, the execution of the plan was post-
poned until 2010 because of the economical crises 
in 2008–2009. Finally the wastes were placed to 
the disposal site and were covered in accordance 
with the approved plan in autumn 2010.
In the safe management of spent fuel and other 
radioactive wastes, international co-operation is 
of importance, and the Finnish regulatory au-
thorities, nuclear power and waste management 
companies and research institutes have actively 
worked in co-operation with foreign organisations. 
In this respect, especially the activities of the 
IAEA,	OECD/NEA,	WENRA	and	the	R&D	frame-
work	 programmes	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 are	
important.
This report has been structured in accord-
ance with the Guidelines Regarding the Form 
and Structure of National Reports (INFCIRC 
604). Reflecting the third Review meeting, this 4th 
National Report includes essential elements of the 
content of the Finnish third National Report with 
more detailed information of the practical imple-
mentation of the articles of the Joint Convention 
during the review period 2008–2010. In Section B 
and Annex L.8, policies and practices of waste man-
agement in Finland are summarised as stipulated 
in Article 32, paragraph 1. In section C, the scope 
of application taking into account the Finnish cir-
cumstances is explained, as stipulated in Article 3. 
Section D provides information on spent fuel and 
waste management facilities in Finland and the 
inventories of spent fuel and radioactive waste, as 
stipulated in Article 32, paragraph 2. The imple-
mentation of each of the Articles from 4 to 28 of 
the Convention is separately evaluated in Sections 
E	 to	 J.	 Section	 K	 summarises	 planned	 activities	
to improve safety. Section L contains the annexes: 
Regulatory approach to the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
final disposal project (L.1), Programme for spent 
fuel disposal (L.2), List of spent fuel storages and 
inventory of spent fuel (L.3), List of radioactive 
waste management facilities and inventory of ra-
dioactive waste (L.4), List of laws, regulations, 
safety guides and other relevant documents (L.5), 
References to official national and international 
reports related to radiation and nuclear safety 
(L.6), References to reports of international review 
missions performed at the request of a Contracting 
Party (L.7), and Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management policy (L.8).
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Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 1
In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each 
Contracting Party shall submit a national report to 
each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This re-
port shall address the measures taken to implement 
each of the obligations of the Convention. For each 
Contracting Party the report shall also address its:
(a) spent fuel management policy;
(b) spent fuel management practices;
(c) radioactive waste management policy;
(d) radioactive waste management practices;
(e) criteria used to define and categorize radioac-
tive waste.
B.32.1 Criteria used to define and 
categorize radioactive waste
Nuclear waste is defined in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Section 3) as radioactive waste in the form of spent 
fuel or in some other form, generated in connection 
with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy, and 
materials, objects and structures which, having be-
come radioactive in connection with or as a result 
of the use of nuclear energy and having been re-
moved from use, require special measures because 
of the danger arising from their radioactivity.
Other radioactive waste than nuclear waste 
is regulated in the framework of Radiation Act. 
According to the Act (Section 10), the term radio-
active waste denotes radioactive substances, and 
various items that have no use any more and have 
to be rendered harmless due to their radioactivity. 
The definition includes also equipment, goods and 
materials that are contaminated by radioactive 
materials. Radioactive substances and radiation 
appliances containing radioactive substances shall 
also be regarded as radioactive waste in case the 
owner of the substances or the appliances cannot 
be found.
The main sources of radioactive waste are nu-
clear wastes generated from the operation of the 
four power reactors and one small research reac-
tor. Other radioactive wastes arise from a number 
of facilities using radioisotopes in medical, re-
search and industrial applications. Consequently, 
the Finnish waste classification system includes 
two main categories: nuclear waste, and radioac-
tive waste not originating from the use of nuclear 
energy and the associated nuclear fuel cycle. Waste 
classification according to disposal route is illus-
trated in Figure 3.
Spent fuel from nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act defines spent fuel from 
the operation of nuclear reactors as nuclear waste, 
destined for disposal in a permanent manner. Due 
to its high activity and heat generation, spent fuel 
is regarded as high-level waste.
Low and intermediate level waste 
from nuclear facilities
The classification system for the purpose of predis-
posal management of LILW from NPPs is based on 
activity	 concentrations,	 given	 in	 guide	 yVL	 8.3.	
Solid and liquid wastes arising from the controlled 
area of a NPP contain almost exclusively short-
lived beta and gamma emitters and are grouped 
into the following activity categories:
•	Low level waste contains so little radioactiv-
ity that it can be treated at the NPP without 
any special radiation protection arrangements. 
The activity concentration in waste is then not 
more	than	1	Mbq/kg,	as	a	rule.
•	Intermediate level waste contains radioac-
tivity to the extent that effective radiation 
protection arrangements are needed when they 
are processed. The activity concentration in the 
waste	is	then	from	1	Mbq/kg	to	10	gbq/kg,	as	a	
rule.
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The classification for the disposal purpose is given 
in	government	Decree	 736/2008.	 It	 distinguishes	
short-lived and long-lived waste accordingly:
•	Short-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste 
the activity concentration of which after 500 
years is below the level of 100 megabecquerels 
(MBq) per kilogram in each disposed waste 
package, and below an average value of 10 
MBq per kilogram of waste in one emplacement 
room;
•	Long-lived waste shall refer to nuclear waste, 
the activity concentration of which after 500 
years is above the level of 100 megabecquerels 
(MBq) per kilogram in a disposed waste pack-
age, or above an average value of 10 MBq per 
kilogram of waste in one emplacement room;
guide	yVL	8.2	provides	for	general	and	case-spe-
cific clearance of nuclear waste. Both clearance 
options are founded upon the criteria of triviality 
of dose; the radiation protection requirement for 
both clearance procedures is that the annual dose 
to any member of the public or worker processing 
the material, shall not exceed 10 µSv and that also 
otherwise the radiation exposure arising from the 
cleared material is as low as reasonably achiev-
able.
Mass and surface concentration based activ-
ity constraints for general clearance are given in 
yVL	 8.2.	 One	 set	 of	 constraints	 is	 for	 unlimited	
amounts of material and the constraints are taken 
from IAEA Safety Guide RS-G-1.7. Another set of 
constraints are applied for limited waste quanti-
ties not exceeding 100 tonnes per year for one NPP 
or other nuclear installation. In case-specific clear-
ance the activity concentrations are determined on 
a case-by-case basis but care has to be taken that 
they do not exceed the exemption limits given e.g. 
in	the	Euratom	Council	Directive	96/92	and	guide	
ST 1.5.
guide	yVL	8.2	covers	also	clearance	of	regulat-
ed buildings and sites in the context of decommis-
sioning of nuclear facilities. The radiation protec-
tion requirement for such clearances is that the an-
nual individual dose shall not exceed a constraint 
between 10 µSv and 100 µSv, to be determined on 
the basis of optimization. The relevant IAEA safety 
standards and guides have been used as reference 
for the guide.
Nuclear Waste
(Subject to Nuclear Energy Act)
Spent Nuclear
Fuel
Low and Intermediate
Level Waste
Discharges,
Cleared waste
Other Radioactive Waste
(Subject to Radiation Act)
Conditioned
Solid Waste
Liquid
Waste
Solid
Waste
Airborne
Discharges
Seawater, Air,
   Landfill
Rock Caverns at
IntermediateDepth
Deep
Repository
AirSewage
Systems
Central
Storage
Landfill
Figure 3. Classification of radioactive waste for disposal purposes.
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Nuclear	and	other	radioactive	
waste	management	policy
Legislative	basis
Nuclear waste is regulated by the Nuclear Energy Act 
and is defined as radioactive waste, including spent 
fuel, arising from the use of nuclear energy. Other ra-
dioactive waste is subject to the Radiation Act.
Political	decision-making	
and	public	consultation
Construction of a major nuclear waste facility shall be 
in line with the overall good of the society, as judged 
by the Government and the Parliament. Consent of 
the proposed host municipality is required for the 
construction of such a facility. An environmental im-
pact assessment procedure shall be conducted prior to 
the first authorization step of a major nuclear waste 
facility.
Responsibilities
Licensee of a nuclear waste management facility shall 
ensure its safe use including physical protection and 
emergency preparedness. Producer of nuclear waste is 
responsible for the implementation and expenses of his 
waste management and decommissioning activities, 
including the related planning, research and develop-
ment work. The State is responsible for nuclear waste 
after its approved disposal and has the secondary re-
sponsibility in case that a producer of nuclear waste is 
incapable to fulfil his management obligation.
User of radioactive substances shall render harm-
less the radioactive waste arising from his operations, 
including those involved with natural radioactive 
substances. A financial security shall be furnished for 
a sealed source or other radioactive waste with sub-
stantial liability. The State has the secondary respon-
sibility in case that a producer of radioactive waste is 
not capable to fulfil his management obligation.
Waste	management	and	
decommissioning	principles
The Nuclear Energy Act states that nuclear waste gen-
erated in Finland with some exceptions shall be han-
dled, stored and permanently disposed of in Finland. 
Nuclear waste generated elsewhere, shall not be han-
dled, stored or permanently disposed of in Finland. 
A long-term overall schedule for the implementation 
of nuclear waste disposal in Finland was contained 
in the Policy Decision of the Government in 1983. 
Subsequently the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) has issued decisions re-establishing 
and amending the schedule.
The preferable management option for disused 
sealed sources is to return them to the supplier/
manufacturer. If this is not feasible, a disused sealed 
source or other small user waste can be transferred 
to a central storage operated by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Facilitation of decommissioning shall be consid-
ered already in the design of a nuclear facility. 
Decommissioning plans shall be regularly updated 
during the operation of the facility. Implementation 
of decommissioning shall not be unjustifiably post-
poned.
Safety	principles	and	control
Safety of nuclear waste management facilities shall be 
kept as high as reasonably achievable and all actions 
justified by safety research and the progress in science 
and technology shall be taken into account to enhance 
safety. Nuclear waste shall be disposed of so that no 
radiation impact exceeding the currently acceptable 
level will occur in the future and so that ensuring 
long-term safety does not depend on the post-closure 
surveillance of the disposal site.
MEE determines the principles on the basis of 
which the nuclear waste management obligation is 
to be implemented. STUK is responsible for the safety 
judgement in authorization processes and for the 
control of the safe management of nuclear and other 
radioactive waste. The construction and operation 
licences for waste management facilities are prepared 
by MEE and granted by the Government.
Discharges from nuclear facilities
Some liquid and airborne discharges arise from the 
operation of nuclear facilities. The discharge limits 
are specific to nuclides or nuclide groups and they 
are in conformity with the dose constraint of 0.1 
mSv per year to the member of the critical group 
among the general public.
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Radioactive waste from medical 
use, research and industry
For small user waste, constraints for disposal in 
landfill or sewage system are provided in Guide ST 
6.2. The criteria are based on the triviality of the 
dose as above in the case of clearance of nuclear 
waste.
According to Guide ST 6.2, liquid waste can be 
disposed of into a sewage system and solid waste 
can be delivered to a landfill site or an incineration 
plant, if the activities are below the nuclide specific 
limits based on the Annual Limit on Intake values. 
The upper level of radioactivity for a sealed source 
eligible to be considered as solid waste and within 
these activity limits is 100 kBq. Sealed sources 
with higher radionuclide content and other ra-
dioactive waste not eligible for disposal to landfill 
have	to	be	delivered	to	a	site	approved	by	STUK	for	
storage and disposal.
B.32.2 Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policy
Main regulations in the field of nuclear ener gy are 
the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the Radiation 
Act and Decree, the Decisions of the Government, 
and the Government Decrees as well as the 
Regulatory	 guides	 (yVL	 guides)	 issued	 by	 the	
Radiation	 and	Nuclear	 Safety	Authority	 (STUK).	
Besides that, the long-term objectives for spent fuel 
and nuclear waste management are given in the 
decisions by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. The most essential safety regulations 
and guides are listed in Annex L.5. The legislative 
and regulatory measures to fulfil the obligations 
of the Convention were dis cussed in detail in the 
previous national reports by Finland related to 
the Joint Convention. It was concluded that the 
Finnish regulatory framework fulfils the obliga-
tions of the Convention, and also the objectives of 
the Convention are complied with. There has been 
no change in the spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management policy during 2008-2010. A summary 
of the spent fuel and radioactive waste manage-
ment policies are given in Text Box 1 below and a 
more detailed text is reproduced in Annex L.8.
B.32.3 Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management practices and plans
The management practices for nuclear waste and 
other radioactive waste are described in detail be-
low. A concise overview of the management strate-
gies is given in Text Box 2.
The main producers of nuclear waste are the 
NPP utilities Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). They take care 
of interim storage of spent fuel, conditioning and 
disposal of low and intermediate level waste and of 
planning for the decommissioning of the NPPs.
TVO and FPH have formed a joint company, 
Posiva Oy, which is responsible for the prepara-
tions for and later implementation of their spent 
fuel disposal. The disposal project covers currently 
spent fuel from the four reactors in operation, from 
the one under construction (Olkiluoto 3) and from 
the one under planning (Olkiluoto 4) but not from 
Fennovoima’s future reactor.
The operator of the research reactor, the VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland has facilities 
for storage of it’s spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
Producers of other radioactive waste perform some 
waste management operations, such as initial stor-
age, clearance and disposal into landfill type sites. 
Small user waste that cannot be cleared, or, in the 
case of sealed sources, returned to the manufac-
turer,	must	be	handed	over	to	STUK	against	a	fee	
that covers the interim storage and later disposal 
of the waste.
Spent fuel management
Spent nuclear fuel from NPPs is stored at the pow-
er plant sites until it will be disposed of. Initially, 
the fuel is cooled for one to five years in reac-
tor pools. The Loviisa NPP has, in addition to the 
pools in the reactor buildings, an integrated pool 
type storage facility. The latest enlargement of the 
storage facility was commissioned in 2001. The in-
stallation of dense fuel racks was started in 2007 
and will continue until 2018. The allowable total 
arising of spent fuel according to the renewed op-
erating	licence	issued	in	2007	is	1100	tU	and	the	
storage capacity will be adequate until the start of 
disposal of the spent fuel.
At the Olkiluoto plant the spent fuel is, after 
cooling in the pools at the reactor buildings, trans-
ferred to an on-site facility, commissioned in 1987, 
with	a	capacity	of	about	1200	tU.	The	current	capac-
ity is adequate until early 2014. TVO has started 
the construction works for enlarging the Olkiluoto 
interim storage in autumn 2010. The extension in-
cludes construction of three new storage pools and 
STUK-B 138
21
SECTION B Policies and practices
Nuclear	and	other	radioactive	
waste	management	strategy
Responsibilities
Current and future producers of nuclear waste (the 
NPP utilities TVO, FPH and FV) take care of interim 
storage of spent fuel, conditioning and disposal of 
low and intermediate level waste and of planning for 
and implementation of the decommissioning of the 
NPPs. A company, Posiva Oy, jointly owned by FPH 
and TVO, is responsible for the preparations for and 
later implementation of spent fuel disposal. As an 
operator of the research reactor FiR 1, VTT is respon-
sible for planning and implementation of the waste 
management and decommissioning of the facility. 
Fennovoima is responsible for its own spent fuel dis-
posal as well as for other nuclear waste management 
and decommissioning activities.
Producers of other radioactive waste manage their 
waste within the limits of their technical capability 
and ensuring safety and security. Small user waste 
that cannot be cleared, including spent sealed sources 
that cannot be returned to the manufacturer, must be 
handed over to STUK against a fee that covers the 
interim storage and later disposal of the waste.
Waste	management	and	
decommissioning	objectives
Such low and intermediate level nuclear waste that 
meets the acceptance criteria for the repositories at 
the NPP sites will be disposed of without unnecessary 
delays. Waste that cannot yet be disposed of is stored 
safely. Also other low and intermediate level waste, 
such as decommissioning waste and small user waste, 
is envisaged to be disposed of in the rock cavern re-
positories at the NPP sites.
Disposal of TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is un-
der preparation in accordance with a strategic plan 
which is in line with the 1983 Government Policy 
Decision and the 2003 Decision of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. The goal for starting the disposal 
operations is the year 2020. The spent fuel disposal 
programme is subject to continuous regulatory review. 
The prospective nuclear utility Fennovoima must by 
2016, either reach an agreement on co-operation on 
disposal of its spent fuel with the owners of Posiva Oy 
or present an Environmental Impact Programme for 
a disposal facility of its own.
The implementation of decommissioning of the 
NPPs will be optimized taking into account the tech-
nical aspects, radiological impact, future use of the 
site, availability of competent workforce and the costs. 
The strategy takes advantage of options for clearance 
of very low level waste and structures of the plant and 
on-site disposal of decommissioning waste.
Financial	liability	system
A financing system for the costs of future waste man-
agement and decommissioning exists to ensure that 
the producers of nuclear waste bear their full finan-
cial liability on the coverage of those costs and that 
the costs can be covered even in case of insolvency 
of the waste generator. The pertinent licence-holders 
submit at three years intervals for regulatory review 
the technical plans and cost calculations on which the 
liability estimates are based. After confirmation of the 
financial liabilities, the licensees pay fees to a State 
controlled fund and provide securities for the liability 
not yet covered by the funded money.
it will be carried out according the updated safe-
ty	 requirements	 (government	 Decree	 733/2008),	
which requires among other things that design has 
to withstand large airplane impact. Extension has 
been	 included	 in	 Olkiluoto	NPP	 1&2	 operational	
licence and has been processed as a plant modifica-
tion. The extension has been planned to be ready 
at the end of 2013. Storage of spent fuel from the 
Olkiluoto 3 unit, scheduled to start operation in 
2013 has been taken into account in the design of 
the extension of the storage.
The nuclear energy legislation provides for dis-
posal of nuclear waste into the Finnish bedrock. 
Posiva is implementing the spent fuel disposal pro-
gramme on behalf of its owners with the following 
main goals, which are in line with the Government 
Policy Decision of 1983 and a further decision by 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2003:
•	 Disposal site selection in 2000 (the Olkiluoto 
site was proposed by Posiva in the Decision-in 
Principle application of 1999; after a safety re-
view	by	STUK	and	approval	of	the	application	
by the host municipality in January 2000, the 
Decision was made by the Government in De-
cember 2000 and ratified by the Parliament in 
May 2001.);
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Figure 4. Timetable for the management of spent fuel from the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto.
•	 Start of construction of an underground rock 
characterisation	facility	(ONKALO)	in	Olkiluo-
to in 2004;
•	 A description in 2009 of preparedness for the ap-
plication of the Construction Licence in 2012;
•	 Preparedness for the application of the Con-
struction Licence in 2012;
•	 Readiness for operation of the disposal facility 
in 2020.
The various steps from siting until closure sched-
uled for the Olkiluoto disposal facility are illustrat-
ed in Figure 4. The construction of the underground 
rock	characterisation	facility	(ONKALO)	started	in	
July 2004 and the access tunnel reached the length 
(chainage) of 4565 m and the depth of 430 m at the 
end of 2010. Also two ventilation shafts and the 
personnel shaft have been constructed until the 
depth of 290 m. Posiva’s programme for spent fuel 
disposal	 is	 described	 in	 section	L.2.,	 and	 STUK’s	
regulatory control of the spent fuel disposal project 
in section L.1.
The current estimate for the amount of spent 
fuel to be disposed of in Olkiluoto is from about 
7000 to more than 8000 tonnes of uranium: 1020 
tU	 from	Loviisa	1	and	2,	2620	 tU	 from	Olkiluoto	
1	and	2,	2000	tU	from	Olkiluoto	3,	and	1400-2500	
tU	 from	Olkiluoto	 4.	The	 estimates	 are	 based	 on	
the expectation that the units Loviisa 1 and 2 
are operational until 2027 and 2030, respectively, 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 until 2038 and 2040, respectively, 
and Olkiluoto 3 until 2073 (Figure 4).
Before disposal, spent fuel of TVO and FPH will 
be stored in water pools (for current facilities for 40 
years on an average) and thereafter transferred to 
the encapsulation and disposal facilities which will 
be located at Olkiluoto. Spent fuel is planned to be 
encapsulated in copper-iron canisters. The canister 
design consists of a cast iron insert as a load-bear-
ing element and an outer container of oxygen-free 
copper to provide a shield against corrosion. The 
canisters will be emplaced in an underground facil-
ity that consists of auxiliary rooms and network of 
tunnels, which will be constructed at the depth of 
400 to 450 m in crystalline bedrock.
The annulus between the canister and the 
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rock wall will be filled with compacted bentonite. 
A schematic layout of the underground rock char-
acterization facility and the network of disposal 
tunnels at Olkiluoto are illustrated in Figure 5 and 
an individual disposal tunnel with two canister 
emplacement variants in Figure 6.
The preliminary designs of the encapsulation 
and disposal facilities, operational and post-closure 
safety assessments and summaries of site char-
acterisation were included in Posiva’s Decision-
in Principle application and in the supporting 
documents.	 STUK’s	 preliminary	 safety	 apprais-
al of the application was published in January 
2000. A Further DiP regarding the expansion of 
the encapsulation and disposal facility for the 
needs of Olkiluoto 3 reactor was confirmed by the 
Parliament in May 2002. The Decision-in Principle 
to extend the capacity of the disposal facility to in-
clude the spent fuel from one further reactor unit, 
Olkiluoto 4, was ratified by the Parliament in July 
2010. Posiva submitted description of its prepared-
ness for the construction licence application, along 
with their current drafts of construction licence ap-
plication	documentation,	in	2009.	STUK	reviewed	
this preliminary licence application material and 
gave a statement to MEE on Posiva’s preparedness 
in	September	2010.	STUK	 is	 continuing	 its	work	
on the subject, with the aim of producing a draft 
for a safety appraisal in middle of 2011 based on 
the preliminary material provided by Posiva. MEE 
gave its statement on Posiva’s preparedness for 
the construction licence application in December 
2010. In the statement some issues, for example 
transfers of spent nuclear fuel, retrievability, qual-
ity and maximum amounts of nuclear waste and 
nuclear materials were mentioned to be deficiently 
presented or outdated in the documents delivered 
to MEE by Posiva. According to the MEEs state-
ment, Posiva shall take all the comments present-
ed in the statement into account in preparation 
of the construction licence application documents. 
Periodic updates of the design of the facilities and 
the components of the post-closure Safety Case 
have been published by Posiva and reviewed by 
STUK	 as	 described	 in	 section	 L.1.	 Posiva’s	 pro-
gramme for spent fuel disposal is presented in 
section L.2.
Posiva Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy published in September 2009 
the triennial overview of the status and plans for 
Figure 5. A schematic presentation of the layout of the underground rock characterization facility and the network 
of disposal tunnels (KBS3-V option).
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Figure 6. Disposal tunnel and canisters with both the vertical and horizontal disposal options depicted.
R&D	and	 technical	 design	 in	 the	 field	 of	 nuclear	
waste management required in paragraphs 74 and 
75 of the Nuclear Energy Act. The programme is 
focused	 on	 the	 years	 2010–2012.	 STUK	 reviewed	
the programme with the assistance of an external 
team of experts and submitted statement to MEE 
in October 2010. MEE submitted its statement in 
December 2010.
Spent fuel of the research reactor FiR1 is stored 
at the facility. The decision on the further use of 
FiR 1 is dependent on the progress of boron neu-
tron capture therapy treatment at the reactor as 
well as on the outcome of the efforts to establish 
a, sustainable source of funding of its operation 
and maintenance. One option for the management 
of spent fuel is interim storage at the facility and 
later on, disposal into the spent fuel repository at 
Olkiluoto. Another option would be to return the 
fuel	 to	 the	 United	 States.	The	 operation	 of	 FiR1	
could be continued until spring 2016 without los-
ing the opportunity to return the spent fuel to 
the supplier. The operation licence of the reactor 
expires at the end of 2011. The operator has ap-
plied for the renewal of the licence for 12 years. 
During the licence period the decision to continue 
operation beyond 2016 will be made. The licence 
application was supplemented by a description of 
the applicant’s plans and available methods for 
arranging nuclear waste management, including 
the decommissioning of the nuclear facility and 
the disposal of nuclear waste, and a description of 
the timetable of nuclear waste management and 
its estimated costs. The dismantling of the reactor 
would start 2-4 years after the final shutdown and 
last about 2 years. The estimated amount of the 
decommissioning waste is 76 m³. VTT and Fortum 
are negotiating about the disposal of the opera-
tional and decommissioning wastes into the LILW 
disposal facility at Loviisa NPP. The total cost es-
timate for the waste management of the research 
reactor is 6.12 million €.
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities
Predisposal management of LILW takes place at 
the NPPs under their Operation Licences and oth-
er provisions. The wastes are segregated, treated, 
conditioned, packaged, monitored and stored, as 
appropriate, before they are transferred to the dis-
posal facilities.
At Loviisa, wet LILW (radioactive concentrates, 
such as spent ion exchange resins, evaporator bot-
toms and corrosion sludge) are for the time being 
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Figure 7.  The Loviisa repository. a) Cross-sectional 
view of the repository for LILW and the planned exten-
sion for decommissioning waste, b) drums of LLW 
from reactor operation waste in the repository tunnel 
and c) an empty repository tunnel for solidified waste.
missioning of a solidification facility is expected 
in 2012 and the operation will start with the ce-
mentation of evaporator bottoms. At Olkiluoto, wet 
LILW is immobilized in bitumen before transfer 
to the disposal facility. Sludge, radioactive concen-
trates and spent ion exchange resins from liquid 
waste treatment in Olkiluoto 3 are planned to be 
dried in drums.
At both currently operating NPPs, solid LLW 
is, after conditioning, transferred to the disposal 
facility. Options for management of waste below 
clearance level are either general or case-specific 
clearance. Such waste can be reused, recycled or 
disposed at landfills. The Olkiluoto NPP has a 
landfill on site while the Loviisa NPP has an agree-
ment with a regional landfill to dispose of cleared 
waste.
Activated metal waste consists of irradiated 
components and devices that have been removed 
from inside of the reactor vessel. So far this kind 
of highly activated waste has not been conditioned 
but is stored at the NPPs and is expected to be 
conditioned and disposed of together with decom-
missioning waste of similar type.
According to the strategy adopted by Finnish 
nuclear operators, low and intermediate level 
wastes from reactor operations are disposed of in 
the bedrock at the power plant sites. The construc-
tion of the repository at the Olkiluoto site began 
in 1988 and the operation in 1992. At Loviisa, the 
construction of the repository was started in 1993 
and the operation of the first phase of the disposal 
facility was started in 1998.
The Loviisa repository is located at the depth 
of approximately 110 m in granite bedrock. The re-
pository consists of two tunnels for solid LLW and 
a cavern for immobilised ILW (Figure 7). Inside the 
cavern for ILW, the waste packages are emplaced 
in a pool-shaped structure made of reinforced con-
crete. The enlargement of the repository for the 
disposal of LLW started in 2010. A new storage 
tunnel will be constructed and used initially only 
stored in tanks at the NPP. The plant uses an in-
novative selective ion exchange method to reduce 
the volume of liquid radioactive waste. The com-
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for storage. This storage facilitates the sorting of 
waste, allowing clearance from regulatory control 
of some of the waste. The tunnel is planned to be 
used later for disposal of decommissioning waste.
The Olkiluoto repository consists of two silos 
at the depth of 60 to 95 m in tonalite bedrock, 
one for solid LLW and the other for bituminized 
ILW. The silo for solid LLW is a shotcreted rock 
silo, while the silo for bituminized waste consists 
of a thick-walled concrete silo inside a rock silo 
where concrete boxes containing drums of bitu-
minised waste will be emplaced in. The LILW from 
Olkiluoto 3 will be disposed of in the same reposi-
tory. The repository will be extended in the future, 
to be able to receive all the waste from Olkiluoto 1, 
2 and 3 reactor units during the planned 60 years 
of operation of the units.
LILW generated from the operation of the re-
search reactor FiR 1 is stored at the reactor facility 
until decommissioning. Disposal of the operational 
and decommissioning waste from FiR 1 in the 
disposal facility at Loviisa site is under discus-
sion. The additional wastes arising from the FiR 1 
decommissioning were taken into account in the 
safety assessment by Fortum. However, no formal 
agreement or decision has yet been made between 
VTT and the utility.
Based on Fennovoima’s plans LILW will be col-
lected, stored, handled and disposed of at the power 
plant site. Fennovoima has made an early estimate 
on amounts of different LILW types based on 
three different reactor types. Plans include waste 
handling methods for dry, wet, liquid and metallic 
waste. LILW will be disposed of in a facility which 
will be constructed at a depth of few tens of me-
ters in the bedrock. Fennovoima also considers a 
surface based facility as an option for the disposal 
of very low level waste (VLLW). All the LILW and 
VLLW management plans are presented only on a 
principle level and they will be developed further 
within the next licensing steps.
Management of other radioactive waste
An applicant for a licence for the use of sealed 
sources is required to present a plan for the man-
agement of the disused sources. The two options are 
either	 return	 to	 the	 supplier/manufacturer	 of	 the	
source or delivery to the national long term stor-
age	operated	by	STUK’s	Department	of	Research	
and Environmental Surveillance. This role in op-
erating the storage is defined in Radiation Decree, 
Section 24 b. A private entrepreneur, Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka, takes care of the conditioning, 
packaging and transfer of the spent sealed sources 
and other small user waste and they are stored, un-
der	the	regulatory	control	of	STUK’s	Department	of	
Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation, in a cav-
ern attached to the LILW repository at Olkiluoto. 
Later, these wastes are planned to be emplaced in 
the silos of LILW repository. The Department of 
Research and Environmental Surveillance takes 
cares of the waste containing nuclear material and 
stores	it	at	STUK.	So	far	there	is	no	plan	to	dispose	
this type of waste. The organisational structure of 
     
Figure 8. The Olkiluoto LILW repository. LLW drums in the disposal silo (left) and cross-sectional view of the re-
pository lay-out (right).
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STUK	clearly	separates	its	duties	in	operating	the	
centralised storage facility from its functions as 
the regulatory authority for the uses of radiation.
A licensee can be exempted from preparing 
a waste management plan if the operations are 
arranged such that the activity limits regarding 
gaseous or liquid discharges or solid-waste disposal 
established in the Guide ST 6.2 are not exceeded. 
however,	even	in	this	case	STUK	may	order	moni-
toring of discharges and reporting thereof, if this 
is considered necessary due to environmental con-
siderations, nature of the work and the nature 
and amount of radioactive substances in use. In 
addition to being below the limits, all discharges 
to the environment shall be as low as reasonably 
achievable.
In practice, most of the wastes from the use 
of unsealed sources in Finland arise in such low 
activity concentrations or amounts that it is not 
necessary to arrange the final disposal of gener-
ated waste in the same way as e.g. for the sealed 
sources. A common practice is that radionuclide 
laboratories store their short lived radioactive 
wastes at their premises until they have decayed 
below the limits set for discharges in the Guide 
ST 6.2. However, some wastes resulting from radio-
chemical	research	at	VTT	have	been	sent	to	STUK	
for storage in Olkiluoto. In addition, the wastes 
resulting from studies conducted by VTT on reac-
tor pressure vessel material behaviour for Loviisa 
NPP are returned back for disposal in the Loviisa 
LILW repository.
All radionuclide laboratories are inspected by 
STUK	 regularly,	 every	 1–5	 years,	 depending	 on	
the type and size of the practice, with storage and 
other activities related to waste management as a 
standard item in the inspection agenda.
A specific waste issue is arising from disused 
smoke detectors. There are currently over 3 mil-
lion detectors in use, each containing about 40 kBq 
of Am-241. The disposal of an individual detector 
in normal municipal waste is considered, from 
the radiological point of view, as the optimum 
waste management option. However, the Council 
Directive	 2002/96/EC	 of	 27	 January	 2003	 defines	
disused smoke detectors as waste electronic equip-
ment subject to recycling requirements. Nowadays, 
a private entrepreneur takes care of removal of the 
radiation sources from recycled smoke detectors 
and	hands	them	over	to	STUK	for	interim	storage.
B.32.4 Decommissioning plans 
for nuclear facilities
No nuclear power plants are currently being de-
commissioned and such decommissioning projects 
are neither foreseen in the near future. The VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland has started 
a more detailed planning of the shutdown and de-
commissioning of the research reactor they operate 
as a preparatory action to the possible decision of 
the closure of the facility. The decision to imple-
ment the plan is dependent on the outcome of ef-
forts to arrange sustainable funding for continued 
operation.
The utilities have updated the decommission-
ing plans of NPPs for regulatory review every five 
years (latest updates were submitted in 2008). 
Since 2008 the regulatory requirement (Nuclear 
Energy Act, Sections 7g and 28) for the update 
period of the decommissioning plan is six years. 
The decommissioning plan for the Loviisa NPP 
(owned by Fortum Power and Heat Oy) is based on 
immediate dismantling, within eight years from 
shutdown while for the Olkiluoto NPP, a safe stor-
age period of about 30 years prior to dismantling 
is envisaged. The disposal plans for wastes from 
decommissioning of the NPPs are based on the ex-
tension of the on-site repositories for LILW. Besides 
the dismantling waste, also activated metal compo-
nents accumulated during the operation of the reac-
tors could be disposed of in those repositories. The 
engineered barriers will be selected taking account 
of the radiological and other safety related charac-
teristics of each waste type. A special feature of the 
decommissioning plans is the emplacement of large 
components, such as pressure vessels and steam 
generators, in the disposal rooms as whole, without 
cutting them in pieces.
The decommissioning plan of the research reac-
tor FiR 1 is also updated every six year, the latest 
update being carried out in 2010. Studies are under 
way on the technical feasibility of disposing of the 
decommissioning wastes in the LILW repository 
at the Loviisa site. The present operation licence 
of FiR 1 is granted until the end of 2011. VTT has 
submitted an application for the renewal of the op-
eration licence to the Government. VTT and Fortum 
continue preparations for additional technical ar-
rangements and to reach a formal agreement of 
disposing of decommissioning waste of FiR 1 in the 
Loviisa LILW repository.
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Article 3 Scope of Application
This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent 
fuel management when the spent fuel results from 
the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel 
held at reprocessing facilities as part of a reproc-
essing activity is not covered in the scope of this 
Convention unless the Contracting Party declares 
reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.
This Convention shall also apply to the safety 
of radioactive waste management when the ra-
dioactive waste results from civilian applications. 
However, this Convention shall not apply to waste 
that contains only naturally occurring radioac-
tive materials and that does not originate from 
the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a dis-
used sealed source or it is declared as radioactive 
waste for the purposes of this Convention by the 
Contracting Party.
This Convention shall not apply to the safety of 
management of spent fuel or radioactive waste with-
in military or defence programmes, unless declared 
as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of 
this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, 
this Convention shall apply to the safety of man-
agement of spent fuel and radioactive waste from 
military or defence programmes if and when such 
materials are transferred permanently to and man-
aged within exclusively civilian programmes.
This Convention shall also apply to discharges 
as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.
Finland has adopted the once-through nuclear fuel 
cycle. Thus, all spent nuclear fuel, after it has been 
permanently removed from the reactor, is in the 
scope of the Convention.
Airborne and liquid discharges from nuclear 
and radioactive waste management facilities, no-
tably from NPPs, are included in the scope of this 
Convention.
No radioactive wastes of military or defence ori-
gin exist in Finland.
Waste outside the nuclear fuel cycle, containing 
only naturally occurring materials (NORM-waste), 
except sealed radium sources, is not declared as ra-
dioactive waste for the purposes of the Convention. 
However, some experience with current practice for 
managing NORM waste and future plans for ura-
nium mining is reported in section H12.2.
STUK-B 138
29
SECTION D Inventories and lists
Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 2
This report shall (also) include:
(a) a list of the spent fuel management facilities 
subject to this convention, their location, main 
purpose and essential features;
(b) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this 
Convention and that is being held in storage 
and of that which has been disposed of. This 
inventory shall contain the description of the 
material and if available, give information on 
its mass and its total activity;
(c) a list of radioactive waste management facili-
ties subject to this Convention, their location, 
main purpose and essential features;
(d) an inventory of radioactive waste that is sub-
ject to this Convention that:
•	 is	being	held	in	storage	of	radioactive	waste	
management and nuclear fuel cycle facili-
ties;
•	 has	been	disposed	of;	or
•	 has	resulted	from	past	practices;
 this inventory shall contain the description of 
the material and other appropriate informa-
tion available, such as volume or mass, activity 
and specific radionuclides;
(e) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of be-
ing decommissioned and the status of decom-
missioning activities at those facilities.
D.32.1 Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management facilities
The locations, ownership, characteristics and in-
ventories of spent fuel and radioactive waste man-
agement facilities in Finland are given in the fol-
lowing tables: spent fuel storages in Table D.1, pre-
disposal waste management facilities in Table D.2 
and disposal facilities in Table D.3. More specific 
inventory data is included in Annexes L.3 and L.4.
D.32.2 Small user waste
The	 licensing	 database	maintained	 by	 STUK	 in-
cludes source-specific information on each sealed 
source in licensee’s possession. This information is 
updated continuously according to licensees' notifi-
cations and observations made during the inspec-
tions. Small users of radioisotopes have in their 
premises radiation sources which are no longer in 
use but have not yet been declared as radioactive 
waste. Except of four old Co-60 therapy or irradia-
tor sources ranging from 1 to 44 TBq, the activities 
in such sources are less than 1 TBq and typically in 
the range of 0.4–4 GBq (see also Chapter J.28.2.).
D.32.3 Waste from past practices
There are no significant amounts of waste from 
past practices requiring further management (see 
also Chapter H.12.2).
D.32.4 Decommissioning
No significant facilities subject to nuclear energy 
or radiation legislation are being decommissioned 
and no final decisions on such decommissioning 
projects have been made. In 2002, decommissioning 
of a sterilisation plant was completed in Ilomantsi, 
Eastern Finland. The highly active Co-60 source 
was transported abroad for reuse. There was no 
contamination in the facility.
The locations, ownership, characteristics and 
inventories of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management facilities in Finland are given in the 
following tables: spent fuel storages in Table D.1, 
predisposal waste management facilities in Table 
D.2 and disposal facilities in Table D.3. More spe-
cific inventory data is included in Annexes L.3 and 
L.4 and in addition, the annual inventories can be 
found in the IAEA’s The Net-Enabled Radioactive 
Waste Management Database.
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Table D.1 Spent fuel storage in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 620 (effective*)
Inventory (end of 2010): 500 tU (4153 assemblies, maximum burnup 45 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings 
Basket type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building 
Rack type pool storage in the NPP auxiliary building
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Capacity: 1555 tU (effective*)
Inventory (end of 2010): 1253 tU (6750 assemblies, maximum burnup 45 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Pool storages inside both reactor buildings Pool storage in a separate facility at the NPP site
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of spent fuel
Inventory (end of 2010): 4.20 kgU ( 23 elements, maximum burnup 23 MWd/kgU)
Essential features: Racks at the walls of reactor pool (10 elements waiting for cooling). After several years’ 
cooling time the elements will be transferred to the well type storage. Well type storage 
under the reactor hall.
* The reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage pool, for storage pool repairs and space for dummy elements are excluded.
Table D.2. Predisposal management of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, conditioning and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 1774 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW Pretreatment of liquid LILW Eight tanks, 
300 m³ each, for storage of liquid LILW Solidification plant for liquid LILW Two storage rooms 
inside the NPP for packed LLW (Dry) storage well and pool storage for unconditioned activated 
waste On-site light built storage hall for waste candidate for clearance
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 1272 m³
Essential features: Pretreatment, compaction and packaging of solid LLW 
Pretreatment and bituminisation of liquid LILW 
Four buffer storage rooms for conditioned LILW 
Pools storage of unconditioned activated waste 
Treatment and storage buildings at the site for unconditioned LLW
FiR 1 research reactor
Operator: VTT
Location: Otaniemi, town of Espoo, Southern Finland
Purpose: Treatment, packaging and interim storage of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 6 m³
Essential features: Storage room in the basement of a laboratory building
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Table D.3. Disposal of radioactive waste in Finland.
Loviisa disposal facility
Owner: FPH
Location: Hästholmen island, town of Loviisa, Southern Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 1682 m³ (0.45 TBq, dominant nuclides 60Co, 63Ni, 137Cs)
Essential features: Rock tunnels for LLW
Olkiluoto disposal facility
Owner: TVO
Location: Olkiluoto island, Municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Disposal of LILW
Inventory (end of 2010): 5315 m³ (64.0 TBq, dominant nuclides 60Co, 63Ni, 137Cs, 90Sr, 14C)
Essential features: Rock silo for bituminized ILW Rock silo for packed LLW
Storage for state owned waste
Owner: STUK
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of waste from small users other radioactive waste not handled by 
recognised installations
Inventory (end of 2010): HEU 0.825 g, LEU 536.2 g, NU 169.6 g, DU 12951.6 g
Essential features: Storage room in the basement of STUK’s building
Storage for state owned waste (recognised installation)
Owner: Suomen Nukliditekniikka
Location: Roihupelto, city of Helsinki, Southern Finland
Purpose: Buffer interim storage of waste from small users other radioactive waste not handled by 
recognised installations
Inventory (end of 2010): 0.8 m³ (0.825 TBq)
Essential features: Storage room in the basement of STUK’s building
Storage for state owned waste
Owner: TVO/Ministry of Social Affairs and Health**
Location: Olkiluoto island, municipality of Eurajoki, South-Western Finland
Purpose: Long-term interim storage of sealed sources and other small user waste
Inventory (end of 2010): 53.9 m³ (20.7 TBq, prominent nuclides: ³H, 137Cs, 85Kr, 241Am, 238Pu, not including natural thorium 
(53 kg) and depleted uranium (1270 kg)
Essential features: Rock cavern attached to the Olkiluoto disposal facility
** By an agreement made in 1996 between TVO and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the waste is stored in a separate rock cavern in TVO’s Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facility. The waste is owned by the State, with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health as the responsible organisation.
Table D.2. (continued)
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Article 18 Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the 
framework of its national law, the legislative, regu-
latory and administrative measures and other steps 
necessary for implementing its obligations under 
this Convention.
The necessary legislative, regulatory and other 
measures to fulfil the obligations of the Convention 
have been taken and are discussed in this report.
Article 19 Legislative and 
regulatory framework
Each Contracting Party shall establish and main-
tain a legislative and regulatory framework to gov-
ern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management.
This legislative and regulatory framework shall 
provide for:
(a) the establishment of applicable national safety 
requirements and regulations for radiation 
safety;
(b)  a system of licensing of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management activities;
(c) a system of prohibition of the operation of a 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility without a licence;
(d) a system of appropriate institutional control, 
regulatory inspection and documentation and 
reporting; the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of the licences;
(e) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bod-
ies involved in the different steps of spent fuel 
and of radioactive waste management.
When considering whether to regulate radioactive 
materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties 
shall take due account of the objectives of this 
Convention.
E.19.1 Safety requirements and regulations
In Finland, the legislation for the use of nuclear 
energy and for radiation protection was established 
in 1957. Since then, several amendments and new 
regulations have been issued.
Nuclear legislation and regulations
The current Finnish nuclear legislation is based 
on the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together 
with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 
1988. Nuclear energy legisla tion was updated 
and reformed in 2008 to cor respond to current 
level of safety requirements and the new Finnish 
Constitution which came into force in 2000.
The scope of this legislation covers e.g.
•	 The construction and operation of nuclear facili-
ties; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for pro-
ducing nuclear energy, including research reac-
tors, facilities performing extensive disposal of 
nuclear waste, and facilities used for extensive 
manufacture, production, use, handling or stor-
age of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes;
•	 Mining and milling operations aimed at produc-
ing uranium or thorium;
•	 The possession, manufacture, production, trans-
fer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear material and nuclear waste 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
A significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy 
Act was passed in 1994, to reflect a new policy that 
emphasises the national responsibility to manage 
nuclear waste generated in Finland. In general, 
the export and import of nuclear waste, includ-
ing spent fuel, is prohibited in the revised Act. A 
notable exception is allowed for the FiR 1 research 
reactor. According Nuclear Energy Act (Section 6a) 
STUK-B 138
33
the above provisions shall not apply to nuclear 
waste that has been generated in connection with 
or as a result of the operation of a research reactor 
in Finland.
In the amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act of 
2008, general safety and security principles were 
added to the Act. This was implied by the new 
Constitution requiring that the general principles 
for the protection of the citizens shall be given on 
the level of Acts.
By definition, the provisions for the use of nucle-
ar energy in the Nuclear Energy Act address also 
spent fuel and nuclear waste management. The 
Nuclear Energy Act sets forth the specific require-
ments on nuclear waste management (Sections 
28–34) and for the financial provisions of nuclear 
waste management (Sections 35–53). These provi-
sions address also spent fuel management.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the Govern-
ment issued in 2008 the following regulations:
•	 Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power	Plants	(733/2008)
•	 government	Decree	on	the	Security	in	the	Use	
of	Nuclear	Energy	(734/2008)
•	 government	 Decree	 on	 Emergency	 Response	
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(735/2008)
•	 government	Decree	on	the	Safety	of	Disposal	of	
Nuclear	Waste	(736/2008).
Finland is a Member State of the European 
Union.	The	implementation	of	the	Nuclear	Safety	
Directive	 (Council	 Directive	 2009/71/Euratom	 of	
25 June 2009 estab lishing a Community frame-
work for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations) 
may require changes in Finnish nuclear legisla-
tion. Also, the international peer reviews concern-
ing physical protection and waste manage ment, 
both carried out during the year 2009, may induce 
minor amendments to legislation.
Finland was active in the process of developing 
a proposal for a European Council Directive on the 
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
The European Commission published its proposal 
for the directive on 3 November 2010. The directive 
will be implemented in the Finnish legislation dur-
ing the next reporting period.
Some other minor amendments were also made 
in nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect 
changes of other legislation (labor safety, criminal 
code). Amendments in other national legislation 
have not caused essential changes to the regula-
tory control of NPPs nor to the safety requirements 
set for them.
Detailed safety requirements on the manage-
ment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste 
resulting from the production of nuclear energy 
are	provided	in	yVL	guides.	yVL	guides	also	pro-
vide administrative procedures for the regulation. 
yVL	 guides	 are	 issued	 by	 STUK,	 as	 stipulated	
in	the	Nuclear	Energy	Act.	yVL	guides	are	rules	
an individual licensee or any other organisations 
concerned shall comply with, unless some other ac-
ceptable procedure or solution has been presented 
to	STUK	by	which	the	level	of	safety	stipulated	in	
Nuclear Energy Act, Nuclear Energy Decree and 
yVL	guides	is	achieved.
The procedure to apply new guides to existing 
nuclear facilities is such that the publication of an 
yVL	guide	 does	 not,	 as	 such,	 alter	 any	 previ	ous	
decisions	made	by	STUK.	After	having	heard	those	
concerned,	 STUK	 makes	 a	 separate	 decision	 on	
how	a	new	or	revised	yVL	guide	applies	to	operat-
ing nuclear facility, or to those under construction, 
and to licensee’s operational activi ties as well as 
to other nuclear facilities related to nuclear waste 
management and disposal and to the research re-
actor. To new nuclear facilities, however, the guides 
apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references con-
sidered in rulemaking are the IAEA safety stand-
ards and WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association) reference levels as well as 
WENRA’s recommendations on storage and decom-
missioning of waste and latest statement on Safety 
Objectives of New NPPs. Other sources of safety 
information are worldwide co-operation with other 
countries	 using	 nuclear	 en	ergy,	 e.g.	 OECD/NEA.	
The Finnish policy is to participate in the interna-
tional discussion on developing safety standards 
and adopt or adapt the new safety requirements 
into	 national	 regulations.	 At	 the	 moment	 STUK	
has a set of about 70 regulatory guides in force. 
The regulatory guides have been con tinuously re-
evaluated for updating. Especially, for the needs of 
the new NPP being build the design requirements 
were thoroughly re-evaluated and updated before 
starting the project.
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After amending the nuclear energy legislation 
in	2008,	also	the	revision	of	the	existing	yVL	guide	
system has been commenced (see Annex L.5, figure 
L.5.1). The main objectives of this effort are the 
following:
•	 to restructure the guide system better to reflect 
the various areas of safety; at the same time to 
limit the total number of guides and need for 
cross-referencing between the guides
•	 to compile requirements concerning related 
safety issues to the same guide making it easier 
to use by the licensees and other stakeholders; 
also they will be coupled to the stage of licens-
ing process
•	 to rewrite the separate requirements in such 
a way that each requirement will have its own 
number, be short and clearly stating who-what-
when shall be doing something; requirements 
are expressed in shall-format, descriptive text 
is provided only when necessary
•	 when considering the requirements, special at-
tention is paid for the opportunities to limit un-
necessary prescriptiveness
•	 to update the contents of the regulatory guides, 
especially with the lessons learnt from the Olki-
luoto unit 3 project.
At the end of 2010 the status of the revision work 
was such that all the 38 planned guides were un-
der preparation. Especially, the guides on radioac-
tive waste management were finalized to the level 
of final draft and submitted for comment to the 
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety, which is 
the last step in the preparatory process. The work 
schedule is such that all the guides are planned 
to be issued before the end of 2011. After that, the 
implementation of new guides (most of them being 
NPP guides) is expected to take at least a year.
Legislation and regulations for 
the use of radiation sources
The Radiation Act and Decree were revised in 1991 
to take into account the ICRP Publication 60 (1990 
Recommendations of the International Commission 
on Radiological Protection). The Radiation Act 
and Decree were further amended in 1998, 2005 
and 2008 to be in conformance with the European 
Community Radiation Protection Legislation, in-
cluding:
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 96/29/EURATOM	 of	 13	
May 1996, on the Protection of the Health of 
Workers and General Public Against the Dan-
gers Arising from Ionizing Radiation,
•	 the	Council	 Directive	 2003/122/Euratom	 of	 22	
December 2003 on the Control of High-Activity 
Sealed Radiation Sources and Orphan Sources, 
as well as,
•	 the	 Council	 Directive	 2006/117/Euratom	 of	 20	
November 2006 on the supervision and control of 
shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel.
Detailed safety requirements on the management 
of radioactive waste, subject to the Radiation Act, 
are	provided	in	STUK’s	ST	guides.	The	responsible	
party running a radiation practice is obliged to 
ensure that the level of safety specified in the ST 
Guides is attained and maintained.
E.19.2 Licensing
The licensing process is defined in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facility 
is not allowed without a licence. The licences are 
granted by the Government. For a NPP, a spent nu-
clear fuel storage, a nuclear waste disposal facility 
or another significant nuclear facility the process 
consists of three steps:
•	 Decision-in Principle – made by the Govern-
ment and ratified by the Parliament
•	 Construction Licence – granted by the Govern-
ment
•	 Operating Licence – granted by the Govern-
ment
The conditions for granting a licence are prescribed 
in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 18–20). The 
operating licences of a nuclear facility are granted 
for a limited period of time, generally for 10–20 
years. In case the operating licence is granted for 
a longer period than 10 years, a periodic safety 
review	 is	 required	 to	 be	presented	 to	STUK.	The	
periodic re-licensing or review has allowed good op-
portunities for a comprehensive safety review.
Before a Construction Licence for a NPP, spent 
fuel storage, nuclear waste disposal facility or 
other significant nuclear facility can be applied for, 
a Decision-in Principle (DiP) by the Government 
and subsequent ratification of the DiP by the 
Parliament are needed. An Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) procedure has to be conducted 
prior to the application of the DiP and the EIA 
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Figure 9. Authorization of nuclear facilities in Finland.
report be annexed to the DiP application. A condi-
tion for granting the Decision-in Principle is that 
the construction of the facility in question is in line 
with the overall good of the society. Further condi-
tions are as follows:
•	 The municipality of the intended site of the 
nuclear facility is in favour of constructing the 
facility;
•	 No factors have appeared which indicate that 
the proposed facility could not be constructed 
and operated in a safe manner.
The entry into force of the Government’s Decision-
in Principle further requires ratification by the 
Parliament. The Parliament can not make any 
changes to the Decision; it can only approve or 
reject it as such. The authorization process is de-
scribed in Figure 9. In the DiP stage the full proc-
ess is required, while for the construction and oper-
ation licences the acceptance of the Parliament and 
the host municipality are not any more needed.
This procedure was first time applied to a 
nuclear waste management facility during the pe-
riod November 1999 – May 2001 when Posiva Oy 
applied for a Decision-in Principle for the disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel originating from 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The 
Government made the DiP in December 2000 and 
the Parliament ratified the decision in May 2001. 
The same DiP procedure was repeated in 2002 
and 2010 for the expansion of the capacity of the 
spent fuel disposal facility for the spent fuel to be 
brought about by the new reactor units Olkiluoto 3 
and Olkiluoto 4.
If the licensee intends to make such modifi-
cations in the systems, structures, components, 
nuclear fuel or operational procedures of a nuclear 
facility which could affect safety, the approval of 
STUK	for	the	modifications	is	required	beforehand	
according to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
112).
On the basis of the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
16), minor licences for spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management activities (export, import, transfer 
and transport licence and licences for operations) 
are granted by either Ministry of Employment 
and	 the	Economy	or	STUK;	 the	 licensing	author-
ity in each case is specified in the Nuclear Energy 
Decree.
The licensing system for practises under the 
Radiation Act is described in Sections 16 and 17 
of the Act. The use of radiation requires a safety 
licence,	which	 can	be	granted	by	STUK	upon	ap-
plication. A safety licence can be subject to extra 
conditions needed to ensure safety. In addition, 
the cases where a licence is not needed are identi-
fied, e.g. when the use of radiation or a devise is 
exempted.
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E.19.3 Prohibition of operation 
without licence
The Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act 
define the enforcement system and rules for sus-
pension, modification or revocation of a licence. The 
enforcement system includes provisions for execu-
tive assistance if needed and for sanctions in case 
the law is violated.
E.19.4 Control and enforcement
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55), 
STUK	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 regulatory	 control	 of	
the safety of the use of nuclear energy. The rights 
and	 responsibilities	 of	 STUK	are	 provided	 in	 the	
Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 55 and 63). The regu-
latory activities include authorization, review and 
assessment, inspection and enforcement, develop-
ment of regulations and guides, national registers 
and inventories, information and public communi-
cation.
The most important documents of the licensee, 
which shall comply with the regulations and other 
safety	 requirements	 and	 are	 reviewed	 by	 STUK,	
are the preliminary and final safety analysis re-
ports (PSAR and FSAR), technical specifications 
and	 the	 operational	 manual.	 STUK’s	 on-site	 in-
spections aim e.g. at verifying, that the actual 
operations at the nuclear facilities comply with the 
regulations and the documents of the licensee.
The Radiation Act (Section 6) provides that 
adherence to the Act and regulations issued in ac-
cordance	with	it	shall	be	supervised	by	STUK.	The	
supervisory	 rights	 of	 STUK	 are	 described	 in	 the	
Act (Sections 53–58).
E.19.5 Clear allocation of responsibilities
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9), 
a licensee, whose operation generates or has gen-
erated nuclear waste, shall be responsible for all 
nuclear waste management measures and their 
appropriate preparation, and the utilities are also 
responsible for the arising expenses.
The NPP utilities FPH and TVO themselves 
take care of interim storage of spent fuel, of 
management of LILW including disposal, and of 
planning for and implementation of the decom-
missioning of the NPPs. Their jointly owned com-
pany, Posiva, is taking care of the preparations for 
and later implementation of spent fuel encapsula-
tion and disposal. The DiP of a NPP granted to 
Fennovoima requires the presentation of waste 
management plans for spent fuel within six years 
from the ratification of the DiP.
The Radiation Act (Section 50) provides for 
management of radioactive waste from non-nu-
clear applications. The responsible party (i.e. the 
licensee or any company or organization which 
uses radiation sources in its practices) is required 
to take all measures needed to render radioactive 
waste arising from its operation harmless. In case 
where the practice produces or may produce ra-
dioactive waste that can not be rendered harmless 
without considerable expenses, a financial security 
shall be furnished to ensure that these costs and 
those arising in performing any necessary environ-
mental decontamination measures are met.
The state has the secondary responsibility in 
case that a producer of nuclear waste (Nuclear 
Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32) or other radioac-
tive waste (Radiation Act, Section 51) is incapable 
of	fulfilling	its	management	obligation.	STUK	oper-
ates an interim storage of radioactive waste, where 
limited amounts of spent sealed sources and other 
radioactive waste are received upon compensation 
covering their further management costs.
The regulatory responsibilities are discussed 
under Article 20.
Article 20 Regulatory body
Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate 
a regulatory body entrusted with the implementa-
tion of the legislative and regulatory framework re-
ferred to in Article 19, and provided with adequate 
authority, competence and financial and human 
resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its 
legislative and regulatory framework, shall take 
the appropriate steps to ensure the effective inde-
pendence of the regulatory functions from other 
functions where organizations are involved in both 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in 
their regulation.
E.20.1 Supreme authorities
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 54), 
the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy 
is the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
which has the responsibility of formulation of the 
national energy policy. The Act (Section 28) states 
that the Ministry shall decide, having consulted, 
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when necessary, the Ministry of the Environment 
in the matter, the principles on the basis of which 
the waste management obligation is to be imple-
mented. The Ministry prepares matters concerning 
nuclear energy, including the nuclear waste man-
agement, to the Government for decision-making 
and grants certain import and export licences for 
nuclear equipment and materials.
As stipulated in the Radiation Act (Section 5), 
which covers radioactive, non-nuclear waste man-
agement, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
(MSAH) is the supreme authority on the supervi-
sion of practices involving exposure to radiation.
E.20.2 Regulatory authority for 
radiation and nuclear safety
STUK	 is	 an	 independent	 governmental	 organisa-
tion for the regulatory control of radiation and 
nuclear	safety.	The	current	Act	on	STUK	was	given	
in 1983 and the Decree in 1997. According to the 
Decree,	STUK	has	the	following	duties:
•	 Regulatory control of safety of the use of nu-
clear energy, emergency preparedness, physical 
protection and nuclear materials safeguards,
•	 Regulatory control of the use of radiation and 
other radiation practices,
•	 Monitoring the radiation situation in Finland, 
and maintaining preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations,
•	 Maintaining national metrological standards 
for radiological measurements,
•	 Research and development work for enhancing 
radiation and nuclear safety,
•	 Providing information and publishing reports 
on radiation and nuclear safety issues, and par-
ticipating in training activities in the field,
•	 Producing expert services in the field,
•	 Making proposals for developing the legislation 
and preparing the decisions of the Government 
in the radiation and nuclear safety fields, and 
issuing general guides in these fields,
•	 Participating in international co-operation and 
taking care of international control, contact or 
reporting activities as enacted or defined.
STUK	 is	 administratively	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Social Affairs and Health. Connections to various 
ministries and governmental organisations are de-
scribed in Figure 10.
It is emphasised that the regulatory control 
of the safe use of nuclear energy and radiation 
is	 independently	 carried	 out	 by	 STUK	 and	 other	
Governmental bodies cannot take for their decision 
a	matter	that	has	been	delegated	by	law	to	STUK.	
STUK	 has	 no	 responsibilities	 or	 duties	 which	
would be in conflict with regulatory control.
STUK’s	 Advisory	 board	 was	 established	 in	
March	 2008.	 Advisory	 board	 helps	 STUK	 to	 de-
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Independent  regulatory and research organisation.
Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
Health
Administrative authority for 
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Ministry of the Interior
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Figure 10. Co-operation between STUK and Ministries and other governmental organisations.
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velop its functions as a regulatory, research and ex-
pert organisation in such a way that the activi ties 
are in balance with the society’s expectations and 
the needs of the citizens. Advisory Board can also 
make	assessments	of	the	STUK’s	actions	and	give	
recommendations	to	STUK.
E.20.3 STUK’s regulatory rights, 
competence and resources
STUK	has	 the	 legal	 authority	 to	 carry	 out	 regu-
latory activities. The responsibilities and rights 
of	 STUK,	 as	 regards	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 use	 of	
nuclear energy and the respective waste manage-
ment, are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree.	STUK’s	responsibilities	and	rights	include	
the following main regulatory activities: authoriza-
tion, review and assessment, inspection and en-
forcement, development of regulations and guides, 
national registers and inventories, information and 
public	communication.	STUK’s	responsibilities	in-
clude nuclear safety, nuclear safeguards and nucle-
ar security. The regulatory control is described in 
detail	in	guide	yVL	1.1.
STUK	does	not	grant	construction	or	operating	
licences for nuclear facilities. However, no such li-
cence	can	be	issued	without	STUK’s	safety	review	
and decision on the fulfilment of the safety regula-
tions.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 16), 
STUK	grants	safety	 licences	 for	 the	use	of	 radia-
tion.	The	regulatory	rights	of	STUK	are	described	
in the Act (Sections 53–58).
STUK	 has	 adequate	 resources	 to	 fulfil	 its	 re-
sponsibilities. The total number of the personnel 
(in the end of 2010) was 344, of which 139 are di-
rectly involved with radiation and nuclear safety 
as well as nuclear safeguards and security related 
regulatory	 activities.	 In	 recent	 years	 STUK	 has	
substantially strengthened and reorganized its 
competence, staff and external expert support in 
the area of nuclear waste management. New hires, 
including experts in the areas of geology, rock en-
gineering, disposal and encapsulation technology, 
and safety assessment, have brought the number of 
STUK	experts	to	19.	In	addition,	STUK	has	its	own	
R&D	programme	(see	Chapter	E.20.4)	supporting	
its regulatory needs related to nuclear waste safe-
ty, and has organized international expert support 
groups for safety issues of disposal site, technology 
and safety assessment. The organisation and staff-
ing	of	STUK	is	described	in	the	Figure	11.
In order to ensure the quality of its program, 
to improve safety, to promote international co-
operation	 and	 transparency,	 STUK	 organised	 an	
international peer review on its regulatory ap-
proach and activities related to the spent fuel 
disposal project in 2009. The results as well as the 
action plan with timetable for each suggestion and 
recommendation	are	published	in	STUK’s	website	
(http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/en_gb/palveluksessasi/).	
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Figure 11. The organisation of STUK and number of personnel in different units at the end of 2010.
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Since	 that	STUK	has	 continued	 implementations	
of the improvements.
The organisational structure and the responsi-
bilities	within	STUK	are	provided	 in	 the	Quality	
Manuals	of	STUK.	Also	procedures	for	regulatory	
control	and	other	activities	of	STUK	are	presented	
in the manuals.
STUK’s	 public	 communication	 is	 proactive,	
open, timely and understandable. Communication 
is a privilege and duty of all employees. Good 
cooperation with the media is emphasized in all 
communication. The general public and media 
can	 reach	 STUK’s	 experts	 any	 time,	 including	
nights, weekends and holidays. A prerequisite for 
successful	communication	is	that	STUK	is	known	
among media and general public and the infor-
mation	 given	 by	 STUK	 is	 regarded	 as	 truthful.	
Communication is always based on best available 
information. Even sensitive matters are openly 
communicated.	 STUK’s	 web	 site	 is	 an	 important	
tool	in	communication.	In	recent	years	STUK	has	
published various information materials and a se-
ries of books on radiation and nuclear safety. The 
books are intended to be used as handbooks for 
those who work in the field and for students.
STUK	is	participating	actively	in	European	and	
international co-operation in the field of nuclear 
waste	 and	 radiation	 safety.	 STUK’s	 experts	 par-
ticipated	 in	 the	 OECD/NEA,	 IAEA,	 IRPA,	 ICRP	
and	European	Commission	expert	groups.	STUK	is	
also involved in the work of European Commission 
through European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group (ENSREG) and its waste management 
sub-group, Atomic Questions Group, NRWG, 
CONCERT and RAMG-related PHARE- and INSC 
programmes, EBRD as well as through Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Association WENRA. 
In addition, there is regulatory co-operation with 
neighbouring Nordic countries, Lithuania, Estonia 
and Russia. With respect to the latter, cooperation 
is both bilateral and through the multinational 
Contact Expert Group (CEG) under the IAEA aus-
pices.
In the area of regulatory control of waste man-
agement,	STUK	receives	about	10%	of	its	financial	
resources through the Government budget. Per 
legislation, the licence holders pay the regulatory 
expenses	to	STUK.	In	2010	the	costs	of	the	regula-
tory control of nuclear safety were 16.5 million €. 
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were 
18.1 million €. Thus the share of activities subject 
to	a	charge	was	91.2	%.
E.20.4 Regulatory support organisations
The	main	technical	support	organisation	of	STUK	
in the field of nuclear energy is the VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland. In VTT and other 
governmental	or	University	institutes,	tens	of	ex-
perts are working in the area of safety of nuclear 
power plants as well as spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste management.
Three international expert groups have been 
established	by	STUK	 to	 support	STUK’s	decision	
making process for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel issues and reviews. The groups are for the 
site investigations (SONEx), engineered barrier 
(AEgIS)	and	safety	analysis	(SAFARI).	STUK	also	
use other national or international experts in 
other areas of waste management and disposal if 
needed.
There	are	three	main	R&D	programs	on	nuclear	
waste management in Finland with the following 
main features:
•	 The program of Posiva Oy; the program is 
mainly aimed at planning and implementing 
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland;
•	 The	 program	 of	 STUK;	 aimed	 at	 supporting	
the	regulatory	decision	making	of	STUK	while	
regulating Posiva and the power companies;
•	 The	KyT	program	administrated	by	the	MEE;	
KyT	program	(KyT2014	Programme)	is	aimed	
at supporting the further development and 
maintenance of the overall national competence 
and the sufficient and comprehensive expertise 
needed for regulatory purposes, and at assess-
ing alternative solutions for long term manage-
ment of spent fuel.
Additionally, the NPP utilities FPH and TVO have 
their	own	R&D	programs	for	low	and	medium	ac-
tive	wastes	(treatment,	conditioning/solidification,	
storage, and disposal) and decommissioning of nu-
clear power plants.
The framework programme (in Finnish and 
in	English)	 for	KyT2014	can	be	 found	at	website	
http://www.tem.fi/files/28692/TEM_72_2010_netti.
pdf.	 An	 international	 peer	 review	 of	 the	 KyT	
Programme will be organised by the MEE in 2012.
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Reports on the regulatory control of nuclear and 
radiation safety, including radioactive waste man-
agement, are published annually.
STUK’s	Advisory	Commission	on	Nuclear	Safety	
has been established by a separate decree in 1998. 
The	Advisory	Commission	helps	STUK	to	develop	
its functions as a regulatory, research and expert 
organisation in such a way that the activi ties are 
in balance with the society’s expectations and 
the needs of the citizens. Advisory Commission 
can	also	make	assessments	of	the	STUK’s	actions	
and	 give	 recommendations	 to	 STUK.	 It	 has	 two	
Committees, one for nuclear waste safety (NWSC) 
and one for reactor safety (RSC). In addition, an 
Advisory Commission on Radiation Safety has 
been established for advis ing the Ministry for 
Health and Social Affairs. The members of the 
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety and the 
Advisory Commission on Radiation Safety (STN) 
are nominated by the Government.
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Article 21 Responsibility of the 
licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime 
responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radio-
active waste management rests with the holder of 
the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets 
its responsibility.
If there is no such licence holder or other re-
sponsible party, the responsibility rests with the 
Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the 
spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
According to the Act (Section 9) each licensee, 
whose operations generate or have generated nu-
clear waste is responsible for all nuclear waste 
management measures and their appropriate 
preparation, and is responsible for their costs. If 
the licence holder is found not to be capable to 
carry out the waste management completely or 
partly, the Government shall order that such nu-
clear waste be transferred to the responsibility of 
the State. The waste management obligation of 
the licensee will expire when the disposal of nu-
clear	 waste	 has	 been	 completed	 and	 STUK	 has	
confirmed that the nuclear waste is permanently 
disposed of in an approved manner (Sections 31-
34 of the Nuclear Energy Act). Furthermore, the 
licensee is responsible for such physical protection 
and emergency preparedness arrangements and 
other necessary arrangements for limitation of nu-
clear damages. Authorities control these arrange-
ments, but the responsibilities belong to the licen-
sees. To ensure that the financial liability for the 
future management and disposal of nuclear wastes 
and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
is covered, the licensees under a waste manage-
ment obligation shall fulfil the financial provision 
obligation by payments into the National Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund, and shall furnish the 
State with securities as a precaution against insol-
vency. The Nuclear Waste Management Fund is in-
dependent of the State budget, but it is controlled 
and administered by the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy.
As a precondition for granting a safety li-
cence for the use of radiation the Radiation Act 
requires (Section 16) that the applicant presents 
a valid proof on safe management of any radio-
active waste, which may be generated. Further, 
the Radiation Act (Section 50) provides that the 
responsible party shall organize the practice so 
that it meets all radiation safety requirements pre-
scribed in the Act and take all measures needed to 
render radioactive waste arising from its operation 
harmless. The Act also provides for the responsibil-
ity of decontamination of the environment, if the 
radioactive material is released in such an extent 
that resulting health or environmental hazards 
requires action. According to the Act (section 50), in 
utilization of natural resources containing radioac-
tive materials, the responsible party shall ensure 
that radioactive wastes do not pose any health or 
environmental hazards during the operations, in-
cluding the final stages.
The Radiation Act (Section 51) provides that if 
the responsible party does not meet the require-
ments set for radioactive waste management, the 
State has the secondary obligation in managing 
the radioactive waste or residues. The same applies 
if the origin of waste is unknown, or no primary 
responsible party can be found.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to 
verify that the licensees fulfil their responsibilities 
set in the regulations. This verification is carried out 
through safety reviews and assessments as well as 
inspection	programmes	established	by	STUK.
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Article 22 Human and financial 
resources
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) qualified staff are available as needed for 
safety-related activities during the operating 
lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste 
management facility;
(b) adequate financial resources are available to 
support the safety of facilities for spent fuel 
and radioactive waste management during 
their operating lifetime and for decommission-
ing;
(c) financial provision is made which will en-
able the appropriate institutional controls and 
monitoring arrangements to be continued for 
the period deemed necessary following the clo-
sure of a disposal facility.
F.22.1 Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that his employees are qualified and authorised 
to their jobs. According to the Nuclear Energy Act 
(Section 19), a necessary condition for granting 
a construction licence of a nuclear facility is the 
availability of the necessary expertise. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), an operat-
ing licence of a nuclear facility can be granted if 
the applicant has available the necessary expertise 
and, in particular, if the operating organisation and 
the competence of the operating staff are appropri-
ate. Furthermore, a nuclear facility must have a 
responsible	manager	and	his/her	deputy	approved	
by	STUK	(Section	7k	§	of	the	Nuclear	Energy	Act).
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
set up in October 2010 a working group to pre-
pare necessary measures to ensure future nuclear 
competence in Finland. The 20-person competence 
group consists of representatives of government of-
ficials, regulators, research institutes, universities 
and industry. The recommendations prepared by 
the competence group will be published in autumn 
2011.
According	to	the	government	Decree	733/2008	
the NPP personnel shall be well suited for its 
duties, competent and well trained. Initial, com-
plementary and refresher training programmes 
shall be established for the personnel. For ensur-
ing safety in all situations, competent personnel 
shall be available in a sufficient number. The 
government	 Decree	 736/2008	 on	 the	 safety	 of	
disposal of nuclear waste includes similar re-
quirements. Accordingly, NPP utilities have special 
training programs including waste management 
for their personnel. Posiva has established their 
own training and education program to develop the 
resources needed in the geologic disposal of spent 
fuel. Staff training at Posiva is based on personal 
training and development plans and company-level 
plans which are updated annually. An elementary 
course dealing with the fundamentals of safety as-
sessment in nuclear waste management is a part 
of the basic training for all staff. Cooperation for 
professional development is carried out with the 
Petrus (Programme for Education, Training and 
Research	 on	 Underground	 Storage)	 network	 for	
specialized courses and training schemes e.g. in 
EC’s 7th Framework programme European Fission 
Training Scheme projects.
Along with the construction of the underground 
characterisation	facility	ONKALO,	increasing	em-
phasis has been put on training to meet with the 
requirements on nuclear and industrial safety, 
environment and quality at Posiva.
Posiva is co-operating with other European 
waste management organizations in the frame-
work of the Technology Platform for Implementing 
Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste (IGD-TP), 
established in 2009. In addition, Posiva has bilater-
al agreements or understandings on international 
cooperation with several research and implement-
ing organizations acting in the area of nuclear 
waste management. Posiva also participates in 
the 7th Framework programme of the European 
Commission and in various projects of the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the OECD.
The long time scales associated with the spent 
fuel disposal underline the importance of the avail-
ability of qualified domestic experts in the field also 
for the future. However, changes in energy markets 
and the fast development of technology will bring 
new challenges to the knowledgebase, and this re-
quires special emphasis by all the parties. Also con-
siderable share of Finnish nuclear experts within 
the regulator, the operators as well as in research 
institutes and universities is retiring early 2010’s 
and at the same time additional human resources 
are needed owing to the spent fuel disposal project, 
and the new NPP projects. The challenges are 
tackled by training young experts in the nuclear 
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safety field as a specific co-operation programme of 
all Finnish nuclear related organizations. During 
2003–2010 about 470 young experts have been 
trained during 5–6 weeks training courses empha-
sizing safety of NPPs including some basic features 
of nuclear waste management. The 9th training 
course will be organized in 2011–2012. The inten-
tion is to continue with the training course on an-
nual basis as long as there are enough participants 
who need the training. Training materials have 
been developed that can be used by the organiza-
tions in their internal training programmes as ap-
propriate and for self-study via distance learning 
including text book, overhead materials, exercises 
and video lectures.
The regulators together with the Aalto 
University	and	the	main	nuclear	related	organisa-
tions organized a joint pilot training course con-
centrating on nuclear waste management safety 
issues in 2010. About 20 young experts took the 
training. The intention is to develop the training 
course further in the forthcoming years.
In addition to these joint training activities on 
reactor safety and nuclear waste management, on-
job training and tutoring of young experts at each 
organisation continues to be very important and 
must be further emphasized in view of the forth-
coming increasing amount of experts retiring early 
2010’s.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 
55	and	7k	§),	STUK	is	responsible	 for	controlling	
the necessary qualifications of the persons engaged 
in	activities	important	to	safety.	STUK	has	issued	
requirements on staff qualification and described 
the respective regulatory control procedures in 
guides	yVL	1.1	and	yVL	1.7.
The Radiation Act (Section 14) prescribes that 
the responsible party is required to ensure that 
in safety related matters of the operations the ex-
pertise is available, taking into account the nature 
and the risks posed by the operation. The respon-
sible party shall appoint a radiation safety officer. 
In a licence application the applicant shall provide 
information on the competence of the persons 
working with radiation.
STUK	shall	 lay	down	 the	qualifications	 of	 the	
radiation safety officer and other persons, as appli-
cable, and investigate that these qualifications are 
met (Section 18 of the Radiation Act). The licensee 
shall provide appropriate training for the employ-
ees. The Guide ST 1.4 sets the requirements for 
the organisation for the use of radiation including 
the competences needed. The Guide ST 1.8 further 
sets detailed requirements on radiation protection 
training for the radiation safety officers and quali-
fied experts. The command that has to be demon-
strated by an exam includes a general part cover-
ing basics of radiation protection and the appropri-
ate legislation. Special requirements are attributed 
to different fields of applications of radiation.
F.22.2 Financial resources
The Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 35 to 53) provides 
detailed regulations for the financial arrangements 
for nuclear waste management and the Decree on 
the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund further 
specifies the financing system. Generators of nucle-
ar waste are every three years obliged to present 
justified estimates of the future cost of managing 
their existing waste, including spent fuel disposal 
and decommissioning of facilities. The Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy (MEE) confirms an-
nually the assessed liability and the proportion 
of liability the Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
has to reach (fund target). The waste generators 
pay annually the difference of fund target and the 
amount already existing in the Fund, but can also 
be reimbursed if the funded amount exceeds the 
liabilities. The waste generators shall provide se-
curities to MEE for the portion of financial liability 
that is not yet covered by the Fund.
For the FiR1 research reactor somewhat modi-
fied practices are followed. The state has initially 
provided the funds on behalf of the operator (VTT). 
In the future the State will take care of the pay-
ments to cover the difference between the Fund 
target and the amount already existing in the 
Fund.
The current estimates, including costs from 
management of existing waste quantities and from 
decommissioning of current NPPs and the research 
reactor, arise to about 2130 million Euros with 
no discounting (Figure 12). The total cost was in-
creased	by	about	12%	at	the	period	2007–2010	from	
the last period 2005–2007. This increase is justified 
mainly with the increase of the general price level 
and modification of the final disposal plan.
According the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19), 
a Construction Licence for a nuclear facility can 
be granted only if the applicant has sufficient fi-
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nancial resources. This condition shall be complied 
with throughout the operation of the facility. For 
example, the licensee shall have adequate finan-
cial resources to enhance the safety of the facility 
based on operating experience and the results of 
safety research as well as on the advancement of 
science and technology. In particular, as provided 
in the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), the opera-
tion of the nuclear facility shall not be started until 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy has 
ascertained that the provision for the cost of waste 
management has been arranged. Furthermore, 
the Nuclear Energy Decree (Sections 32 and 34) 
provides that the application for the construction 
and operating licence of a nuclear facility shall in-
clude information on the financial resources of the 
applicant, cost estimates and financial plan for the 
nuclear facility programme, as well as a descrip-
tion of the timetable of nuclear waste management 
and its estimated costs.
The financial provisions to cover the possible 
harms of a nuclear accident have been arranged 
according to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. 
Finland has participated in the international ef-
forts to revise the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
for Nuclear Third Party Liability in order to raise 
the funds made available by the Contract Parties 
in case of accidents. Accordingly, the amendment 
of the Finnish Nuclear Liability Act was agreed 
upon by the Parliament in 2005 but it is pending 
the coming into force of the amendments of the 
Paris and Brussels Conventions. The amendment 
includes an unlimited financial liability to licens-
ees. Because of the delay and unforeseeable time 
schedule with these international agreements, it 
has been decided in Finland to prepare a new, 
provisional amendment on purely national basis 
to substantially increase the licensees’ financial 
liability they have to cover by insurance and also 
to set the unlimited liability. This amendment is 
coming into force on January 1, 2012.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 19), the 
licensee shall furnish security to ensure that it will 
meet the costs of waste management or any decon-
tamination measures, if the operations are liable to 
produce radioactive waste that cannot be rendered 
harmless without substantial cost. The need to 
furnish security and the amount of it shall be de-
cided	by	STUK	when	the	safety	licence	is	granted	
(Section 15).
F.22.3 Financial provisions for post-closure
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 32), 
a condition for the expiry of waste management 
obligation of a nuclear waste generator is that the 
waste has been permanently disposed of in an ap-
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Figure 12. The fund targets (for the operating reactors) in the Nuclear Waste Management Fund and liabilities 
covered by securities. After 2012 the data are illustrative and take into account both the use of the funds for the 
implementation and additional inputs until the closing of the reactors.
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proved manner and a lump sum to the State for 
the further control of the waste has been paid. 
Thereafter, the State is responsible for the neces-
sary waste management measures and incurred 
costs.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 51), the 
responsible party and others who have taken part 
in producing or handling the radioactive materials 
or waste shall compensate the State for the costs 
incurred by the measures taken to render the 
waste harmless and to decontaminate the environ-
ment.
Article 23 Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance 
programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management are established and 
implemented.
Nuclear Energy Decree (Sections 35 and 36) re-
quires that a quality management system for de-
sign and construction as well as for operation are 
required	to	be	submitted	to	STUK	when	applying	
for a construction and operating licence of a nu-
clear facility, respectively. The general quality as-
surance requirements apply to the whole life of a 
nuclear facility.
According	to	the	government	Decrees	733/2008	
and	 736/2008,	 the	 organisations	 participating	 in	
the design, construction, operation, and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear facility are required to employ 
a man agement system. The management system 
shall aim at ensuring that priority will always 
be given to safety and that the requirements for 
quality management are commensurate to the im-
portance to safety of the action. The management 
system shall be systematically assessed and de-
veloped. The quality management system require-
ments concerning nuclear facilities are provided in 
the	guide	yVL	1.4	 reflecting	 the	updating	 of	 the	
IAEA guidelines and the recent development in the 
qual ity management in industry.
Quality	management	systems	of	 the	 licensees/
applicants and of the main suppliers are subject 
to	 approval	 by	 STUK.	 Furthermore,	 quality	 as-
surance programmes have to be established by 
all other organisations participating in activities 
important to safety of the use of nuclear energy. 
The implementation of these quality management 
systems	is	verified	by	STUK.	The	operators	of	the	
NPPs, FPH, TVO, and the waste management com-
pany Posiva have adopted quality management 
systems consistent with the ISO 9001 standard. 
The quality management system of the ISO 9001 
standard in TVO covers also the construction time 
of Olkiluoto 3. Moreover, FPH, TVO and Posiva 
have adopted environmental management system 
according to ISO 14001. Posiva has been granted in 
2010 an ISO 14001:2004 certificate.
Most of their contractors have also similar 
quality management systems and the others are 
currently developing their systems. The implemen-
tation of these quality assurance programmes is 
verified	by	STUK	through	audits	and	inspections.	
The Quality System of VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland has been granted in 2006 an 
ISO9001:2000 certificate that is regularly audited. 
Both NPP licensees have recently implemented new 
quality management systems. For the Olkiluoto 
3	 construction	 phase	 STUK	 has	 approved	 “The	
Quality	 Manual	 for	 Olkiluoto	 3	 Project”.	 STUK	
approved Posiva’s quality management system for 
the	ONKALO	facility	construction	is	2009.	During	
the DiP phases of Olkiluoto 4 and Fennovoima 
NPP’s	STUK	reviewed	the	management	systems	of	
the	licence	applicants	against	yVL	1.4.
STUK	has	a	Quality	Management	System	which	
consists of quality policy, quality manuals on differ-
ent levels, evaluation and assessment procedures 
and follow-up of development projects. The quality 
manuals contain the quality policy, description of 
the quality system, or ganization and management, 
main and supporting working processes and the 
personnel policy. The results of systematic internal 
audits, self-assessments and external evaluations, 
including international evaluations, as well as 
feedback from customers and stakeholders, are 
used as inputs for the development projects of the 
Quality Management System.
In	 addition	 to	 the	 main	 level	 STUK	 Quality	
Manual,	 all	 main	 functions	 of	 STUK	 have	 their	
own more detailed Quality Manuals. In the qual ity 
management system, the implementation of the 
process oriented ap proach was started throughout 
the whole organization in 2004.
The	 quality	 policy	 of	 STUK	 was	 updated	 in	
2008. In 2010, a new user interface of the Quality 
Management System was devised, based on certain 
topic areas in both the main processes and the sup-
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port processes. This was done to help newcomers to 
easily find the information they need on different 
topics. The earlier manual based interface is kept 
alive for those more used to that approach. All the 
manuals	are	stored	in	STUK’s	document	manage-
ment system, if applicable.
Article 24 Operational radiation 
protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility:
(d) the radiation exposure of the workers and the 
public caused by the facility shall be kept as 
low as reasonably achievable, economic and 
social factors being taken into account;
(e) no individual shall be exposed, in normal 
situations, to radiation doses which exceed na-
tional prescriptions for dose limitation which 
have due regard to internationally endorsed 
standards on radiation protection; and
(f) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and 
uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials 
into the environment.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
(g) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reason-
ably achievable, economic and social factors 
being taken into account; and
(h) so that no individual shall be exposed, in 
normal situations, to radiation doses which 
exceed national prescriptions for dose limita-
tion which have due regard to internationally 
endorsed standards on radiation protection.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime 
of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an 
unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive 
materials into the environment occurs, appropriate 
corrective measures are implemented to control the 
release and mitigate its effects.
F.24.1 Basic radiation protection 
requirements
Basic requirements for the safe use of nuclear en-
ergy are given in the Nuclear Energy Act. The prin-
ciples of justification, optimisation and dose limita-
tion are included in the Radiation Act (Section 2). 
Occupational dose limits and dose limits for the 
general public are set forth in the Radiation Decree 
(Sections 3 to 5). These limits are in conformi-
ty with the ICRP 103 Recommendation (2007), 
ICRP 60 Recommendation (1990) and the Council 
Directive	96/29/EURATOM.
According to the Radiation Decree (Section 3) 
the effective dose from occupational exposure shall 
not exceed 20 mSv per year as an average over 
five years or 50 mSv in any single year. Medical 
surveillance of employees of NPPs and other work-
ing places where employees are engaged in radia-
tion work is performed following Council Directive 
96/29	EURATOM.
The Radiation Decree (Section 6) states that de-
tailed instructions on the application of the maxi-
mum values laid down for radiation exposure and 
on the calculation of radiation doses shall be issued 
by	 STUK.	 It	 further	 states	 that	 notwithstanding	
the dose limits given in the Decree (Sections 3 to 
5),	 e.g.	 the	 1	 mSv/a	 limit	 for	 the	 general	 public,	
STUK	may,	in	individual	cases,	set	constraints	low-
er than the maximum values, if such constraints 
are needed to take account of radiation exposure 
originating from different sources and to keep the 
exposure as low as reasonably achievable.
F.24.2 Dose constraints
government	Decree	733/2008	includes	regulations	
for limiting the radiation exposure of the general 
public and the releases of radioactive substances 
into the environment, arising from the normal op-
eration of a NPP (including spent fuel storage and 
LILW treatment and storage facilities), as well as 
from anticipated operational transients and acci-
dents. The constraint for the annual dose of the 
most exposed individual among the population, 
arising from the normal operation or an anticipat-
ed operational transient of a NPP, is 0.1 mSv. The 
annual dose refers to the sum of the effective dose 
arising from external radiation within the period of 
one year, and of the committed effective dose from 
the intake of radioactive substances within the 
same period of time. The individual annual dose 
constraint as a result of postulated accidents is 1 
mSv, 5 mSv or 20 mSv depending on the type and 
likelihood of the accident. The dose constraints are 
defined for the entire NPP, including all nuclear 
facilities on the site. Thus the future operation of 
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Figure 13. Committed doses (µSv/a) calculated by STUK to members of critical groups in the vicinity of the 
 Finnish NPPs due to annual discharges of radioactive substances. The dose constraint is 100 µSv/a.
Olkiluoto 3 will not increase the applied dose con-
straints at the site.
STUK	has	 issued	 several	yVL	guides	dealing	
with radiation protection as regards the design 
and	operation	of	NPPs	 (guides	yVL	1.0,	 7.1,	 7.9,	
7.10 and 7.18). They cover also spent fuel storages 
and on-site waste management facilities, including 
the operational period of on-site disposal facilities 
for LILW. The Guides define the level of safety 
required and are the basis for regulatory review 
of licence application as well as for review and in-
spection during commissioning and operation.
According	 to	 government	 Decree	 736/2008,	 a	
spent fuel disposal facility and its operation shall 
be designed so that as a consequence of undis-
turbed operation of the facility, discharges of ra-
dioactive substances to the environment remain 
insignificantly low. The radiological consequence of 
an anticipated operational transient as the annual 
dose to the most exposed members of the public 
shall remain below 0.1 mSv. The annual dose 
caused by postulated accidents shall remain below 
1 mSv or 5 mSv depending on the type and likeli-
hood of the accident.
Notification limits for occupational collective 
doses	for	the	NPP	employees	given	in	guide	yVL	
7.9 is 2.5 manSv per 1000 MWe as an average over 
two consecutive years. A more stringent target of 
0.5 manSv per 1000 MWe as an average over the 
whole	 lifetime	of	 the	plant	 is	 set	 in	yVL	7.18	 for	
the design of a new NPP.
In	 the	 yVL	 guides,	 reporting	 requirements	
concerning exceptional situations including excep-
tional releases are given. Release rate limits are 
also given in the Guides, ensuring actions already 
before a release limit would be reached. The Guides 
also give requirements concerning monitoring re-
lease pathways and environmental surveillance.
F.24.3 Operational experiences
Experience gained from operation of Finnish nucle-
ar facilities shows that the dose constraints have 
not been exceeded, and that the ALARA principle 
has been followed. The results of environmental 
surveillance programmes show that the amount 
of radioactive materials in the environment of the 
NPP sites, originating from the Finnish nuclear 
facilities, has been very low. Calculated radiation 
exposures to the critical groups in the environment 
of the NPPs are currently less than one per cent of 
the dose constraint (Figure 13). The new NPP unit, 
Olkiluoto 3, will have advanced liquid and gaseous 
effluent treatment systems and it is expected that 
the discharges from the entire Olkiluoto NPP will 
remain at the current low level after the commis-
sioning of the new unit. It should also be noted that 
the dose constraints and actual doses discussed 
above apply to the entire operation of the NPP and 
the contributions due to spent fuel storage and 
waste management are insignificant fractions of 
the total exposure: the occupational collective dos-
es resulting from waste management, decontami-
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nation and spent fuel management activities at the 
both NPPs are of the order of some hundredths of 
manSv.
Article 25 Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before 
and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management facility there are appropriate 
on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. 
Such emergency plans should be tested at an ap-
propriate frequency.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps for the preparation and testing of emer-
gency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to 
be affected in the event of a radiological emergency 
at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management 
facility in the vicinity of its territory.
F.25.1 On-site emergency preparedness
The emergency preparedness plans for spent nu-
clear fuel storages and radioactive waste manage-
ment facilities are included in the plans for NPPs. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), 
adequate on-site emergency preparedness arrange-
ments are required before starting the operation of 
a nuclear facility. The basic regulations for on-site 
emergency preparedness for nuclear installations 
are	 given	 in	 the	 government	 Decree	 735/2008	
and	the	detailed	requirements	by	STUK	in	guide	
yVL	7.4.
The licensee is responsible for the on-site emer-
gency response arrangements. The Government 
Decree states e.g. that emergency planning shall 
be based on the analysis of NPP behaviour in 
emergencies and on the analysis of the conse-
quences of emergencies. Action in an emergency 
shall be planned taking into account controllability 
of events as well as severity of their consequences. 
Therefore, emergency situations are classified. The 
Decision requires also that appropriate training 
and exercises shall be arranged to maintain opera-
tional preparedness. Exercises shall be arranged in 
co-operation with the authorities concerned.
On-site emergency exercises are conducted an-
nually so that at least the licensee personnel, local 
off-site	emergency	management	group	and	STUK	
participate in them. There are always observers 
from	STUK	and	several	other	organisations	assess-
ing the performance of exercising teams. The sce-
narios have varied from severe reactor accidents to 
emergency standby events, which involve alerting 
nuclear power plant emergency organization to the 
extent necessary to ensure the safety level of the 
plant. Also exercises for combined fire and emer-
gency situations and the threat situation in the 
spent nuclear fuel storage have been arranged.
Concerning the small users, the Radiation 
Decree	 (Section	 17)	 stipulates	 that	 STUK	 has	 to	
be notified immediately in case of any abnormal oc-
currences, connected with the use of radiation that 
is substantially detrimental to safety, at the place 
where the radiation is used or in its environment. 
In	addition,	STUK	has	to	be	informed	if	a	radiation	
source has disappeared, been stolen, lost or other-
wise ceased to be in the licensee’s possession.
F.25.2 Off-site emergency preparedness
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans are 
prepared by local authorities. The requirements for 
off-site plans and activities in a radiation emer-
gency are provided in the Act and Decree of Rescue 
Services (2003) and in the Decree on Emergency 
Planning and Public Information issued by the 
Ministry of the Interior (2001, rev. 2007). Full scale 
off-site emergency exercises are conducted every 
third year at both Finnish NPPs. Smaller scale 
exercises are held annually at each site with par-
ticipation of the staff of NPP, local authorities and 
STUK.	In	addition	to	exercises	held	with	licensees,	
exercises with local, regional and national authori-
ties are regularly organised.
F.25.3 Early notification and communication
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions 
to inform the population in the case of an acci-
dent. In addition, written information on radiation 
emergencies, emergency planning and response ar-
rangements have been provided to the population. 
Such information can also be found in the tele-
phone directories of Finland. Citizens living near 
nuclear facilities are regularly provided with more 
detailed written information on nuclear accidents 
and protective measures needed during emergen-
cies.
STUK	 is	 the	National	Warning	 Point	 and	 the	
National Competent Authority in Finland for any 
kind of situation which might result in actual or 
potential deterioration of radiation safety of the 
population,	environment	or	society.	STUK	has	es-
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tablished an Emergency Preparedness Manual for 
its own activities in the case of a nuclear accident 
or	radiological	emergency.	STUK	has	an	expert	on	
duty for 24 hours a day, in order to be able to im-
mediately give advice to local, regional and govern-
mental authorities on needed emergency response 
actions. These actions can include, e.g. warning 
the population with a message which can be heard 
through all radio and TV channels. The message on 
an exceptional event (alarm) can be received from 
the operating organisations of the facilities, or au-
tomatically from the radiation monitoring network 
that is dense in the whole country, or from foreign 
authorities. In addition to the expert on duty for 
fast	emergency	response,	STUK	has	a	separate	24	
hour contact point for media.
Finland is a Contracting Party to the 
International Convention on Early Notification of 
a Nuclear Accident, as well as to the Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency, both done in Vienna 
in 1986. Furthermore, as a Member State of the 
European	 Union,	 the	 Council	 Directives	 and	
Regulations and Decisions concerning accident sit-
uations apply in Finland. In addition, Finland has 
respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
germany,	 Norway,	 Russia,	 Sweden	 and	 Ukraine.	
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed to 
directly inform the competent authorities of these 
countries in the case of an accident. Similar ar-
rangements ensure direct notification to the au-
thorities of Estonia. The bilateral agreements also 
cover the exchange of relevant information on 
nuclear facilities.
Article 26 Decommissioning
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resourc-
es are available;
(j) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to op-
erational radiation protection, discharges and 
unplanned and uncontrolled releases are ap-
plied;
(k) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to 
emergency preparedness are applied; and
(l) records of information important to decommis-
sioning are kept.
F.26.1 Regulatory provisions for 
decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) states that 
sufficient and appropriate methods for arranging 
the decommissioning of a nuclear facility have 
to be identified before the construction licence is 
granted.	 guide	yVL	 1.0	 requires	 that	 provisions	
for decommissioning of the NPPs shall be made 
already during the design phase. Limitation of ra-
dioactive waste generation and of the radiation 
exposure of workers and the environment arising 
from decommissioning shall be considered.
The general provisions for licensing and the 
waste management obligation included in the cur-
rent nuclear energy legislation are adequate in 
the present situation when no concrete decom-
missioning project is underway or foreseen in the 
near future. A few supplementary requirements 
were included in a 2008 amendment to the Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. The Government Decrees 
related to nuclear safety and waste management 
were also revised so that there are provisions ap-
plicable for decommissioning.
In	addition,	a	yVL	guide	 (yVL	D.4)	 including	
requirements for decommissioning is in the final 
stages of being published. This Guide will replace 
guide	yVL	8.2	 issued	 in	February	2008	on	clear-
ance covering the removal from regulatory con-
trol of materials arising from decommissioning of 
nuclear facilities and of previously licensed sites.
The licensees are responsible for the implemen-
tation of decommissioning. As described in Chapter 
F.22.2, assets are collected in the Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund, ensuring that financial re-
sources are available for the licensee to implement 
decommissioning. In the event that a licensee is 
incapable of doing so, the state has the secondary 
responsibility. In this case, the costs are covered 
by assets collected in the Fund and by securities 
provided by the licensees. The financing of decom-
missioning of the research reactor FiR 1 and the 
management of resulting waste is also covered by 
assets in the Nuclear Waste Management Fund. 
The decommissioning of facilities subject to the 
Radiation Act is covered by the security referred to 
in Section 19 of the Act.
F.26.2 Decommissioning plans
The four nuclear power units in Finland have 
been in operation for 30 to 34 years and they are 
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planned to be operated at least for two more de-
cades. No nuclear power plants are currently being 
decommissioned and such decommissioning proj-
ects are neither foreseen in the near future. The 
current licence of FiR 1 research reactor is valid 
until 2011. Nevertheless, the operator of FiR1, VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, has started 
more detailed planning of the shutdown and de-
commissioning of the research reactor as a prepa-
ratory action to the possible decision of the closure 
of the facility. The decision to implement the plan 
is dependent on the outcome of efforts to arrange 
sustainable funding for the continued operation of 
the research reactor. VTT submitted the operation 
licence application to MEE in November 2010. In 
that context decommission plan after the shut-
down in 2023 was also provided.
According to the Government policy decision 
of 1983 and later decisions by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (presently the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy), the licensees are 
obliged to prepare decommissioning plans for regu-
latory review and to update them every five years. 
These plans aim at ensuring that decommissioning 
can be appropriately performed when needed and 
that the estimates for decommissioning costs are 
realistic. The latest updates of the NPP decommis-
sioning plans were published at the end of 2008. 
Since 2008 the regulatory requirement for the 
update period of the decommissioning plan is six 
years.
The decommissioning plans include assess-
ments of occupational and off-site radiological safe-
ty of the operations. They include rather detailed 
descriptions of the required dismantling and waste 
management operations and estimates of work-
force and other resources needed. The plans are 
based on the actual designs of the nuclear facilities 
and they take into account the activity inventories 
in the facilities. The contamination levels in the fa-
cilities are followed by means of specific monitoring 
and recording programmes.
The cost estimates of decommissioning depend 
on the amount of waste to be disposed as radioac-
tive and thus on the limits to be applied for remov-
al of material from regulatory control (clearance 
limits).	guide	yVL	 8.2	 has	 been	 revised	 to	 cover	
also bulk amount of waste resulting from decom-
missioning and the premises for release from con-
trol of regulated sites.
The decommissioning plan for the NPP units 
Loviisa 1 and 2 is based on 50 years operation and 
immediate dismantling. Large and heavy reac-
tor components, e.g. reactor pressure vessels and 
steam generators, will be removed intact without 
cutting them in pieces. The advantages of the 
method are saving of time and reduction of oc-
cupational radiation doses. Activated components 
accumulated during the operation will be packed 
into the reactor vessels which will thereby serve 
as additional release barriers. The waste will be 
disposed of in an extension of the current LILW 
repository in Loviisa. (c.f. Figure 6).
The present decommissioning plan for Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 units was submitted in 2008. The plan is 
based on 60 years of operation and 30 years of safe 
enclosure to decrease activity of the contaminated 
circuits. For Olkiluoto 3, immediate dismantling is 
considered as an option as well. According to this 
timetable, dismantling of these three reactor units 
at Olkiluoto will be performed in one campaign, 
which is also seen beneficial. As in the case of 
Loviisa, the reactor pressure vessels of Olkiluoto 
1	&	2	are	planned	to	be	removed	and	disposed	as	
such, in one piece at Olki luo to site. The Olkiluoto 
4 unit, for which the Decision-in Principle was 
granted in 2010, will be included in the Olkiluoto 
site decommissioning plans in the future.
The decommissioning plan of the research reac-
tor FiR 1 is also updated every six years, the lat-
est update being carried out in 2010. Studies are 
under way on the technical feasibility of disposing 
of the decommissioning wastes in the disposal 
facility for decommissioning wastes at the Loviisa 
site. Negotiations are underway to reach an agree-
ment between VTT and Fortum to dispose of FiR 1 
decommissioning waste in Loviisa.
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Article 4 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel man-
agement, individuals, society and the environment 
are adequately protected against radiological haz-
ards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during spent fuel management 
are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
associated with spent fuel management is kept 
to the minimum practicable, consistent with 
the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in spent fuel management;
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with 
spent fuel management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
G.4.1 Scope and principal regulations
Finland has adopted the once-through strategy for 
spent nuclear fuel management as described in 
Section B. Spent fuel is currently stored at the 
NPPs while the operation of the final disposal facil-
ity for TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is scheduled to 
commence in 2020. The discussion in this Section is 
limited to the interim storage of spent fuel whereas 
the final disposal plans for spent fuel are discussed 
in Section H, Safety of radioactive waste manage-
ment. Fennovoima Oy will become a licensee under 
a waste management obligation when its power 
plant is granted an operating licence.
The general regulations for the safety of spent 
fuel storage are included in Government Decree 
(733/2008).	 More	 specific	 technical	 requirements	
are	given	in	guides	yVL	1.0	and	yVL	6.8.
G.4.2 Criticality and removal of residual heat
According	 to	 government	 Decree	 (733/2008),	 in	
handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel, main-
tenance of subcritical conditions, integrity of fuel 
cladding, adequate heat removal and radiation 
shielding shall be ensured with high certainty. 
guide	yVL	 1.0	 stipulates	 that	 a	NPP	 shall	 have	
sufficient rooms and systems for the safe han-
dling, treatment, storage and inspection of fresh 
and spent fuel. Fuel criticality shall be prevented 
primarily by the use of appropriate storage struc-
tures. Appropriate technical and administrative ar-
rangements are to be made during fuel storage and 
transfer to prevent fuel damage. Spent fuel cooling 
must be possible even if a single failure occurs. 
guide	yVL	6.8	gives	limits	for	the	effective	multi-
plication factor (keff<0.95) and coolant temperature 
in normal (<60ºC) and postulated accident condi-
tions (<100ºC). The technical specifications of the 
facilities give more detailed requirements for criti-
cality prevention and residual heat removal.
G.4.3 Waste minimization
Relevant to the objective of waste minimization is 
the	 requirement	 provided	 by	 the	 guide	yVL	 6.8	
that the storage conditions shall be such that cor-
rosion of fuel and storage equipment is minimized. 
The coolant shall be kept sufficiently clear and 
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clean to facilitate e.g. checking of fuel identifica-
tion. Requirements for safety related systems in 
the storage facility are also given. In Olkiluoto 
leaking fuel assemblies are placed in the fuel pool 
in hermetically closed capsules to minimize the 
Cs-activity in the fuel pool clean-up system and 
in effluents. In Loviisa, the cobalt content of the 
shielding	 elements	 (“dummy	 fuel	 elements”)	 has	
been decreased, which results in a smaller amount 
of activation products in the cooling water.
In Loviisa leaking fuel assemblies are stored 
normally in pools together with other spent fuel 
assemblies. Pool water samples are taken regu-
larly and no significant activity originating from 
the leaking fuel rods has been found from these 
samples.
G.4.4 Interdependencies
The Finnish once-through spent fuel management 
scheme provides that the fuel is stored in pools at 
power plant sites and is planned to be disposed 
in deep bedrock. TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is 
planned to be disposed of in Olkiluoto, in the vicini-
ty of the largest present interim storage. Spent fuel 
transport, encapsulation and disposal plans have 
been adapted to the fuel types and storages at both 
the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs. The plans have 
been adapted to take into account of the dimen-
sions and other characteristics of the fuel of the 
Olkiluoto 3 unit and need to be amended to take 
into account spent fuel from Olkiluoto 4 unit. The 
implementing organisation for TVO’s and FPH’s 
spent fuel disposal, Posiva, is owned by these NPP 
utilities. Thus, the interdependencies between dif-
ferent steps are taken into account in practice. 
Fennovoima is responsible for disposal of its fu-
ture spent fuel and is required to submit a more 
detailed plan for disposal programme during six 
years from NPP DiP ratification.
Though the current policy is based on the once-
through option, reprocessing of spent fuel would 
be technically feasible later on due to the long in-
terim storage period. The selected disposal concept 
would, to the great extent, be applicable to disposal 
of high level reprocessing waste as well. However, 
the present legislation requires that all manage-
ment of high level waste from NPPs, such as spent 
fuel, needs to take place in Finland.
G.4.5 Protection of individuals, 
society and the environment
The operational radiation protection require-
ments for spent fuel storage are discussed under 
Article 24. Operating experiences as discussed un-
der Article 9 indicate that spent fuel storage has 
caused practically no releases and occupational ra-
diation exposures have been very low.
G.4.6 Biological, chemical and other hazards
The biological, chemical and other non-radiological 
hazards posed by the spent fuel storage are low 
compared to the potential radiological hazards. 
Such hazards are regulated by legislations related 
to general occupational safety and management of 
hazardous substances.
G.4.7 Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
Interim storage of spent fuel is envisaged to last 
several decades. The current high level of safety 
can be maintained during that time by means of 
appropriate operational, maintenance and surveil-
lance procedures. The future costs of storage will 
be covered by the assets collected in the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund. Thus the future 
generations are adequately protected and they will 
neither be imposed to any other undue burdens.
Article 5 Existing facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to review the safety of any spent fuel manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Convention 
enters into force for that Contracting Party and to 
ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable 
improvements are made to upgrade the safety of 
such a facility.
As described in Chapter D, the existing spent nu-
clear fuel storages in Finland are at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs and are covered by their Operation 
Licences. In addition, under the research reactor 
licence 23 spent fuel elements are stored at the 
FiR 1 either in the reactor pool or in a well under 
the floor of the reactor hall.
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G.5.1 Safety reviews
The latest comprehensive safety assessments of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs, including the spent 
fuel storages, were carried out for Loviisa NPP 
in connection with re-licensing of the operation 
of the plant in 2006–2007 and for Olkiluoto NPP 
the periodic safety review was completed in 2008 
and	reviewed	by	STUK	in	2009.	A	comprehensive	
safety assessment for Olkiluoto spent fuel storage 
was	carried	out	in	2009	and	review	by	STUK	2010	
in connection with licensing the construction of 
storage extension.
The comprehensive safety assessments for ap-
plications for the renewal of licences include updat-
ing e.g. the following safety relevant documents:
•	 Final	safety	analysis	reports
•	 Quality	assurance	programmes	for	operation
•	 Technical	specifications
•	 Programmes	for	periodic	inspections
•	 Plans	for	nuclear	waste	management,	including	
decommissioning and disposal
•	 Timetable	 of	 nuclear	 waste	 management	 and	
estimated costs
•	 Plans	for	physical	security	and	emergency	pre-
paredness
•	 Administrative	rules	for	the	facilities
•	 Programmes	 for	 radiation	 monitoring	 in	 the	
environment of the facilities
•	 Licensee	 assessments	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	
regulations, including assessment of the fulfil-
ment	of	yVL	guides
•	 Licensee	assessments	of	how	an	adequate	safety	
level has been maintained
The periodic safety review report shall include the 
same update information, as appropriate.
The re-licensing safety reviews and statements 
of	STUK	given	to	the	Ministry	of	Employment	and	
the Economy concluded that, as regards radiation 
and nuclear safety, the conditions at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto NPPs comply with the Finnish nu-
clear energy legislation and regulations. In addi-
tion to the review of the above mentioned docu-
ments,	 STUK	 has	 also	 made	 independent	 safety	
assessments and annually a number of regular and 
topical inspections to the facilities.
The safety of the FiR 1 research reactor was 
reviewed in the context of the renewal of the 
operating licence in 1999. The present licence is 
valid until the end of 2011 and licence application 
for renewal of the operation licence was submit-
ted to the Government in 2010. The safety of the 
FiR 1 reactor is continuously reviewed by means of 
STUK’s	periodic	 inspection	programme	and	other	
regulatory	 control	measures.	 Under	 the	 terms	 of	
reference	 of	 INFCIRC/18/Rev.1,	 an	 IAEA	 team	
last visited Finland in 1999 (INSARR mission) for 
evaluating the nuclear safety and radiation protec-
tion at the FiR 1.
G.5.2 Need for safety enhancement
Continuous safety assessment and enhance-
ment approach applied in Finland is based on the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) stating the safety 
of the use of nuclear energy shall be as high as rea-
sonable achievable. To further enhance safety, all 
actions justified by operational experiences, safety 
research and the progress in science and technol-
ogy shall be taken.
In conclusion, the safety review required by 
Article 5 of the Convention has already been car-
ried out. Safety improvements have been annually 
implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
including the facilities for spent nuclear fuel han-
dling and interim storage since the commissioning. 
Also in plant modifications, e.g. the extension of 
the spent fuel storage facility in Olkiluoto, safety 
enhancements are introduced. Continuous safety 
enhancement means also that lessons learned 
from incidents and accidents elsewhere are analy-
sed and the identified need for improvements are 
implemented.
Article 6 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed spent fuel management 
facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
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(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 4.
G.6.1 Siting process and site-related factors
Spent fuel management facilities are nuclear fa-
cilities, either as an integrated part of a nuclear 
power plant or as separate facilities. All spent fuel 
management facilities in Finland are located on 
NPP sites except spent fuel interim storage of the 
research reactor. Requirements for the siting of 
a nuclear power plant and for an environmental 
impact assessment are provided in the Nuclear 
Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
application for a Decision-in-Principle has to in-
clude e.g.:
•	 An outline of the ownership and occupation of 
the site,
•	 A description of settlement and other activities 
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity,
•	 An evaluation of the suitability of the site and 
the restrictions caused by the nuclear facility on 
the use of surrounding areas,
•	 An assessment report in accordance with the 
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure	 (468/1994)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 description	
of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment. More 
detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(713/2006)	 on	 the	 Environmental	 Impact	 As-    
sessment Procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, includ-
ing spent fuel management facilities at site, site-
related external events have to be taken into ac-
count.	 government	 Decree	 733/2008	 provides	 as	
follows: “The safety impact of local conditions, as 
well as the security and emergency preparedness 
arrangements, shall be considered when selecting 
the site of a nuclear power plant. The site shall be 
such that the impediments and threats posed by 
the facility to its environment remain extremely 
minor and heat removal from the plant to the en-
vironment	 can	 be	 reliably	 implemented.”	 STUK	
issued	in	2001	a	guide	yVL	1.10,	“Safety	criteria	
for	 siting	 a	 nuclear	 power	 plant”,	 that	 describes	
generally all requirements concerning the site and 
surroundings of a nuclear power plant, gives re-
quirements on safety factors affecting site selection 
as well as covers regulatory control. Specific provi-
sions against earthquakes are provided in Guide 
yVL	2.6.
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other 
external events. The probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) required as part of the safety review for 
Construction and Operating Licences of nuclear 
power plants provides information on the esti-
mated frequency of and consequence brought about 
by internal and external events. For the spent fuel 
storage encapsulation and operations of disposal 
facility probabilistic risk analysis needs to concen-
trate on accidents that deterministically indicate 
potential for significant consequences.
In connection with the construction of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in the 1970s, princi-
pal safety requirements were defined for the siting 
of nuclear power plants and for the population 
density and human activities in the surrounding 
area. These requirements include also restrictions 
for industrial facilities and air traffic. In a sparsely 
populated country like Finland the safety require-
ments were quite easily and practically achiev-
able.
Assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and candidate sites
The Construction Licence for the Olkiluoto 3 unit 
was granted by the Government in February 2005. 
The construction is in progress. Site-related fac-
tors were evaluated and reviewed in connection 
with the Construction Licence procedure. Further 
clarifications have been submitted by the licensee 
during construction.
In 2007, initiatives for building additional nu-
clear power reactors in Finland were announced. 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) proce-
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dures were carried out for the possible Olkiluoto 4 
and Loviisa 3 units in 2007–2009.
A new nuclear power company, Fennovoima, 
was founded in 2007. The company started a pre-
liminary site survey process, mainly on the coast 
of the Gulf of Bothnia (the northern gulf of the 
Baltic Sea) and on the eastern Gulf of Finland (the 
eastern gulf of the Baltic Sea), the northernmost 
candidate site being 20–30 km from the borderline 
of Sweden. Fennovoima prepared an EIA pro-
gramme and subsequently an EIA report for three 
(originally four) alternative new candidate sites in 
2007–2009.
The EIA procedure did not reveal any major nu-
clear or radiation safety issues as regards the pro-
posed new NPP sites or new units on the existing 
sites. EIA was, however, a tool to cope comprehen-
sively with the environmental issues depending on 
the specific site (e.g. sea environment and eutroph-
ication, special natural species and phenomena, 
biodiversity, Natura natural reserve assessment, 
fisheries, salmon migration, combined heat and 
power production) and to increase the opportunity 
for citizens and authorities to receive information, 
become involved in the planning and express their 
opinions on the project.
Comments were requested from altogether nine 
countries near the Baltic See by the Finnish 
Environmental Ministry. Several comments from 
e.g. Estonia, Sweden and Germany were given and 
considered by the Finnish authorities. Additionally, 
the Austrian Government as a party of the Espoo 
convention sent their statement on each EIA and 
requested for consultation in Finland. Thus, sub-
sequent meetings were arranged in 2008–2009 at 
the Finnish Ministry of the Environment where 
a Finnish delegation of experts from the utility 
concerned,	STUK	and	the	Ministry	of	Employment	
and the Economy gave detailed explanations to the 
questions provided.
Separate applications for the Government’s 
Decision-in Principle for new NPP units were 
sub mitted in 2008 and 2009 by TVO, Fortum and 
Fennovoima. The relevant site-related factors po-
tentially affecting the safety of the planned new 
NPP units and the related nuclear facilities (in-
cluding spent fuel management and other waste 
management facilities) during their projected life-
time were again evaluated for the existing Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto sites and for the alternative new 
sites at Pyhäjoki, Simo and Ruotsinpyhtää pro-
posed by Fennovoima. In late 2009, Fennovoima re-
moved the Ruotsinpyhtää site from its application 
for a Decision-in Principle. The evaluations were 
reviewed	by	STUK	and	other	expert	organisations	
in their respective fields. In addition to the Finnish 
regulations, IAEA Safety Requirements and Safety 
Guides and WENRA re quirements were considered 
in the review.
Specific issues regarding the new sites are the 
size of precautionary action zone (5–6 km radius 
in Finland), the limitation of maximum population 
within it which may be affected in a severe acci dent 
situation and the possibility to evacuate the popu-
lation. According to the Finnish regulations, an 
early evacuation before an expected release shall 
be possible within a time of four hours from the 
evacuation decision. The population in the vicinity 
of the Finnish candidate sites is inter nationally 
compared relatively small (maximum of 3000 in-
habitants up to 6 km from the site at Simo). Three 
other issues which have to be taken into account, if 
the northernmost Simo site is chosen, are seismic 
conditions (similar to typical Central European 
sites), pack ice and the possible need of restrictions 
on	the	approach	area	of	the	Kemi-Tornio	airport.
All three Decision-in-Principle applications de-
scribe approvable methods for the interim storage 
of spent nuclear fuel. First the spent fuel will be 
stored in reactor building for few years and then 
transported to an on-site interim storage facility. 
At the Olkiluoto site it is suggested that either 
the existing pool storage facility will be extended 
or new one will be build. At the Loviisa site a new 
interim storage facility (either a pool type or a dry 
storage) will be build according to the application. 
In Fennovoima’s application both dry and pool type 
storages are described as options. Currently, there 
are no dry storages in use in Finland.
According	 to	 STUK’s	 preliminary	 safety	 as-
sessments, no site related factors were found at 
any of the sites which would prevent building the 
proposed new NPP units and the related other 
nuclear facilities according to the safety require-
ments.
G.6.2 Safety impact
The safety impact of a spent fuel management 
facility is analysed in safety analysis reports pre-
sented as part of construction and operation li-
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cence applications of nuclear power plants. The 
operating licences for nuclear facilities are granted 
for a limited period of time. For the licence renewal 
and Periodic Safety Review, a comprehensive re-
assessment of safety, including the environmen-
tal safety of the nuclear facility and the effects of 
external events on the safety of the facility, shall 
be	 done.	 STUK	 reviews	 the	 licence	 applications,	
including all site-specific safety reports.
G.6.3 Availability of information
The availability of information in case of the siting 
process for a major nuclear facility is based on the 
Finnish legislation on the openness of information, 
notably on the Act on the Openness of Government 
Activities	 (621/1999).	 Further	 requirements	 are	
based on the Act and Decree on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Procedure and the Nuclear 
Energy Act. The first step of consultation with 
the general public is the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) procedure. Public hearings are 
arranged both in the preparation stage of the EIA 
programme and during the actual assessment. The 
responsible contact authority for that procedure is 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. The 
EIA report must be attached to the application for 
the Decision-in Principle.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 13) states 
that, before the Decision-in Principle is made, the 
applicant shall make available to the public an 
overall description of the facility, of the environ-
mental effects it is expected to have and of its safe-
ty. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
shall provide residents and municipalities in the 
immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility as well as 
local authorities chance to present their opinions 
in writing before the Decision-in Principle is made. 
Furthermore, the Ministry shall arrange a public 
hearing in the municipality where the planned 
site of the facility is located and during this hear-
ing the public shall have the opportunity to give 
their opinions either orally or in writing. The 
presented opinions have to be made known to the 
Government. The Act (Section 14) provides further 
that a necessary prerequisite for the Decision-in 
Principle is that the planned host municipality for 
the nuclear facility is in favour of siting the facility 
in that municipality.
Århus Convention came into force in 2004 in 
Finland. It has not yet been applicable in Finland.
G.6.4 Consulting of Contracting Parties
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The Finnish policy 
is	(Act	468/1994)	to	provide	full	participation	to	all	
neighbouring countries, which can be affected by 
the nuclear facilities in question.
Notable events during the review period 2008–
2010 are listed below. Spent fuel management fa-
cilities are part of the nuclear reactor projects.
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Procedure for expanding the capacity of spent 
fuel repository was carried out within 2008-
2009. Public hearings on Environmental Impact 
Assessment Program and Report were organised 
by the MEE as the liaison authority specified in 
the Act. Several organisations made statements on 
both	EIA	Programme	and	EIA	Report.	STUK	gave	
its statement on EIA Programme in June 2008 and 
on EIA Report in January 2009.
In the assessment procedure with respect to 
cross-border environmental impact, based on the 
Espoo Convention, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment notified the authorities of the Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia and Russia about the project, EIA 
Programme and EIA Report. Sweden, Norway, 
Germany and Estonia participated in the interna-
tional hearing on the EIA report.
MEE issued a statement on the EIA report and 
its sufficiency in March 2009. EIA procedures for 
new nuclear power plant units and other related 
nuclear facilities were carried out within 2007-
2009. Public hearings on Environmental Impact 
Assessment Programmes and Reports were or-
ganised by the MEE as the liaison authority speci-
fied in the Act. Several organisations made state-
ments on both EIA Programmes and EIA Reports. 
STUK	gave	 its	 statements	 on	 the	projects	 as	 fol-
lows: EIA Programme for Olkiluoto 4 in September 
2007 and EIA Report for Olkiluoto 4 in April 2008; 
EIA Programme for Loviisa 3 in September 2007 
and EIA Report for Loviisa 3 in June 2008; EIA 
Programme for Fennovoima Power Plant in March 
2008 and EIA Report for Fennovoima Power Plant 
in December 2008.
Both Olkiluoto 4 and Loviisa 3 EIA reports de-
scribe pool type storage for interim storage of spent 
nuclear fuel similar to the existing storage facili-
ties for operating NPPs at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. 
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EIA report for Loviisa 3 also introduces dry storage 
as an option for pool storage. Fennovoima’s EIA 
describes both pool and dry storage as options for 
interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. According 
STUK’s	 statement	 both	 dry	 and	 pool	 storage	 are	
approvable and safe methods for interim storage.
In the assessment procedure with respect to 
cross-border environmental impact, based on the 
Espoo Convention, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment notified the authorities of the Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia and Russia about the project, EIA 
Programme and EIA Report. Austria, Sweden, 
Norway, Germany, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland 
participated in the international hearing on the 
EIA report.
MEE issued statements on the reports and their 
sufficiency as follows: EIA Report for Olkiluoto 4 
in June 2008; EIA Report for Loviisa 3 in August 
2008; for Fennovoima Power Plant in February 
2009.
Århus Convention will be applicable in the con-
struction license phase of new nuclear power plant 
units.
Article 7 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a spent fuel 
management facility provide for suitable meas-
ures to limit possible radiological impacts on 
individuals, society and the environment, in-
cluding those from discharges or uncontrolled 
releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a spent fuel management facility 
are taken into account;
(c) the technologies incorporated in the design 
and construction of a spent fuel management 
facility are supported by experience, testing or 
analysis.
Regulatory approach
According	 to	 the	 government	 Decree	 733/2008,	
several levels of protection have to be provided 
in the design of a nuclear power plant and on-site 
spent fuel interim storage. The general design of 
the nuclear facility and the technology used is as-
sessed	by	STUK	for	the	first	time	in	the	context	of	
review of the application for a Decision-in Principle 
and performing a preliminary safety appraisal of 
the facility. More detailed safety assessments are 
carried	out	by	STUK	when	reviewing	the	applica-
tions for construction licence and operating licence. 
Design is reassessed against advancement of sci-
ence and technology, when the operating licence is 
renewed.
G.7.1 Limitation of radiological impacts
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) 
the prerequisite for granting a construction licence 
is that the location of a nuclear facility is appropri-
ate with respect to safety of the planned operations 
and that environmental protection has been taken 
into account appropriately. The Nuclear Energy 
Decree (Section 32) requires that the construction 
licence application shall include a description of 
the effects of the nuclear facility on the environ-
ment and a description of the design criteria that 
will be observed by the applicant in order to avoid 
environmental damage and to restrict the burden 
on the environment. More detailed requirements 
are	given	 in	government	Decree	733/2008	and	in	
guide	yVL	1.0.
The limitation of radiological impact is dis-
cussed in more details in Section F in the context of 
Article 24 (Chapters F.24.1 and F.24.2).
G.7.2 Provisions for decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) states that 
provisions for decommissioning shall be included 
in the design of a nuclear facility. In the context 
of licensing requirements, the Government Decree 
733/2008	states	that	the	design	of	NPP	shall	take	
account decommissioning so as to limit waste vol-
umes, radiation exposure to workers and environ-
ment. The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 32) lays 
down that the application for a construction licence 
has to include a description of the applicant’s plans 
and available methods for arranging nuclear waste 
management, including the decommissioning of the 
nuclear facility and the disposal of nuclear wastes, 
and a description of the timetable of nuclear waste 
management and its estimated costs. More detailed 
requirements	are	given	in	guide	yVL	1.0.	The	re-
quirements regarding decommissioning plans are 
discussed in Chapter F.26.2.
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G.7.3 Tested technology
The requirement to use proven or otherwise care-
fully examined, high quality technologies is stat-
ed in the design requirements provided in the 
government	 Decree	 733/2008.	 Detailed	 require-
ments on the design of spent fuel handling systems 
are	given	 in	guides	yVL	1.0	and	yVL	6.8.	Spent	
fuel storage at the Finnish NPPs is based on water 
pool technology, of which extensive experiences ex-
ists worldwide.
G.7.4 Implementation during 
the review period
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related	technologies	is	made	by	STUK	for	the	first	
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in Principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, a detailed evaluation of systems 
and equipment is carried out through their de-
sign approval process. The design of Loviisa plant 
units	 was	 reassessed	 by	 STUK	 during	 operating	
licence renewal review in 2006–2007. The design of 
Olkiluoto	plant	units	was	reassessed	by	STUK	in	
2008–2009 in connection with the Periodic Safety 
Review.
STUK	review	conclusions	were	 that	 spent	nu-
clear fuel is managed in a safe manner. Both 
nuclear power plants have plans for increasing the 
storage capacities of spent nuclear fuel.
The new NPP unit under construction, Olkiluoto 
3, has a pool type interim storage for spent fuel. 
The preliminary safety analysis report and other 
safety related documents for that facility were re-
viewed in 2004 as a part of the construction licence 
process.
The design of the Olkiluoto on-site interim stor-
age facility for spent fuel and its extension was 
reviewed	by	STUK	when	the	facility	was	licensed.	
The documents reviewed included the preliminary 
safety analysis report and other safety related 
documents. The extension is designed and the de-
sign of the existing part of the storage is updated 
to withstand a large aeroplane crash. Also spent 
fuel pool cooling water systems will be improved to 
enable water feed from outside.
Article 8 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a spent fuel management 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment appropriate to the 
hazard presented by the facility and covering 
its operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(b) before the operation of a spent fuel manage-
ment facility, updated and detailed versions of 
the safety assessment and of the environmental 
assessment shall be prepared when deemed 
necessary to complement the assessments re-
ferred to in paragraph (a).
G.8.1 Regulatory approach
The licence applications for a new licence or for the 
renewal of licence include the documents required 
by the Nuclear Energy Decree: Preliminary or Final 
Safety Analysis Reports; Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
Reports, including Level 1 and 2 PRA analyses; 
Quality Assurance Programmes for Construction 
and Operation; Safety Classification Document, 
Operational Limits and Conditions Document 
(Technical Specifications); Programmes for Periodic 
Inspections; Plans for Physical Protection and 
Emergency Preparedness; Manuals for Accounting 
and Control of Nuclear Materials; Administrative 
Rules for the Facilities; Programmes for Radiation 
Monitoring in the Environment of the Facilities.
The design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and 
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The 
reports	 are	 submitted	 to	 STUK	 for	 approval	 in	
connection with, respectively, the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licences. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to be con-
tinuously updated.
The requirements of performing the initial 
safety assessment and environmental impact as-
sessment for nuclear facilities are discussed in the 
context of Article 6. A safety analysis needs to be 
included in the Decision-in Principle application.
The	government	Decree	733/2008	requires	that	
unless compliance with safety regulations can be 
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directly verified on the basis of the nuclear power 
plant’s design solution, compliance must be demon-
strated. Nuclear power plant safety and the techni-
cal solutions of its safety systems shall be substan-
tiated by using experimental and computational 
methods. These include analyses of operational 
occurrences and accidents, strength analyses, fail-
ure mode and effect analyses, and probabilistic risk 
assessments. Analyses shall be maintained and 
revised if necessary, taking into account operating 
experience, the results of experimental research, 
plant modifications and the advancement of com-
putational methods.
The	safety	assessments	are	reviewed	by	STUK	
with	support	of	independent	safety	analyses	and/or	
by external experts. The licences and related safety 
documents of the on-site spent fuel storages are at-
tached to those of the respective NPPs and also the 
renewal review processes take place concurrently.
G.8.2 Implementation
As discussed under article 7, an assessment of the 
design of the facility and related technologies is 
made	by	STUK	 for	 the	first	 time	when	assessing	
the application for a Decision-in Principle. Later on, 
the evaluation is continued when the Construction 
Licence application is reviewed. Finally, the de-
tailed evaluation of systems and equipment is car-
ried out through their design approval process. The 
design of Loviisa plant units was reassessed by 
STUK	in	2006–2007.	The	design	of	Olkiluoto	plant	
units	 was	 reassessed	 by	 STUK	 in	 2008-2009	 in	
connection with the Periodic Safety Review.
The preliminary safety analysis report and the 
other safety related documents for extension of 
Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facility were 
reviewed in 2010. The extension is designed and 
design of the existing part of storage is updated to 
withstand a large aeroplane crash.
Article 9 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a spent fuel management 
facility is based upon appropriate assessments 
as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on 
the completion of a commissioning programme 
demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, 
is consistent with design and safety require-
ments;
(b) operational limits and conditions derived from 
tests, operational experience and the assess-
ments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and 
revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a spent fuel management facility 
are conducted in accordance with established 
procedures;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a spent fuel management 
facility;
(e) incidents significant to safety are reported in 
a timely manner by the holder of the licence to 
the regulatory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel man-
agement facility are prepared and updated, as 
necessary, using information obtained during 
the operating lifetime of that facility, and are 
reviewed by the regulatory body.
G.9.1 Initial authorisation
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
36), the Final Safety Analysis Report is required to 
be	submitted	to	STUK	when	applying	for	an	oper-
ating licence. More detailed requirements are given 
in	guide	yVL	1.1.	The	requirements	for	safety	as-
sessment are discussed in detail under Article 8.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme for NPPs and associated spent fuel stor-
ages	 are	 set	 forth	 in	 guide	 yVL	 2.5.	 According	
to the Guide, the purpose of the commissioning 
programme is to give evidence that the plant has 
been constructed and will function according to 
the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deficiencies in design and construction can 
also be observed. The commissioning programme 
is described in the preliminary and final safety 
analysis	reports,	which	are	submitted	to	STUK	for	
review and approval.
G.9.2 Operational limits and conditions
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
36), the applicant for an operating licence has to 
provide	 STUK	 with	 the	 technical	 specifications.	
They shall at least define limits for the process 
quantities that affect the safety of the facility in 
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various operating states, provide regulations on 
operating restrictions that result from component 
failures, and set forth requirements for the testing 
of components important to safety.
government	 Decree	 (733/2008)	 requires	 the	
nuclear power plant and on-site spent fuel interim 
storage facilities to have a condition monitoring 
and maintenance programme for ensuring the in-
tegrity and reliable operation of systems, structures 
and components. This programme shall define in-
spections, testing, maintenance, replacements and 
other procedures for controlling operability and the 
impacts of the operating environment.
The technical specifications are subject to the 
approval	 of	 STUK	 prior	 to	 the	 commissioning	 of	
a facility. Strict observance of the technical speci-
fications	 is	 verified	 by	 STUK	 through	 a	 regular	
inspection programme. Technical specifications are 
updated based on operational experiences, tests, 
analyses and plant modifications. Some recent in-
cidents that have resulted in updating of technical 
specifications are discussed in G.9.5.
G.9.3 Established procedures
guide	yVL	1.4	on	management	systems	for	nuclear	
facilities requires that documents and procedures 
for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing 
are established and that these documents are con-
tinuously kept up-to-date, mutually consistent and 
in accordance with the state of affairs. The respon-
sibilities and administrative procedures indicating 
how to take care of these actions are described in 
the quality assurance programme of the facility. 
The procedures shall be approved by the licensee 
itself, and most of them are required to be sub-
mitted	to	STUK	for	information.	Detailed	require-
ments	 are	 presented	 in	 appropriate	yVL	guides.	
STUK	verifies	by	means	of	inspections	and	audits	
that approved procedures are followed in the op-
eration of the facility.
G.9.4 Engineering and technical support
The staffing, training and qualifications of the per-
sonnel are discussed in general in Chapter F.22.1. 
The licensee has the primary responsibility for en-
suring that his employees are qualified and au-
thorised to their jobs and that the continuity of 
the expertise is secured for the operational life-
time	 of	 the	 facility.	 guide	 yVL	 1.7	 specifies	 the	
expertise requirements for technical support staff. 
guide	yVL	6.8	requires	specially	that	fuel	may	be	
handled only by personnel who has the appropri-
ate training and whose competence has been as-
certained.	 Nuclear	 Competence	 Center/Technical	
Support of Fortum Power and Heat Oy is work-
ing as a technical supporting organization for the 
Loviisa NPP personnel also in waste management 
and nuclear fuel questions. For TVO the respec-
tive support organizations are sections of Nuclear 
Engineering and Power Plant Engineering. A new 
nuclear power company, Fennovoima has presented 
preliminary plans during the Decision-in Principle 
process to form it’s competence to cover all engi-
neering tasks during the life-cycle of the Plant 
including nuclear waste management.
Competence of the engineering and technical 
support is supervised by the licensee. In addition, 
STUK	carries	out	inspections	and	audits	by	which	
also the competence of the support staff is evalu-
ated.
G.9.5 Operating experiences, incident 
reports and evaluation
government	Decree	733/2008	requires	that	opera-
tional experience feedback shall be collected and 
safety research results monitored, and both as-
sessed for the purpose of enhancing safety. Safety-
significant operational events shall be investigated 
for the purpose of identifying the root causes as 
well as defining and implementing the corrective 
measures. Improvements in technical safety, re-
sulting from safety research, shall be taken into 
account to the extent justified on the basis of the 
safety principles stated in Nuclear Energy Act sec-
tion 7 a.
According	to	guide	yVL	6.8,	a	spent	fuel	condi-
tion	 surveillance	 program,	 subject	 to	 STUK’s	 ap-
proval, shall be drawn up in order to monitor the 
effects of long-term storage on spent fuel.
guide	 yVL	 1.5	 provides	 in	 detail	 the	 report-
ing requirements on incidents, operational dis-
turbances and events, which have to be reported 
to	 STUK.	 It	 also	 defines	 requirements	 for	 the	
contents of the reports and the administrative 
procedures for reporting, including time limits for 
submitting	 of	 various	 reports.	 STUK	 publishes	
the operational events in its quarterly reports on 
nuclear safety that are also available to the gen-
eral public through internet or paper reports in 
Finnish.	 STUK	Annual	 Report	 on	 nuclear	 safety	
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summarizes events from the whole year and is 
available to the general public through internet or 
paper reports both in Finnish and in English.
Leakages through the steel liners in spent fuel 
storage pools at the Finnish NPPs have been very 
infrequent. Over years only one leakage requiring 
repair works has been discovered in liners of a pool 
where spent fuel is being stored.
G.9.6 Decommissioning plans
The preparation and updating of decommission-
ing plans, as required in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (Section 28) and the Decision by Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy is discussed in 
Chapter F.26.
Article 10 Disposal of spent fuel
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory 
framework, a Contracting Party has designated 
spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent 
fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of 
Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive 
waste.
According to the Finnish waste management policy, 
spent fuel is regarded as waste and shall be perma-
nently disposed of in Finland. Therefore, disposal 
of spent fuel is discussed in Section H, in the con-
text of safety of radioactive waste management.
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Article 11 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropri-
ate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive 
waste management individuals, society and the 
environment are adequately protected against ra-
diological and other hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take 
the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual 
heat generated during radioactive waste man-
agement are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste 
is kept to the minimum practicable;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the 
different steps in radioactive waste manage-
ment
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, 
society and the environment, by applying at 
the national level suitable protective methods 
as approved by the regulatory body, in the 
framework of its national legislation which 
has due regard to internationally endorsed 
criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and 
other hazards that may be associated with ra-
dioactive waste management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reason-
ably predictable impacts on future generations 
greater than those permitted for the current 
generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on fu-
ture generations.
H.11.1 Scope and general regulations
In this Section, management of LILW from nuclear 
facilities, including disposal, management of other 
radioactive waste and the plans for spent fuel en-
capsulation and disposal are discussed. The rel-
evant general regulations are, besides the Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, the Government Decree 
(733/2008)	on	the	general	regulations	for	the	safe	
handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and oth-
er nuclear waste in a nuclear facility attached to a 
nuclear power plant and the Government Decree 
(736/2008)	on	the	safety	of	disposal	of	nuclear	waste	
including disposal of low and intermediate opera-
tional waste and spent nuclear fuel. More detailed 
technical requirements on management, including 
disposal,	of	LILW	and	spent	fuel	are	given	in	yVL	
Guides. Radioactive waste subject to Radiation Act 
is regulated by Guide ST 6.2.
H.11.2 Criticality and removal of residual heat
government	 Decree	 (736/2008)	 requires	 that	 in	
handling of spent nuclear fuel, the occurrence of 
a self-sustaining chain reaction of fissions shall be 
prevented to a high degree of certainty and that 
he disposal package containing spent nuclear fuel 
shall be designed so that no self-sustaining chain 
reaction of fissions can occur, even in the disposal 
conditions.
guide	yVL	8.5	further	specifies	that	transport	
casks, storage rooms and handling equipment as 
well as the waste canisters shall be designed so 
that no critical fuel concentrations may be formed 
in any operational situations, including anticipated 
operational transients and postulated accidents. 
The canisters emplaced in the geological repository 
shall retain their subcriticality in the long term, 
when the internal structures of the canisters may 
have corroded and the canisters may be partly 
filled with groundwater.
Posiva’s spent fuel disposal canister and its 
loading have been designed so that the effective 
multiplication factor (keff) remains below 0.95. The 
criticality	safety	of	the	copper/iron	canisters	devel-
oped has been studied by Posiva with the MCNP4C 
Monte Carlo code. All three types of canisters 
planned to be used for final disposal of TVO’s and 
FPH’s spent fuel have been analysed. A study by 
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Posiva in 1995, which was re-analysed in 2005, 
showed that a contemporary canister design load-
ed with twelve fresh VVER 440 assemblies with 
an	initial	enrichment	of	4.2%	fulfils	the	criticality	
safety criteria. Also an earlier design of the BWR 
canister loaded with twelve fresh BWR assemblies 
with	 an	 initial	 enrichment	 of	 3.8%	 and	 without	
burnable absorbers was shown to meet the safety 
criteria.
In a Posiva study (2005), the main emphasis 
was on the canister designed for the fuel to be used 
in the EPR-type Olkiluoto 3 reactor. This canister 
type fulfils the criticality safety criteria only if the 
reactivity change due to burnup (burnup credit) 
is taken into account in calculations, as opposed 
to making calculations with non-irradiated fuel. 
The fuel bundles to be loaded in an EPR canister 
must	be	irradiated	at	least	to	a	burnup	of	20	MWd/
kgU	to	fulfil	the	criteria.	Criticality	safety	assess-
ments are being updated and will be presented in 
Construction Lisence application documents.
Residual heat generation of spent fuel is also 
required to be taken into account in the design of 
the encapsulation and disposal facilities. Guide 
yVL	8.4	prescribes	that	spent	fuel	disposal	shall	be	
implemented with due regard to long-term safety, 
and in doing so, one aspect to be considered is the 
reduction of the activity and heat generation prior 
to	disposal.	guide	yVL	8.5	requires	the	safety	sys-
tems in the encapsulation facility, intended for the 
prevention of overheating of spent fuel assemblies, 
to be designed with regard to the single failure 
criterion.
As for the Posiva’s disposal canister, the can-
ister-bentonite clay interface temperature is re-
quired to be at maximum 100ºC. This temperature, 
with a safety margin of 10ºC, is used in the re-
pository dimensioning calculations. The maximum 
temperature of disposal canister surface is reached 
within 10 to 15 years after the disposal and in case 
on EPR fuel about 20 years after disposal.
Thermal dimensioning including the detailed 
heat transfer phenomena in the near field and op-
timisation of the repository has been studied. The 
canisters are planned to be emplaced in disposal 
holes in tunnels with a minimum separation of 
7.2 m for VVER 440 canister, 9 m for BWR canister 
and 10.6 m for EPR canister. The distance between 
parallel disposal tunnels is 25 m in the planned 
reference case.
H.11.3 Waste minimization
Waste minimization is in the interest of the nucle-
ar power companies, as less waste to be disposed of 
implies	smaller	disposal	costs.	guide	yVL	8.3	un-
derlines that generation of waste shall be limited 
i.a. by proper planning of repair and maintenance 
and by means of decontamination, clearance and 
volume reduction practices. The Guide also refers 
to sound working methods for waste minimiza-
tion, e.g. by volume reduction of waste, by avoiding 
transfer of unnecessary objects and materials in 
the controlled areas and by adoption of working 
processes that create little or easily manageable 
wastes.
Removal of very low level waste from control 
(clearance)	is	regulated	by	virtue	of	guide	yVL	8.2.	
Both conditional and unconditional removal from 
regulatory control is effectively used for waste min-
imization by the NPPs. Clearance criteria, limits 
and procedures are discussed in Section B.32.1.
The accumulation of LILW in the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs is depicted in Figure 14. The aver-
age annual accumulation of LILW to be disposed 
of has been fairly low: about 85 m³ per reactor. 
The accumulation of waste has in some years even 
turned to decline by effective waste minimization 
measures, such as radiochemical treatment of liq-
uid waste and campaigns for removal of very low 
level waste from control and compaction of main-
tenance waste.
In the 1990’s FPH developed, together with 
the	 University	 of	 helsinki	 Laboratory	 of	 Radio-
chemistry, sophisticated selective ion exchange 
methods for purification of liquid waste (especially 
the removal of Cs, Sr and Co). The benefits of these 
methods, now in use at Loviisa NPP, can be seen in 
Figure 13 and also in the decrease of the doses to 
the critical group shown in Figure 12.
TVO has made a modification in both plant 
units in the condensate polishing system in order 
to decrease the temperature and thus increase the 
lifetime of precoat resins. Consequently, the gen-
eration of spent ion exchange resins has decreased 
considerably. Low and intermediate level waste 
subject to long-term storage at the Olkiluoto plant 
mostly includes components removed from inside 
the reactor pressure vessels, which are stored in 
the fuel pools. The cutting up and final disposal of 
steam separators started in 2004.
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Disposal containers can be filled more effective-
ly, when crushed metal is placed in unused spaces 
of containers. Surface contaminated metal scrap 
is decontaminated in a new facility by blasting 
with glass marbles. Decontaminated metals are 
released from regulatory control, if activity levels 
below those for clearance are reached. The average 
accumulation of low and medium level waste at 
the Olkiluoto NPP has been about 85 m³ per reac-
tor year. In addition, a total of 1000 m³ of metallic 
waste was generated due to the replacement of 
turbine system reheaters in 2005 and 2006. These 
components were transported to Studsvik facility 
in Sweden in spring 2010. Active parts that have 
been separated from the metal will be transported 
back to Finland in 2011 for final disposal.
At the new Olkiluoto 3 NPP unit an in-drum 
drying facility is planned to be used for condition-
ing of liquid wastes, which is expected to provide 
an effective volume reduction. This new waste type 
is planned to be interim stored at the site before 
final disposal into Olkiluoto LILW-repository. The 
repository extension is expected in 2030’s.
The laboratories using radioactive sources in 
medical and research applications usually store 
their short lived radioactive waste at their premis-
es until it has decayed below the limits set for dis-
charges in the Guide ST 6.2. Only small amounts 
of waste need to be conditioned for disposal.
H.11.4 Interdependencies
guide	yVL	8.3	on	treatment	and	storage	of	LILW	
from NPPs requires that a licence for a NPP unit 
must include an approved general waste manage-
ment plan which takes into account e.g. the seg-
regation, categorisation and conditioning of waste 
in an appropriate way with regard to its further 
management. The Guide also provides for the con-
sideration of the requirements of waste packages 
related to their final disposal. These requirements 
may concern e.g. the structure of the waste packag-
es, their physical and chemical composition, their 
resistance to external and internal loads and the 
amount and stability of radioactive substances in 
the waste packages.
Both power plants have their own LILW dis-
posal facilities, thus the premises for considering 
interdependencies in the waste management chain 
are excellent. Interdependencies of the various 
steps in waste management are taken into account 
in the NPPs’ Operational Manuals. In Loviisa all 
the waste treatment, conditioning, handling, stor-
ing, transport and disposal operations are carried 
out at the Loviisa NPP site by the operators of the 
Loviisa NPP. Only the spent nuclear fuel will be 
transported for disposal from the Loviisa NPP site 
to the disposal facility at Olkiluoto. In case of the 
Olkiluoto NPP, all the steps of waste management 
take place at the site. Decision in Principle con-
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Figure 14. Accumulation of LILW in Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs.
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cerning Fennovoima includes also LILW disposal 
facility at NPP site. Fennovoima has done prelimi-
nary site characterisation for proposed sites and 
STUK	has	reviewed	these	results.
Interdependencies in the context of spent fuel 
management are discussed in Chapter G.4.4.
H.11.5 Protection of individuals, 
society and the environment
The operational radiation protection of radioactive 
waste management facilities is discussed under 
Article 24.
The	 government	 Decree	 (736/2008)	 requires	
that a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel shall 
be designed so that as a consequence of normal 
operation of the facility, discharges of radioactive 
substances to the environment would remain in-
significantly low, that the annual effective dose 
to the most exposed members of the public as a 
consequence of anticipated operational transients 
remains below 0.1 mSv. As a consequence of a 
postulated accident, the annual dose to the most 
exposed members of the public, other than workers 
of the facility remains below the value of 1 mSv 
when postulated accident can be assumed to occur 
at least once during any period of a thousand oper-
ating years. Annual dose to the most exposed mem-
bers of the public have to remain below the value of 
5 mSv when postulated accident can be assumed to 
occur less frequently than once during any period 
of a thousand operating years.
Regarding the long term radiation protection 
requirements for nuclear waste disposal, Govern-
ment	Decree	(736/2008)	requires	that	in	the	period	
of first several thousands of years the annual effec-
tive dose to the most exposed members of the public 
shall remain below 0.1 mSv and the average annual 
effective doses to other members of the public shall 
remain insignificantly low. Beyond that period the 
average quantities of radioactive substances over 
long time periods, released from the disposed waste 
and migrating further to the environ ment, shall re-
main below the nuclide specific constraints defined 
by	STUK.	These	constraints	are	given	in	the	guide	
yVL	8.4	as	limits	for	annual	activity	releases	to	the	
environment. They are defined so that, at their max-
imum, the radiation impacts arising from disposal 
are comparable to those arising from natural radio-
active substances and, on a large scale, the radiation 
impacts remain insignificantly low.
In	addition,	guide	yVL	8.4	gives	due	regard	to	
the protection of the living nature requiring that 
disposal of spent fuel shall not detrimentally affect 
species of fauna and flora. This shall be demon-
strated in the safety assessment by assessing typi-
cal radiation exposures of terrestrial and aquatic 
populations in the disposal site environment, as-
suming the present kind of living populations. 
These exposures shall remain clearly below the 
levels which, on the basis of the best available 
scientific knowledge, would cause decline in biodi-
versity or other significant detriment to any living 
population. Moreover, rare animals and plants as 
well as domestic animals shall not be exposed det-
rimentally as individuals.
H.11.6 Biological, chemical and other hazards
Other hazards than those posed by radiation are 
considered in the EIA reports in the same way 
as in the connection with other industrial activi-
ties but are not especially dealt with in the safety 
analysis of LILW repositories.
Disposed LILW consists of NPP’s trash waste, 
scrap metal, filter elements and liquids and sludge. 
These materials and their immobilisation matrices 
are not harmful to the environment as such, but 
may contain harmful residues like heavy metals.
Some studies on radioactive nickel releases 
from repository have been carried out in Finland. 
The results show that the potential annual release 
is small. In the same way it can be argued that also 
the release rate of chromium and poorly soluble 
lead and cadmium will be small. The chemical ef-
fects of the Swedish LILW disposal facility (SFR) 
have been studied more thoroughly. SFR and the 
Finnish LILW facilities are similar regarding to 
structure and the type and content of disposed 
waste. Swedish studies indicate that the increase 
of heavy metal concentration in seawater would be 
negligible, mostly due to the barriers in repository.
If the waste is isolated properly, the discharges 
to the environment are quite small when compared 
with other forms of industry or other sources of 
hazardous wastes. At least as long as the engi-
neered barriers are isolating the radioactive waste 
also the other harmful substances are effectively 
isolated from the environment. Furthermore, the 
LILW repositories are located in areas which do 
not contain exploitable groundwater reserves for 
communities.
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Biological, chemical and other hazards may be 
related to some wastes arising from medical and 
research applications. The requirements of the rel-
evant non-radiation related regulations, including 
those related to general occupational health, are 
applied as appropriate.
H.11.7 Protection of future generations 
and avoidance of undue burdens 
on future generations
The limitation of the potential hazard to future 
generations posed by disposal of LILW or spent 
fuel is discussed above under Chapter H.11.5. 
Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy Act states that 
nuclear waste shall be managed so that no radia-
tion exposure will occur after disposal that would 
exceed the levels considered acceptable during the 
implementation of disposal.
The Finnish nuclear waste management policy 
is based on the ethical principle to avoid transfer-
ring undue burdens to future generations. Disposal 
facilities for LILW are operational at both NPP 
sites and are planned to host also decommission-
ing waste and waste from small users. TVO will 
submit in 2011 new operational licence application 
that includes also disposal of waste from small 
users. Active institutional controls are not needed 
to ensure the safety of these disposal facilities in 
the post-closure period. Preparations for spent 
fuel disposal have progressed in accordance with 
the objectives set by the Government Decision in 
1983. The costs of disposal of LILW and spent fuel 
as well as decommissioning of the NPPs and the 
FiR 1 research reactor are covered by assets col-
lected in the Nuclear Waste Management Fund. 
The obligation for financial provision starts when 
MEE	or	STUK	grants	 licence	 for	 operations	 that	
produce nuclear waste. For new NPPs the obliga-
tion to set assets in the Fund starts when NPP has 
operation licence and fuel is loaded in reactor.
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7h) requires that 
disposal of nuclear waste in a permanent manner 
shall be planned with due regard to safety and 
that ensuring long-term safety does not depend on 
the surveillance of the disposal site. Government 
Decree	 (736/2008)	 adds	 that	 the	 planning	 of	 dis-
posal of nuclear waste shall take account of the 
decrease of the activity by interim storage and the 
utilisation of high quality technology and scientific 
knowledge and the need to ensure long-term safe-
ty by investigations and performance monitoring. 
However, the implementation of disposal shall not 
be unnecessarily postponed.
Article 12 Existing facilities and 
past practices
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the 
appropriate steps to review:
(a) the safety of any radioactive waste manage-
ment facility existing at the time the Conven-
tion enters into force for that Contracting Party 
and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably 
practicable improvements are made to upgrade 
the safety of such a facility;
(b) the results of past practices in order to de-
termine whether any intervention is needed 
for reasons of radiation protection bearing in 
mind that the reduction in detriment resulting 
from the reduction in dose should be sufficient 
to justify the harm and the costs, including the 
social costs, of the intervention..
H.12.1 Existing facilities
The predisposal management facilities for low and 
intermediate level radioactive waste in Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPPs and the FiR 1 research reactor are 
covered by the respective Operation Licences of the 
reactors. The LILW disposal facilities have sepa-
rate licences. The requirements for safety review 
are described in Chapter G.5.1. and the conclusions 
drawn are valid for LILW management as well.
Thorough assessments of the safety of the facili-
ties were carried out by the licensees and reviewed 
by	STUK	in	connection	with	the	construction	and	
operation licence applications. A periodic safety 
review of the LILW disposal facilities is made at 
a 15 years interval. The Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility was taken into operation in 1992 and con-
sequently its safety assessment was submitted for 
review in 2007. In the same context the suitability 
of the waste packages from the new Olkiluoto 3 
NPP unit for disposal in the facility was evaluated. 
The first stage of the Loviisa LILW disposal facility, 
the LLW disposal tunnel, was taken in operation in 
1998. The construction of the second stage of the 
facility, the ILW disposal cavern, was completed in 
2007 and the FSAR of the facility was accordingly 
updated	and	reviewed	by	STUK.	Correspondingly,	
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the safety related documentation for the construc-
tion of the third stage of the disposal facility, the 
connecting tunnel and the third LLW disposal cav-
ern,	was	reviewed	by	STUK	in	2010.	Third	cavern	
will be used in first place as LLW storage and will 
be licensed for disposal operations in future.
In conclusion, the safety reviews regarding the 
predisposal management of LILW at NPPs and 
research reactor required by Article 12 are carried 
out at the time of licensing, the safety analysis 
reports continuously being updated. In addition, 
periodical safety reviews are made. Safety im-
provements have been continuously implemented 
at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants, including the 
facilities for waste management, since their com-
missioning.
H.12.2 Past practices
In 1958–1961, a company established by the 
Finnish industry carried out uranium mining and 
milling activities in a pilot scale in Paukkajavaara 
in the municipality of Eno in the Eastern part of 
Finland. About 31 000 tonnes of uranium ore were 
excavated from small open mines and an under-
ground mine. After the termination of the activities 
the mines were left open and the mine and mill 
tailings were left at the site.
The restoration of the site was carried out in 
1992–1994 by the current owner of the area. The 
mine and mill tailings were covered with layers of 
clay and gravel and a soil layer on the top. Finally, 
trees were planted on top of the disposal site. 
Furthermore, the bottom sediment of a nearby lake 
was covered by an additional layer of soil and other 
material.	STUK	inspected	the	work	and	carried	out	
environmental surveillance in the area. Five years 
after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 restoration,	 STUK,	
having carried out further environmental studies, 
concluded that no radiation risk is posed to the 
human health by the disposed mining and milling 
waste and confirmed the waste to be permanently 
disposed of in accordance to the requirements of 
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 32–34). However, as 
an extra precaution restrictions for utilization of 
the site were imposed: any permanent occupancy, 
construction work or earthmoving is not allowed 
in the area.
Very small scale uranium mining and milling 
activities were carried out in 1956–1959 in Askola, 
Southern Finland; only about 1000 tonnes of ore 
was treated. The owner of the site did some resto-
ration work in the area in late 1980’s and reported 
to	STUK	in	1991.	STUK’s	inspection	and	later	in-
vestigations	made	by	STUK	in	2007	concluded	that	
the restoration was not yet satisfactory and the 
case is still open. Even so, the area does not pose 
any immediate hazard to the nearby population or 
the environment.
Some wastes from non-uranium mining and ore 
processing con tain elevated levels of uranium and 
thorium. In 1961–1972 lead was mined and pro-
cessed	 in	Korsnäs,	 on	 the	West	Coast	 of	Finland.	
The amount of waste is 760000 tons. The average 
uranium and thorium concentrations of the waste 
are both estimated at 60 ppm. Currently there is 
no foreseen use for the area and the area is sur-
rounded with a fence. Possible remedial action is 
considered when the current owner (Municipality 
of	Korsnäs)	 decides	 on	 the	 possible	 future	 use	 of	
the area. Also about 36000 tons of milled ore re-
mained at the mining area. It contains 120-360 
ppm of uranium and 250-370 ppm of thorium. In 
1997, the heaps of ore were remedied by covering 
them with one meter thick layer of soil.
At the Vihanti Zinc mine, where mining activi-
ties ended in 1992, the wastes con tain uranium 400 
bq/kg	(30	ppm)	on	the	average.	The	area	has	been	
covered with a thin layer of soil which, together 
with the increasing vegetation, prevents dus ting 
and reduces external gamma radiation.
Article 13 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed radioactive waste man-
agement facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors 
likely to affect the safety of such a facility dur-
ing its operating lifetime as well as that of a 
disposal facility after closure;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a 
facility on individuals, society and the environ-
ment, taking into account possible evolution of 
the site conditions of disposal facilities after 
closure;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a 
facility available to members of the public;
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(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity 
of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to 
be affected by that facility, and provide them, 
upon their request, with general data relating 
to the facility to enable them to evaluate the 
likely safety impact of the facility upon their 
territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting 
Parties by being sited in accordance with the gen-
eral safety requirements of Article 11.
In Finland, the siting decisions for the LILW repos-
itories at NPP sites were made in 1983. Decision-in 
Principle for Fennovoima NPP in 2010 includes 
also LILW repository at NPP site. In the context 
of the Decision-in Principle process in 1999–2001 
for TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel disposal, Olkiluoto 
was selected as the site for a spent nuclear fuel 
disposal facility. In 2004 Posiva started the con-
struction of the underground characterization fa-
cility	 ONKALO	 (Figures	 15	 and	 16)	 in	 order	 to	
obtain confirmative data and information for the 
application of the construction licence, planned to 
Figure 15. The opening of the ONKALO tunnel in winter 2010–2011.
 
Figure 16. The access tunnel of ONKALO.
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Table H.13.1. Siting of the spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto.
Site characterisation phase 
1983–1999 Site investigations and regulatory reviews
•	 Countrywide	site	screening	1983–85
•	 Preliminary	site	investigations	at	five	areas	1987–1992
•	 Detailed	site	investigations	at	four	areas	1993–1999
•	 Regulatory	reviews	in	1986	and	1993
Environmental impact assessment procedure
1997
 
 
 
 
 
1998
EIA Programme
•	 20	scoping	workshops	organised	by	Posiva	in	four	municipalities
•	 EIA	programme	report,	February	1998
•	 Public	hearings	in	four	municipalities
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI*
•	 Judgement	by	MTI,	November	1998
1999 EIA Report
•	 Report,	May	1999
•	 Public	hearings	in	four	municipalities
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI
•	 Judgement	by	MTI,	November	1999
2008 EIA Programme on expanding the capacity of spent nuclear fuel repository
•	 EIA	Programme,	May	2008
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Judgement	by	MEE,	August	2008
EIA Report
•	 Report,	October	2008
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Judgement	by	MEE,	March	2009
* During the EIA procedure and DiP process the statements were issued by the predecessor of MEE, i.e. the Ministry of Trade and Industry, MTI.
be filed with the Government by the end of 2012. 
In the end of 2010 construction had progressed in 
depth of –430 m and the length of access tunnel 
was 4565 m. DiP for Fennovoima required that it 
has agreement for spent fuel disposal in Olkiluoto 
disposal facility or EIA programme for separate 
repository during six years from the date of DiP 
ratification (2010) by the Parliament.
Concerning siting, design, construction and as-
sessment of safety, details of the regulatory ap-
proach	 to	ONKALO,	and	the	Olkiluoto	spent	 fuel	
disposal project are described in Annex L.1.
The description of siting procedures, provided 
under Article 6 (Chapters G.6.1–G.6.5) for NPPs 
(including spent fuel storages), is also applicable 
for facilities intended for predisposal management 
of LILW at the NPPs and for disposal of LILW or 
spent fuel and is not repeated here.
Concerning siting of a disposal facility for spent 
nuclear	fuel,	government	Decree	(736/2008)	states	
that the geological characteristics of the disposal 
site, as a whole, shall be favourable for the isola-
tion of the disposed radioactive substances from 
the environment. An area having a feature that 
is substantially adverse to long-term safety shall 
not	be	selected	as	the	disposal	site.	guide	yVL	8.4	
specifies generic site suitability criteria. Site inves-
tigations at Olkiluoto site have been going on since 
70
STUK-B 138 SECTION H Safety of radioactive waste management
Decision-in-Principle process 
1999
2000
2001
Application for DiP
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	May	1999
•	 EIA	report	annexed	to	the	application
Handling of application
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MTI
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	January	2000
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	January	2000
•	 DiP	by	the	Government,	December	2000
•	 Ratification	of	the	DiP	by	the	Parliament,	May	2001
2002 Ratification of the DiP to expand the capacity of the repository to include the spent fuel from the 5th reactor 
unit (Olkiluoto 3 reactor unit)
2004 Start of construction of the underground rock characterisation facility, ONKALO, with the aim of final 
confirmation licence of the site suitability
2008 Application for DiP on spent fuel from the Olkiluoto 4 unit
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	April	2008
•	 EIA	report	1999	annexed	to	the	application
2009 Handling of application of Olkiluoto 4
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality,	October	2008
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	May	2009
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	December	2008
•	 DiP	by	the	Government,	May	2010
•	 Ratification	of	the	DiP	by	the	Parliament,	July	2010
Application for DiP on spent fuel from the Loviisa 3 unit
•	 DiP	application	submitted	to	the	Government,	March	2009
•	 EIA	report	2008	annexed	to	the	application
Handling of application of Loviisa 3
•	 Public	hearing	in	Eurajoki	municipality,	June	2009
•	 Statements	and	written	opinions	to	MEE
•	 Preliminary	safety	appraisal	by	STUK,	October	2009
•	 Consent	statement	by	Eurajoki	municipality,	August	2009
•	 Unfavourable	DiP	by	the	Government,	May	2010
2010 Ratification of the DiP to expand the capacity of the repository to include the spent fuel from the 6th reactor 
unit (Olkiluoto 4 reactor unit)
2012 Planned: Submission of application for the construction licence of the spent fuel encapsulation and disposal 
facility
Table H.13.1. (continues)
the early 1980’s. These have included many kind of 
investigations from the air and surface, boreholes 
at different depths, and finally they will include 
direct investigations at the disposal depth at the 
ONKALO	facility	to	confirm	the	suitability	of	the	
site. The first possible step for siting a separate 
disposal facility for Fennovoima spent fuel will be 
the EIA programme.
The various steps of the siting process concern-
ing the final disposal of spent fuel in Olkiluoto are 
detailed in Table H.13.1.
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Article 14 Design and construction 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a radioactive 
waste management facility provide for suit-
able measures to limit possible radiological 
impacts on individuals, society and the envi-
ronment, including those from discharges or 
uncontrolled releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as 
necessary, technical provisions for the decom-
missioning of a radioactive waste management 
facility other than a disposal facility are taken 
into account;
(c) at the design stage, technical provisions for the 
closure of a disposal facility are prepared; the 
technologies incorporated in the design and 
construction of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are supported by experience, test-
ing or analysis.
The discussion under Article 7 (Chapter G.7) is val-
id for predisposal management facilities for LILW, 
which are covered by the licence of the NPPs and 
government	Decree	(733/2008).
The design requirements for LILW and spent 
fuel disposal facilities and the measures to limit 
radiological impacts from these facilities are dis-
cussed in Chapter H.11.6. An illustration of the 
repository of spent fuel at Olkiluoto is shown in 
Figure 4. The design of Loviisa and Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facilities are illustrated in Figures 6 and 
7, respectively.
According	 to	 government	 Decree	 (736/2008),	
the design, excavation, other construction and 
closure of the underground facility shall be imple-
mented in a manner that retains characteristics of 
the host rock important to long-term safety as far 
as possible. The depth of the waste emplacement 
rooms shall be selected appropriately with regard 
to the waste to be disposed of and the local geologi-
cal features. The objective shall be that the impacts 
of above-ground events, actions and environmental 
changes on long-term safety will remain minor 
and inadvertent human intrusion to the repository 
will be difficult. More detailed requirements on the 
design	principles	are	given	in	guides	yVL	8.1,	8.4	
and 8.5.
Conceptual plans for the closure of the disposal 
facilities have been included in their initial designs 
(e.g. the PSAR designs of the LILW repositories 
and the Decision-in Principle design of the spent 
fuel repository in Olkiluoto). These closure plans 
will be reconsidered in the context of later licens-
ing stages or periodic safety assessments.
Concerning siting, design, construction and as-
sessment of safety, a more detailed description of 
the regulatory approach to the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
disposal project is presented in Annex L.1.
Article 15 Assessment of safety 
of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a radioactive waste 
management facility, a systematic safety as-
sessment and an environmental assessment 
appropriate to the hazard presented by the fa-
cility and covering its operating lifetime shall 
be carried out;
(b) in addition, before construction of a disposal 
facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment for the period fol-
lowing closure shall be carried out and the re-
sults evaluated against the criteria established 
by the regulatory body;
(c) before the operation of a radioactive waste 
management facility, updated and detailed 
versions of the safety assessment and of the 
environmental assessment shall be prepared 
when deemed necessary to complement the as-
sessments referred to in paragraph (a).
H. 15.1 Regulatory approach
The discussion under Article 8 on safety assess-
ment of spent fuel storage is valid for predisposal 
management of LILW because both activities are 
covered by the licence of the NPP and Government 
Decree	(733/2008).
Predisposal management of wastes subject to 
Radiation Act involves generally operations which 
may not cause any extensive hazards: handling of 
sealed sources, segregation and packaging of small 
amounts of LLW. Thus no comprehensive safety or 
environmental impact assessments are needed but 
the safety of the required operations is evaluated 
in the context of the licensing processes.
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Regarding the final disposal of spent fuel, com-
pliance with long-term radiation protection ob-
jectives as well as the suitability of the disposal 
concept and site shall, according to Government 
Decree	(736/2008),	be	justified	by	means	of	a	com-
pliance with the long-term radiation protection 
objectives as well as the suitability of the disposal 
concept and site shall be justified through a safety 
case that addresses both the expected evolutions 
and unlikely disruptive events impairing long-
term safety.
According	 to	guide	yVL	8.4	a	 safety	analysis,	
or a safety case as in Government decree, shall 
include:
•	 Description of the disposal system (waste canis-
ter, backfilling materials and sealing structures, 
excavated rooms, characteristics of host rock, 
groundwater and the disposal site) and defini-
tion of the barriers,
•	 Analysis of the potential future evolutions of 
the disposal system (scenarios analysis),
•	 Definition of the performance targets for the 
barriers,
•	 Functional description of the disposal system by 
means of conceptual and mathematical model-
ling and the determination of the input data 
needed in these models,
•	 Analysis of the activity releases and resulting 
doses from radionuclides which are released 
from the waste, penetrate the barriers and en-
ter to the biosphere,
•	 Whenever practicable, estimation of the prob-
abilities of activity releases and radiation doses 
arising from unlikely disruptive events impair-
ing long-term safety,
•	 Uncertainty	and	sensitivity	analyses	and	com-
plementary discussions on the significance of 
such phenomena and events which cannot be 
assessed quantitatively,
•	 Comparison of the outcome of analyses with the 
safety requirements,
•	 Documentation of the safety analysis.
The various phases of the safety analysis shall be 
carefully documented. Documentation shall target 
to
•	 Transparency, so that the approaches, methods, 
results and the coupling to the entirety in each 
part of the analysis can easily be discovered,
•	 Traceability, so that justifications for the adopt-
ed assumptions, input data and models can eas-
ily be found in the safety assessment report or 
its reference reports.
A safety case shall be presented in connection with 
the construction licence application and the operat-
ing licence application of the nuclear waste facility. 
The safety case shall be updated at 15 year inter-
vals unless otherwise provided in the licence con-
ditions. Furthermore, the safety case shall be up-
dated prior to the permanent closure of the facility. 
Furthermore, the safety analysis shall be updated 
in case that any new information has emerged 
which might crucially affect the outcome of the 
analysis in relation to the safety requirements.
A scenario analysis shall cover both the expect-
ed evolutions of the disposal system and unlikely 
disruptive events affecting long-term safety. The 
scenarios shall be composed systematically from 
features, events and processes, which are poten-
tially significant to long-term safety and may arise 
from:
•	 Mechanical, thermal, hydrological and chemical 
processes and interactions occurring inside the 
disposal system
•	 External events and processes, such as climate 
changes, geological processes and human ac-
tions.
The base scenario shall assume the performance 
targets defined for each barrier, taking account of 
the incidental deviations from the target values. 
The influence of the declined overall performance of 
a single barrier or, in case of coupling between bar-
riers, the combined effect of the declined perform-
ance of more than one barrier, shall be analysed by 
means of variant scenarios. Disturbance scenarios 
shall be defined for the analysis of unlikely disrup-
tive events affecting long-term safety.
In accordance with the Government Decree 
736/2008	(Section	15),	 the	basis	 for	selecting	the	
computational methods used shall be that the ac-
tual radiation exposure and quantities of radioac-
tive materials released remain below the results 
of safety analyses, with a high degree of certainty. 
The uncertainties involved in the safety analysis, 
and their significance, shall be separately as-
sessed.
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In order to assess the release and transport of 
disposed radioactive substances, conceptual models 
shall first be drawn up to describe the physical phe-
nomena and processes affecting the performance of 
each barrier. Besides the modelling of release and 
transport processes, models are needed to describe 
the circumstances affecting the performance of 
barriers. From the conceptual models, the respec-
tive calculation models are derived, normally with 
simplifications. Simplification of the models as well 
as the determination of input data for them shall 
be based on the principle that the performance of 
any barrier will not be overestimated but neither 
overly underestimated.
The modelling and determination of input data 
shall be based on the best available experimen-
tal knowledge obtained through laboratory ex-
periments, geological investigations and evidence 
from natural analogues and expert judgement. The 
models and input data shall be appropriate to the 
scenario, assessment period and disposal system of 
interest. The various models and input data shall 
be mutually consistent, apart from cases where 
just the simplifications in modelling or the aim of 
avoiding the overestimation of the performance of 
barriers implies apparent inconsistency.
The importance to safety of such scenarios that 
cannot reasonably be assessed by means of quan-
titative analyses shall be examined by means of 
complementary considerations. They may include 
e.g. bounding analyses by simplified methods, com-
parisons with natural analogues or observations 
of the geological history of the disposal site. The 
significance of such considerations grows as the 
assessment period of interest increases, and the 
judgement of safety beyond one million years can 
mainly be based on the complementary consider-
ations.
Complementary considerations shall also be ap-
plied parallel to the actual safety analysis in order 
to enhance the confidence in results of the whole 
analysis or a part of it.
H.15.2 Implementation
Concerning safety after closure, Posiva has contin-
ued the safety assessment work after the Decision-
in Principle with the goal to be ready to submit 
the construction licence application for Olkiluoto 
encapsulation and disposal facilities in 2012. A 
framework for the development of the safety case 
was first reported in 2005 and updated in 2008. 
Posiva is developing the safety case portfolio to 
meet regulatory requirements and to show safe-
ty assessment methodology. According to present 
plans the main reports of the Safety Case portfolio 
are as follows:
•	 The	Description of Disposal System report sum-
marizes the information on the waste form, the 
engineered barrier system and the Olkiluoto 
site.
•	 The	 Process report describes the features, 
events and processes affecting in evolution of 
the repository
•	 The	Design Basis report explains the perform-
ance targets and target properties of the host 
rock.
•	 The	 Performance Assessment report discusses 
how the system complies with the performance 
targets defined.
•	 The	Formulation of Scenarios report describes 
the evolution of repository and scenarios
•	 The	 Models and Data report describes most 
significant data and modelling used in safety 
assessment.
•	 The	Analysis of Scenarios report describes the 
assessment of release of radionuclides and their 
radiological consequences
•	 The	 Complementary Considerations describes 
the importance to safety of such scenarios that 
cannot reasonably be assessed by means of 
quantitative analyses
•	 The	 Synthesis report summarizes the whole 
methodology applied, draws together the key 
findings and arguments and concludes with a 
statement of confidence in the long-term safety 
of the waste disposal programme.
The safety case will rely heavily on a number of 
supporting reports, especially
•	 The	Olkiluoto Site Description
•	 The	Biosphere Description
•	 The	Design and Production Line reports, which 
describe the design and the initial state of the 
repository after emplacement of the canisters.
These reports or their key background reports are 
updated stepwise during the iterative process of 
developing	 disposal	 system.	 STUK	 continuously	
reviews and assesses Posiva’s program, using also 
outside experts.
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An essential part of Posiva’s spent fuel disposal 
program are the investigations to be carried out 
in an underground rock characterisation facility 
(ONKALO).	These	 investigations	 aim	 at	 confirm-
ing the suitability of the bedrock for disposal and 
acquiring site characteristics data for the design of 
the disposal facility and for its safety evaluation.
STUK	has	implemented	a	regulatory	oversight	
program for reviewing the development of con-
struction licence application and supporting long-
term	 safety	 case	 and	 for	 the	 ONKALO	 project.	
These activities are described more in detail in 
Annex L.1.
Article 16 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that:
(a) the licence to operate a radioactive waste man-
agement facility is based upon appropriate 
assessments as specified in Article 15 and is 
conditional on the completion of a commission-
ing programme demonstrating that the facil-
ity, as constructed, is consistent with design 
and safety requirements;
(b) operational limits and conditions, derived 
from tests, operational experience and the as-
sessments as specified in Article 15 are defined 
and revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection 
and testing of a radioactive waste manage-
ment facility are conducted in accordance with 
established procedures. For a disposal facility 
the results thus obtained shall be used to verify 
and to review the validity of assumptions made 
and to update the assessments as specified in 
Article 15 for the period after closure;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safe-
ty-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a radioactive waste man-
agement facility;
(e) procedures for characterization and segrega-
tion of radioactive waste are applied; incidents 
significant to safety are reported in a timely 
manner by the holder of the licence to the regu-
latory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant 
operating experience are established and that 
the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste 
management facility other than a disposal fa-
cility are prepared and updated, as necessary, 
using information obtained during the operat-
ing lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by 
the regulatory body;
(h) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are 
prepared and updated, as necessary, using 
information obtained during the operating 
lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the 
regulatory body.
The discussion on and references to nuclear energy 
legislation,	general	safety	regulations	and	STUK’s	
guidance discussed under Article 9 are also valid 
for predisposal management of LILW from NPPs 
and for the operational period of a LILW disposal 
facility. Therefore only some specific features re-
lated to disposal of LILW or spent fuel, as well as 
those related to radioactive waste from small op-
erators, are presented here.
H.16.1 Initial authorization
The Nuclear Energy Decree requires that a number 
of documents, including the Final Safety Analysis 
Report	shall	be	submitted	to	STUK	when	applying	
for an operating licence for a nuclear facility. More 
detailed	requirements	are	given	in	guide	yVL	1.1,	
including	 STUK’s	 review	 and	 inspection	 of	 com-
missioning of a nuclear facility. The requirements 
for safety assessment are discussed in detail above 
under Article 15.
In the context of the commissioning of a nuclear 
waste facility, the licensee shall ensure that the 
systems, structures and components as well as the 
entire facility function as planned. The licensee 
shall ensure that an appropriate organization, ade-
quate skilled workforce and applicable instructions 
exist for the coming operation of the facility.
H.16.2 Operational limits and conditions
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, Technical 
Specifications, which shall at least define limits for 
the process quantities that affect the safety of the 
facility in various operating states, provide regu-
lations on operating restrictions that result from 
component failures, and set forth requirements for 
the testing of components important to safety, shall 
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be	submitted	to	STUK,	when	applying	for	an	oper-
ating licence for a nuclear facility.
government	 Decree	 (736/2008)	 requires	 that	
technical and administrative requirements and re-
strictions for ensuring the operational safety shall 
be set forth in the technical safety specifications of 
the disposal facility.
H.16.3 Established procedures
According	 to	 government	 Decree	 (736/2008)	 ap-
propriate instructions shall exist for the operation, 
maintenance, regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests as well as for transient and accident 
conditions for nuclear waste management and dis-
posal facilities. The reliable function of systems 
and components shall be ensured by adequate 
maintenance and by regular in-service inspections 
and periodic tests.
H.16.4 Updated assessment for 
post closure period
For the LILW repositories, both in Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto, there is an operation licence condition 
requiring a periodic update of the safety assess-
ment.	The	government	Decree	(736/2008),	concern-
ing nuclear waste disposal, requires that the safety 
case shall be updated every 15 years, if not other-
wise prescribed in licence conditions. The safety 
case shall be updated prior to the final closure of 
the disposal facility.
H.16.5 Engineering and technical support
The	government	Decree	 (736/2008)	 requires	 that	
the licensee’s organisation shall have access to the 
professional expertise and technical knowledge re-
quired for the safe operation of the nuclear waste 
facility and long-term safety of nuclear waste dis-
posal. The LILW repositories operate under NPP 
organisations and the requirement for adequate en-
gineering	and	technical	support	in	guide	yVL	1.7	
applies.
H.16.6 Characterization and segregation 
of waste, incident reports
The guidance and requirements for LILW char-
acterization and segregation is provided in Guide 
yVL	 8.3.	 STUK	 reviews	 plant	 procedures,	 the	
FSAR, and performs inspections waste manage-
ment at the NPPs and the repositories to ensure 
compliance with requirements.
Incident reporting is required in Guide 
yVL	1.5.
H. 16.7 Decommissioning plans
The decommissioning plans for facilities for LILW 
and spent fuel management, other than reposito-
ries are part of the decommissioning plans of the 
NPPs. Decommissioning is discussed in more de-
tail under Article 26.
H.16.8 Closure plans
In	accordance	with	government	Decree	(736/2008),	
a safety case for a disposal facility shall be includ-
ed in the application for a construction licence and 
the operating licence. The safety case shall be up-
dated every 15 years, if not otherwise prescribed in 
licence conditions. The safety case shall be updated 
prior to the final closure of the disposal facility. An 
investigation and monitoring programme shall be 
implemented during the operational period of the 
disposal facility to obtain confirming information 
on the long-term performance of the barriers.
Article 17 Institutional measures 
after closure
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facil-
ity:
(a) records of the location, design and inventory 
of that facility required by the regulatory body 
are preserved;
(b) active or passive institutional controls such as 
monitoring or access restrictions are carried 
out, if required; and
(c) if, during any period of active institutional 
control, an unplanned release of radioactive 
materials into the environment is detected, in-
tervention measures are implemented, if neces-
sary.
H.17.1 Records
According	to	government	Decree	(736/2008),
•	 A record shall be kept of the disposed waste 
which includes waste package specific informa-
tion on waste type, radioactive substances, loca-
tion in the waste emplacement rooms and other 
necessary	 data.	 STUK	 maintains	 a	 database	
where the nuclear waste data reported annually 
by the operators of the NPPs are stored. In 2007 
STUK	made	a	decision	to	improve	the	database,	
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especially its user-interface and report genera-
tion. The improvement was carried out in 2009.
•	 STUK	 shall	 arrange	 for	 the	 depositing	 of	 the	
information about the disposal facility and dis-
posed	waste	in	a	permanent	manner.	guide	yVL	
8.1 adds that during the operational period the 
records referred to above shall be annually com-
plemented	and	submitted	to	STUK.	At	the	time	
of the closure of the repository, the record of the 
disposed waste and the relevant information 
in the FSAR will be converted into a national 
archive for long-term deposition.
H.17.2 Institutional control
Two types of institutional control can be imple-
mented: restrictions in land use (passive control) 
and technical post-closure surveillance (active con-
trol).
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 
63,	STUK’s	supervisory	rights	include	issuing	land	
use restrictions after the closure of the disposal fa-
cility when deemed necessary. Government Decree 
(736/2008)	on	nuclear	waste	disposal	further	stipu-
lates that an adequate protection zone shall be 
reserved around the disposal facility as a provision 
for the prohibitions on measures referred to in 
Section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act. According 
to	guide	yVL	8.1	 it	 can	be	assumed	 that	human	
activities, affecting the repository or the nearby 
host rock, are precluded for 200 years at the most 
by means of land use restrictions and other passive 
controls. It should also be noted that the Finnish 
repositories for LILW are located at 60–100 m 
depth in the bedrock and spent fuel repository is 
planned to be located at least 400 m below the 
surface; the increased depth lessens the need for 
institutional controls.
H.17.3 Potential intervention measures
After approval of the closure of a LILW or spent 
fuel repository, the State bears the responsibility of 
the waste repository and all intervention measures 
that may be needed (Nuclear Energy Act, Section 
34). Such measures are unlikely because the repos-
itory concepts are based on passive safety; multiple 
engineered barriers ensuring effective long-term 
containment of the disposed waste.
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Article 27 Transboundary movement
Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary 
movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure 
that such movement is undertaken in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of this Convention 
and relevant binding international instruments.
In so doing:
(a) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 
transboundary movement is authorized and 
takes place only with the prior notification and 
consent of the State of destination;
(b) transboundary movement through States of 
transit shall be subject to those international 
obligations which are relevant to the particu-
lar modes of transport utilized;
(c) a Contracting Party which is a State of desti-
nation shall consent to a transboundary move-
ment only if it has the administrative and 
technical capacity, as well as the regulatory 
structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or 
the radioactive waste in a manner consistent 
with this Convention;
(d) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin 
shall authorize a accordance with the consent 
of the State of destination that the require-
ments of subparagraph (c) are met prior to 
transboundary movement;
(e) a Contracting Party which is a State of ori-
gin shall take the appropriate steps to permit 
re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary 
movement is not or cannot be completed in con-
formity with this Article, unless an alternative 
safe arrangement can be made.
A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment 
of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destina-
tion south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage 
or disposal.
Nothing in this Convention prejudices or af-
fects:
(a) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, 
of maritime, river and air navigation rights 
and freedoms, as provided for in international 
law;
(b) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioac-
tive waste is exported for processing to return, 
or provide for the return of, the radioactive 
waste and other products after treatment to the 
State of origin;
(c) the right of a Contracting Party to export its 
spent fuel for reprocessing;
(d) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent 
fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or 
provide for the return of, radioactive waste and 
other products resulting from reprocessing op-
erations to the State of origin.
I.27.1 Regulatory approach
Regulations on transport of all kinds of dangerous 
goods are laid down in Act and modal Degrees on 
Transport of Dangerous Goods. As far as radioac-
tive material is of concern, additional requirements 
are given in Radiation Act and Decree as well as 
in Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. Concerning 
transboundary movement of radioactive material, 
the	Regulation	93/1493/EURATOM	on	 shipments	
of radioactive substances between Member States 
shall be applied. The requirements are also in ac-
cordance with the European Council Directive 
2006/117/EURATOM	on	 the	supervision	and	con-
trol of shipments of radioactive waste and spent 
fuel. Further guidance is given in Regulatory 
guides	yVL	6.5	and	ST	5.7	of	STUK.
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With respect to illicit trafficking, regulatory 
and detection measures were taken in mid 1990’s 
to address and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materials across Finland’s 
borders. It included fixed monitors for vehicles 
and railway traffic have been installed to all major 
crossing points along the Finnish–Russian border 
and at Helsinki harbor and portable monitors a all 
crossing.	 In	2008	Customs	and	STUK	launched	a	
joint project for revisiting radiation control at the 
borders, which will be implemented in 2009–2014. 
The project includes equipment procurements and 
upgrades at the Finnish border crossing points, in-
cluding upgrading all systems with neutron detec-
tion capability, allowing better detection of special 
nuclear materials. Also, integrating the capability 
of expert reach back support is one key part of the 
project. As part of the improved expert support, 
an update of common operational methods and in-
structions is included in project. To ensure that the 
new methods are efficiently implemented in the 
border crossing pints, training plan and a provision 
of training together with Customs School is a part 
of the project.
I.27.2 Experiences
According to an agreement between Finland and the 
Soviet	Union	spent	fuel	was	to	be	shipped	from	the	
VVER	type	Loviisa	power	plant	to	the	Soviet	Union/
Russian Federation. Subsequent to the amendment 
of the Nuclear Energy Act approved by the Finnish 
Parliament in 1994, the transportation was ceased 
in 1996. During the years 1981–1996 altogether 
about	330	tU	was	returned	to	Russia.	The	spent	fuel	
was	transported	by	a	special	train	in	TK-6	transport	
casks under special safety arrangements.
Besides the shipments of spent fuel discussed 
above, there have been few cases of transboundary 
movements. In 2008–2010 two spent fuel rods were 
shipped out of Finland for research purposes and 
some large metal components for scrapping.
Regarding illicit trafficking, the systematic bor-
der control for monitoring radioactive materials 
has produced substantial results over the years. 
In 1997, the top year, 23 shipments were stopped 
at the border. After a number of turned-back ship-
ments and enhanced cooperation with Russian 
counterparts, the number of cases has fallen dras-
tically and altogether only three cases of illicit 
radioactive material were detected at the Finnish 
border control between 2001 and 2010.
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Article 28 Disused sealed sources
Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework 
of its national law, take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or 
disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a 
safe manner.
A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry 
into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the 
framework of its national law, it has accepted that 
they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to re-
ceive and possess the disused sealed sources.
J.28.1 Regulatory control of sealed sources
Regulatory control of radioactive sources is based 
on the Radiation Act and regulations issued pur-
suant thereto, into which the provisions of the 
European	 Union	 radiation	 protection	 directives	
(Council	Directive	96/42	EURATOM,	and	Council	
Directive	 97/43	 EURATOM	 etc.)	 have	 been	 im-
plemented.	 Other	 EU	 regulations	 are	 applica-
ble	 as	 well,	 e.g.	 the	 Council	 Regulation	 1494/93/
EURATOM	on	shipments	of	radioactive	substances	
between the Member States.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 16) pri-
or authorization is required for all activities with 
radioactive sources, e.g. for the use, manufacture, 
trade in, holding and disposal of sources. A safety 
licence	is	granted	by	STUK	upon	written	applica-
tion. General conditions for granting a licence are 
laid down in the Radiation Act and the licens-
ing procedure is prescribed in more detail in the 
Radiation Decree (Sections 14–18). All premises 
where radioactive sources are employed are in-
spected	 by	 STUK	 regularly,	 every	 1–8	 years,	 de-
pending on the type and extent of the practice. For 
sealed sources the inspection frequency is normally 
once in 5 years. The main objective of an inspection 
is to validate that radioactive sources are used and 
stored safely and other conditions set in the safety 
licence preserve. The inspector shall identify each 
sealed source. However, in premises where several 
tens or more sources are employed (such a large in-
dustrial facility) the licensee shall provide written 
evidence on its own regular checks on all the sourc-
es and then the inspector shall select randomly 
about	10–20%	of	the	sources	for	identification.	Any	
discrepancies to licensing information concerning 
placing of sources, new sources and sources taken 
out of use are recorded for amending the licence 
accordingly.
The Radiation Decree (Section 17) provides 
that	 STUK	 has	 to	 be	 notified	 immediately,	 if	 a	
radiation source has disappeared, been stolen, lost 
or otherwise ceased to be in the licensee’s posses-
sion. Licensing information is stored in a database 
maintained	by	STUK,	including	also	source-specif-
ic information on each sealed source in licensee’s 
possession. Source-specific information is updated 
continuously according to licensees' notifications 
and observations made during the inspections. 
Some low-activity radioactive sources, such as cali-
bration sources employed in laboratories as well as 
sources in the storages of dealers (e.g. importers of 
radioactive sources) are not individually registered 
into	STUK’s	database.	however,	 records	of	 trans-
fers of sources maintained by dealers are reported 
to	STUK	annually	and	they	are	also	subject	to	in-
spection	by	STUK	at	any	time.
J.28.2 Handling of disused sealed sources
The Radiation Act (Section 10) states that radio-
active sources that have no further use must be 
rendered harmless. Guide ST 5.1 dealing with 
sealed sources specifies that disused sources shall 
not be stored unnecessarily. In practice, howev-
er, it is sometimes difficult to define whether a 
stored source might have some use in the future. 
The annual fee for holding a licence depends on 
the number of sources in licensee’s possession 
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and, therefore, there is some financial incentive to 
transfer disused sources back to the provider (and 
thereof to the manufacturer) or to a recognised 
installation (a facility authorised for the handling, 
long-term-storage or disposal of sources). The 
number of unused sources stored in the premises 
of various licensees is currently (14.2.2011) 315, 
i.e.	5%	of	the	total	number	of	sealed	sources	in	use	
(total number of licensed sources is about 6750).
TVO has leased to the State a cavern in the 
LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto for interim stor-
age of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The amount 
of stored waste cannot be more than 100 m3. Most 
of this waste, including sealed sources, could also 
be disposed of in the disposal facility. A few high 
activity sealed sources will need a different dis-
posal route, which is not yet determined.
Disused sources are collected by a private 
entrepreneur, ‘Suomen Nukliditekniikka’, by 
whom they are repacked, as necessary, and then 
transferred	 to	 the	 storage	 at	 Olkiluoto.	 STUK’s	
Radiation Practices Regulation Department has 
issued an authorisation based on the Radiation 
Act to Suomen Nukliditekniikka for its opera-
tions as a recognised installation. The safety of the 
operations at the Olkiluoto storage is supervised 
by	 STUK’s	 Department	 of	 Nuclear	 Waste	 and	
Materials Regulation.
When	new	sources	are	authorized	for	use,	STUK	
requires the applicant to present a plan on meas-
ures to be taken when it becomes a disused source. 
Essentially there are two main options; either to 
have an agreement with the provider on returning 
the source or that the source will be transferred 
to the central disposal storage at the costs of the 
licensee. The first option is preferred and it is fore-
seen that in the future an agreement on returning 
the source to the provider shall be required for all 
sources.
Sources manufactured in Finland can be re-
turned to Finland once they have become disused 
sources.
J.28.3 Orphan sources
According to the Radiation Act (Section 50) the li-
censee is required to take all the measures needed 
to render harmless radioactive wastes arising from 
its operations. If the origin of the waste is un-
known, like in the case of orphan sources, the State 
has the obligation to render the radioactive waste 
harmless (Section 51). In such case, the licensee – 
if identified later – shall compensate the State for 
the costs incurred in such action.
With respect to the orphan sources and border 
controls, please see section I.
All important users of scrap metal have in-
stalled fixed monitors at the gates of their installa-
tions.	STUK	co-operates	with	the	Customs	and	the	
metal industry in questions such as measurement 
arrangements	 and	 training	 of	 personnel.	 STUK	
also provides expert help in cases where excep-
tional radiation is detected.
On an average, about 1–2 sealed radioactive 
sources have been found among imported scrap 
metal annually. Orphan sources, whose owner can 
not be identified, are delivered to the State interim 
storage at Olkiluoto.
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SECTION K Planned activities to improve safety
K.1 Spent fuel disposal
The project to construct an encapsulation and dis-
posal facility for spent nuclear fuel in Olkiluoto 
can be seen as the most important activity for im-
provement of nuclear waste safety in Finland. The 
project has progressed as planned during the re-
porting period. Thus, it is anticipated that the con-
struction licence application for the facility will be 
submitted at the end of 2012, within the next Joint 
Convention	 reporting	 period.	 Posiva	 and	 STUK	
continue to develop their processes and resources 
to ensure that on the one hand the supply of key 
documents required in the construction licence ap-
plication can be submitted in time and on the other 
hand the safety related regulatory review tasks 
can be executed in time and with high quality.
The disposal project requires continued re-
search and development programmes. As stipu-
lated by the Nuclear Energy Act (9901987), the 
producers of the waste are solely responsible for 
the safe handling, management and disposal of 
their wastes. This responsibility includes the plan-
ning and implementation of required research and 
development efforts as well as bearing all costs 
thereof. For regulating the safe management of 
nuclear	wastes,	independent	R&D	is	necessary	for	
MEE	and	STUK.	The	 three	main	R&D	programs	
concerning spent nuclear fuel disposal are:
•	 The	 R&D-program	 of	 Posiva;	 the	 program	 is	
mainly aimed at planning and implementing 
the spent fuel disposal project;
•	 The	 R&D-program	 of	 STUK;	 the	 regulatory	
R&D	 program	 aims	 at	 supporting	 the	 regula-
tory	decision	making	of	STUK;
•	 The	KyT2014-program	administrated	by	MEE;	
the program aims at supporting the creation 
and maintenance of the overall competence and 
the basic abilities needed, and at assessing al-
ternative solutions for long term management 
of spent fuel.
Posiva’s	R&D-program	is	obviously	the	largest	and	
has the major challenge to produce the results, 
which are related to the Olkiluoto-site, the en-
gineered barrier system and the safety case and 
which are needed to justify the construction licence 
application planned to be submitted by the end 
of 2012. To facilitate developing and maintaining 
independent public sector’s competences in nucle-
ar	and	waste	safety,	STUK	provides	direction	and	
guidance	to	the	national	KyT2014-program.
K.2 Spent fuel storage
The extension of the spent fuel storage facility at 
Olkiluoto started in 2010 and the facility is ex-
pected to be operational in 2014. Protection against 
large airplane crash will be included in the design 
of the extension and the protection of the existing 
part of the facility will also be improved. Also, the 
spent fuel pool cooling water systems will be im-
proved to enable water feed from outside.
K.3 LILW disposal
In Loviisa, the LILW repository is being enlarged 
with a new room for waste handling and a tunnel 
facilitating disposal operations.
An application for a modified licence to operate 
the Olkiluoto LILW repository is expected in 2011 
to allow disposal of Olkiluoto 3 low and intermedi-
ate operational waste and such waste from the cen-
tralized storage of small user’s waste that can be 
disposed in the facility. The application will contain 
an updated safety analysis of the facility.
A small quantity of small user’s waste consist-
ing of nuclear material and a few high activity 
sources can not be disposed of in the Olkiluoto fa-
cility. Actions have been started to find an alterna-
tive disposal route for these wastes.
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K.4 Uranium mining
Talvivaara Mining Company, operator of a mine 
producing primarily nickel and zinc by biohea-
pleaching method, has submitted an application 
to recover uranium from the leaching solution. The 
process decreases the (small) concentration of ura-
nium in the waste of the metal recovery facility 
and it is expected that about 350 to 500 tonnes or 
uranium per year will extracted and processed.
STUK	is	developing	its	capabilities	and	internal	
guidance on safety related to uranium mining and 
milling.
K.5 Peer reviews
MEE has requested an IAEA Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) review. The review, preced-
ed by a self assessment, will take place in late 2012 
and will cover also waste management. The review 
will	complement	the	2009	peer	review	by	EU	mem-
ber	state	regulators	arranged	by	STUK.
K.6 Education and training
An important factor in achieving high level of safe-
ty in waste management is competent personnel in 
the pertinent organizations. A joint pilot project for 
enhanced education and training concerning spent 
fuel disposal was launched in 2010, with a short 
course arranged in December 2010 for new staff in 
several organisations. It is intended that a continu-
ing program similar to that for the nuclear reactor 
safety will be set up. In addition, the organisations 
involved in the nuclear waste management and 
disposal continue their internal training and tutor-
ing activities.
The European Commission has proposed that 
the general requirements for nuclear power plant 
safety and nuclear waste management be harmo-
nised	in	the	EU.	In	Finland,	the	safety	regulations	
that are within the scope of the Nuclear Energy 
Act are under revision.
The structure of the detailed safety require-
ments	 (yVL	guides)	published	by	STUK	is	being	
updated. This includes also new guidance on de-
commissioning.
Plant lifetime extensions of existing nuclear 
power plants require renewal of systems and com-
ponents and modernization of technologies, includ-
ing those related to the radioactive waste and 
spent fuel management. The regulation of existing 
nuclear power plants emphasises the manage-
ment of ageing and the quality of plant operations. 
International cooperation for learning lessons from 
experiences in nuclear power plant operation, in-
cluding waste and spent fuel management, must 
be improved so that risks identified anywhere can 
be controlled efficiently everywhere.
Security arrangements in nuclear energy field 
and the use of high-activity radiation sources also 
call for efficient supervision. One must be prepared 
for the possibility that nuclear materials, waste or 
other radioactive substances are used in interna-
tional terrorism. The procedures, preparations and 
information exchange involved in antiterrorism 
activities will be enhanced worldwide. As concerns 
nuclear material control in Finland, this will mean 
a stronger focus on security arrangements, border 
control, import and export control, security ar-
rangements for other radioactive materials and 
research in the field. Development is carried out in 
cooperation with other authorities.
In a public discussion about uranium explo-
ration,	 STUK	 is	 frequently	 asked	 to	 provide	 in-
formation on radiation safety of this activity, in 
particular from NORM viewpoint. The need for 
more intensive cooperation with other authorities 
is	also	becoming	obvious.	STUK	must	enhance	its	
knowledge and develop analysis methods in order 
to be well prepared for evaluating potential mining 
projects at the investigation stage.
The European Commission promotes worldwide 
co-operation to further develop nuclear, radiation 
and waste safety through its INSC- and former 
TACIS-	and	PhARE-programmes.	STUK	has	been	
and will be a supporter of this European develop-
ment and involvement. Currently, three fourths 
of	STUK’s	service	volume	comprises	promotion	of	
radiation and nuclear safety in Eastern European 
countries.
The retirement of large post-war age groups will 
affect public administration throughout, includ-
ing	STUK.	The	above	activities	require	additional	
manpower and efforts from Posiva, nuclear power 
companies and regulatory body for strengthening 
their activities. Ageing manpower and organiza-
tions optimized for operation and control of current 
nuclear and radioactive waste management facili-
ties require further development in organizational 
arrangements and activities. Human resources will 
have to be allocated with great care in the future. 
STUK’s	 resources	 are	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 such	 a	
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way that the key tasks in radiation and nuclear 
safety can be taken care of at all times. Education 
and training programmes are emphasised.
Communication will become an increasingly im-
portant	success	factor	for	STUK,	Posiva	and	power	
companies. Interest in radiation and nuclear safety 
topics will continue to increase. The media plays a 
growing important role in communication.
As a rule, Posiva, nuclear power companies and 
STUK	aim	at	 continuous	 improvements	of	 safety.	
These cover activities related to LILW and NORM 
management which are, however, less challenging 
than the spent fuel disposal project.
In order to ensure the quality of its program, to 
improve safety, to promote international co-opera-
tion	and	 transparency,	STUK	 intends	 to	organise	
an international peer review on its regulatory 
approach and activities related to the spent fuel 
disposal project during 2009.
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SECTION L Annexes
L.1 Regulatory approach to the Olkiluoto 
spent fuel disposal project
From a regulatory viewpoint, the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel final disposal project can be divided into the 
following main phases (approximate years):
1. Research phase from the late 1970’s to the 
“Decision-in-Principle”	 licensing	 phase	 (DiP),	
(1978–2001)
2. Design, research and development phase in-
cluding construction of an underground rock 
characterization facility (from DiP to Construc-
tion licence (CL)), (2001–2014)
3. Construction phase (from CL to operating li-
cence (OL)), (2014–2020)
4. Operating phase (2020–2120) (if no new NPP’s)
5. Decommissioning and closure phase (2120–
2125) (assuming no new NPP’s).
In 2000, the Government made the the DiP, decid-
ing that disposal of spent fuel into Olkiluoto bed-
rock was in the overall benefit of the society. The 
DiP also stated that the project is allowed to pro-
ceed	by	constructing	at	first	the	ONKALO	under-
ground rock characterization facility in Olkiluoto. 
From a legal standpoint, the DiP thus included a 
permit to start a limited construction of the reposi-
tory.	ONKALO	may	be	later	used	as	a	part	of	the	
actual repository and therefore the regulatory ap-
proach	to	ONKALO	construction	is	the	same	as	is	
for the rest of the repository.
In addition, the DiP also called for the continua-
tion of the research, development and design work 
to elaborate further the disposal project’s safety 
justifications for the purposes of the next licensing 
stages. This is consistent with the general struc-
ture of the Finnish licensing process. After the DiP 
the start of the actual construction requires a con-
struction licence granted by the Government.
The activities of Posiva, the applicant and the 
recipient of the DiP, to fulfil the DiP are regulated 
by	the	MEE	and	STUK.	The	regulatory	oversight	
of Posiva’s spent fuel disposal project (including 
the	 construction	 of	 ONKALO),	 consists	 of	 review	
and assessment and inspection. Other functions, 
such as establishing, updating or adopting safety 
principles, regulations and regulatory guides, are 
developed	in	parallel	with	the	RD&D	work.
L.1.1 Regulatory approach to the 
construction of ONKALO
The safety of the Olkiluoto disposal facility is based 
on ensuring the integrity of the containment of the 
disposed waste i.e. (engineered) containment for a 
long period of time and, in the case this primary 
barrier becomes defective, effective limitation of the 
release of radioactive nuclides (retardation as well 
as protection from external impacts). Maintaining 
sub-criticality also in post-closure conditions is also 
required.
For long term safety it is vital that such chemi-
cal and mechanical conditions are maintained in 
the bedrock that the safety functions of the re-
pository are not jeopardized over a long period of 
time in a variety of normal and abnormal circum-
stances.
Construction	of	ONKALO	until	the	planned	dis-
posal depth (c.a. –430m) disturbs the geological en-
vironment and conditions in a variety of ways. The 
purpose	of	STUK’s	regulatory	control	of	ONKALO	
construction is primarily to ensure that the design, 
location, orientation and construction are carried 
out in such a manner that the geo-environment re-
tains its favourable characteristics and conditions 
needed for the safety functions.
In particular, this implies the minimization of:
•	 Host rock responses to excavation, excavation 
disturbed areas and zones,
•	 groundwater	leakages	to	the	ONKALO	tunnels	
and shafts, and
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•	 Introduction of foreign, potentially harmful sub-
stances	to	ONKALO	during	(cement	and	other	
grouting materials, reinforcement materials, ex-
plosives etc.).
•	 Pathways from surface to disposal rooms
STUK’s	 regulatory	 activities	 (approvals,	 review	
and assessment, inspection,) are implemented in 
a graded approach. All the structures, systems and 
components of the facility are classified based on 
their significance to safety (safety classes 1, 2, 3, 
4 and to those which are not important to nuclear 
safety). This includes also constructed underground 
rooms.
Since the management of the construction and 
related safety culture affect directly the safety 
and quality of the work and its long-term results, 
Posiva’s management system is also subject to 
STUK’s	regulatory	control.
L.1.1.1 Review and assessment
STUK	 has	 defined	 requirements	 for	 documents	
that	 are	 required	 to	 be	 submitted	 to	 STUK	 for	
review and approval. These documents include pre-
liminary safety analysis report, safety classification 
report and description of constructing organization, 
staff competences, regulations, codes and standards 
to be used in the construction, management system 
(especially safety and quality management), de-
sign data, drawings, construction documentation, 
in-service inspection plan etc.
In addition, Posiva was required to submit to 
STUK	a	plan	on	how	the	company	intends	to	com-
municate	to	STUK	the	progress	of	the	construction	
work. The purpose of this document is to facilitate 
well planned, timely and properly targeted and re-
sourced regulatory activities synchronized with the 
actual construction activities and provide timely 
information for example on unexpected events 
underground. This documentation includes sched-
ules, realization reports, as-built documentation, 
test results, information about research planned 
to	be	performed	in	ONKALO	during	construction,	
and	information	about	ONKALO’s	unclassified	sys-
tems.
Review and assessment criteria are presented 
in	regulatory	yVL	guides.	These	guides	are	more	
performance based than prescriptive.
In its review and assessment process for 
ONKALO	 construction,	 STUK	 is	 assisted	 by	 ex-
ternal consultants. All the results and regulatory 
decisions, including their justifications, are docu-
mented and published.
L.1.1.2 Inspection activities
ONKALO	 inspection	 activities	 cover	 all	 areas	 of	
STUK’s	responsibilities.	Inspections	are	carried	out	
in order to ensure that Posiva is in compliance with 
regulations,	conditions	and	approvals	of	STUK	in	a	
high quality manner. Inspection activities can be 
divided into three areas, which are discussed in the 
following:
•	 Construction Inspection Program (CIP),
•	 Inspections concerning the readiness to begin 
excavation and other work phases, and
•	 Inspection concerning construction works on 
site.
STUK’s	inspectors	prepare	reports	of	their	inspec-
tion activities and findings, which are fed back into 
the regulatory process.
Construction	Inspection	Program	(CIP)
STUK	has	 established	 a	 planned	 and	 systematic	
CIP-program. CIP is prepared, approved and im-
plemented annually as a continuous process.
The main levels of CIP are:
•	Management	 system	 (ONP-A):	 Dealing	 with	
issues	 such	 as	 managing	 ONKALO	 construc-
tion, organization, safety culture, quality assur-
ance, competence of staff, communication with 
STUK,
•	Main	Operations	(ONP-b):	construction	project	
management and resources, safety issues, qual-
ity assurance for construction work, facility 
design,
•	 Functions	 and	Activities	 (ONP-C):	Posiva’s	 in-
spections and QC, excavation and excavation 
disturbed zone, drillings, mapping of features 
and construction impacts to safety functions 
(to geochemistry, rock mechanics, hydrogeology, 
groundwater	 leakages	 to	 ONKALO,	 introduc-
tion of foreign potential hazardous materials 
to	ONKALO,	grouting,	enforcement	works	and	
materials).
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Inspections	concerning	the	readiness	to	
begin	excavation	and	work	phases
The	ONKALO	 construction	 is	 divided	 into	 differ-
ent phases. The purpose of the inspections related 
to these phases is to ensure that all the arrange-
ments and conditions at the construction site are 
in order for the next construction phase to start 
(previous phase is properly completed).
Examples of this type of inspections are in-
specting the preparedness to begin shotcreting of 
a specified tunnel section, and inspecting the pre-
paredness to start a new excavation phase.
Inspection	concerning	
construction	works	on	site
Inspections are targeted to excavation work pro-
cesses, methods and practices, and their quality 
and compliance with approvals. Inspections are 
carried out approximately once in two weeks.
L.1.2 Regulatory approach by STUK 
for Posiva’s RD&D activities
During the period after DiP and before construc-
tion	licence	application,	STUK’s	regulatory	control	
of	Posiva’s	RD&D	activities	 is	mainly	 directed	 to	
the evolving safety case material, as well as the re-
lated management system (specifically safety and 
quality management) of Posiva. The regulatory ho-
rizon in terms of level of detail and uncertainties is 
the next licensing phase, the construction licence 
review, with an application expected to be submit-
ted at the end of 2012.
Regulations and safety guides are developed 
and regulatory decisions are made in parallel with 
the	 proceeding	 RD&D	work.	 Currently,	 final	 ver-
sions of the relevant updated Regulatory Guides 
have been prepared, and they will be published by 
the end of 2011.
RD&D	 work	 is	 a	 continuous	 process.	 Posiva	
publishes	 its	 RD&D	 plan	 every	 three	 years	 and	
submits	it	to	MEE.	STUK	reviews	the	report	and	
gives a statement to the Ministry. The most recent 
report was submitted to the ministry in September 
2009. The next main documentation step will be 
the submittal of construction licence application at 
the end of 2012.
In	support	of	its	regulatory	staff,	STUK	has	or-
ganized the three international experts groups for
•	 Olkiluoto site safety investigations (SONEx),
•	 Engineered Barrier System and Technology 
(AEGIS), and
•	 Safety Assessment (SAFARI).
The above mentioned regulatory activities are tar-
geted	to	the	following	Posiva’s	ongoing	RD&D	ac-
tivities:
•	 Safety of the encapsulation plant: design basis, 
design basis accidents (DBA), safety classifica-
tion, PSAR, deterministic safety analysis, use of 
PRA, safety functions, layout, operational con-
ditions, operational safety, physical protection, 
emergency preparedness,
•	 Spent fuel transportation safety; risk analysis.
•	 Spent fuel to be disposed of: fuel types, quanti-
ties, irradiation characteristics, criticality, fuel 
dissolution, cladding behaviour, release frac-
tions, effects of water chemistry, radiolysis,
•	 Disposal canister: design basis, sealing, manu-
facturing, quality control, damage tolerance, 
stresses, corrosion, ductility,
•	 Buffer: design basis, properties, behaviour, fab-
rication, emplacement, quality control, THMCB 
evolution, saturation, swelling pressure, inter-
action with cementitious materials, erosion and 
piping, freezing and permafrost damage,
•	 Backfill and plugs: design basis, concept, ma-
terials, handling, manufacturing, installation, 
plugging of tunnels and boreholes, swelling 
pressure, compressibility, density, hydraulic 
conductivity,
•	 Host rock: surface conditions, geology, rock me-
chanics, hydrogeology, hydrogeochemistry, im-
pact	 of	 ONKALO	 construction,	 chemical	 and	
mechanical stability, rock suitability and clas-
sification system,
•	 Operational and long term safety, DBAs, acci-
dent analysis,
•	 Disposal system and affecting features, events, 
processes, description of system evolution and 
performance,
•	 Selection of scenarios, repository’s system be-
haviour and robustness,
•	 Radionuclide transport in geosphere and bio-
sphere,
•	 Radiation safety; dose and release constrains,
•	 Natural analogues and other complementary 
evaluations,
•	 Uncertainty	management.
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L.1.3 Regulatory approach for 
Nuclear Safeguards
As	ONKALO	was	foreseen	to	become	a	part	of	the	
future final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, 
STUK	decided	 in	2003	to	start	 implementing	nu-
clear	safeguards	to	ONKALO.	Subsequently,	Posiva	
was obliged to implement safeguards from the be-
ginning	 of	ONKALO	 excavation	 to	 the	 closure	 of	
the final disposal facility and site. In accordance 
with	STUK’s	regulations,	Posiva	has	prepared	and	
documented the necessary safeguards procedures 
and measures in a quality manual called “Nuclear 
Materials	handbook”	which	was	reviewed	and	ap-
proved	 by	 STUK	 in	 2005.	 Since	 then	 Posiva	 has	
regularly updated the handbook and submitted it 
to	STUK	for	review	and	approval.
Safeguards activities for final disposal in 
Finland have three main objectives:
•	 To ensure that all safeguards relevant infor-
mation about the final disposal facility will be 
available in due time;
•	 To be able to confirm that there are no unde-
clared nuclear activities or nuclear materials 
relevant to safeguards at or near the final dis-
posal site;
•	 To enable the IAEA and the European Com-
mission to plan and perform their safeguards 
activities.
STUK’s	current	safeguards	activities	consist	of	in-
specting and assessing Posiva’s safeguards imple-
mentation, reviewing Posiva’s reports and verifying 
by	on-site	inspections	that	ONKALO	is	in	compli-
ance	with	Posiva’s	as-built	documentation.	STUK	
also verifies that the information of the Posiva site 
(according to the Additional Protocol article to 2a 
(iii)), provided by Posiva is correct and complete.
STUK	 inspections	 of	 Posiva’s	 safeguards	 im-
plementation include review of the documented 
results and the observations made throughout 
the year in connection with report reviews and on-
site	 inspections.	The	 results	 of	STUK	 inspections	
are	 fed	back	to	STUK’s	regulatory	process	and	to	
Posiva.
STUK’s	 safeguards	 activities	 and	 findings	
are published annually in the safeguards re-
port “Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in 
Finland. Regulatory control, international coop-
eration and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty”.
L.2 Programme for spent fuel disposal
General
According to the Government Decisions-in Principle, 
endorsed by the Parliament first time in 2001 and 
subsequently for additional units (Olkiluoto 3 and 
4) in 2002 and 2010, the spent fuel from the re-
actor units at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto Nuclear 
Power	Plants	will	be	disposed	of	 in	a	KbS-3	type	
geological repository on the Olkiluoto island in the 
municipality of Eurajoki. Posiva Oy, the company 
responsible for the implementation of disposal, is 
carrying out a research, development and techni-
cal design programme that aims at submission of 
the application for the construction licence of the 
disposal facility in 2012. The facility will consist of 
an encapsulation plant for packaging of the spent 
fuel elements and the actual geological repository 
on the same site.
The reference repository design is based on the 
idea of emplacing the spent fuel canisters in verti-
cal position in floors of the repository tunnels, but 
in parallel to the reference design the feasibility 
of horizontal deposition of the canisters is being 
studied. The site characterization continues now 
both on the surface and in the underground rock 
characterization	 facility,	 ONKALO,	 the	 construc-
tion of which was started in 2004. Studies into the 
long-term safety aim at producing a full safety case 
in the form of a portfolio of reports in 2012.
ONKALO Rock Characterisation Facility
The first overall site characterization programme 
for a nuclear spent fuel repository in Finland was 
launched in 1982. This programme already sug-
gested that the final stage of site investigations, 
called the site confirmation stage according to the 
IAEA vocabulary then, should include characteri-
sation of the bedrock performed in an underground 
rock characterisation facility. International views 
have also emphasised the importance of under-
ground rock characterisation before the decision to 
construct the repository is taken. Generic under-
ground laboratories have been and are still oper-
ating	 in	 several	 countries	 (Stripa,	grimsel,	URL,	
Äspö, Bure). The development and full-scale test-
ing of the disposal concept conducted at these have 
shown the significance of site-specific properties for 
the design of the disposal systems.
The excavation of the underground rock char-
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acterisation	 facility,	 ONKALO,	 is	 now	 nearing	
completion	 at	 Olkiluoto.	 Unlike	 the	 generic	 rock	
laboratories	the	ONKALO	is	being	constructed	at	
the actual repository site, and this means that the 
construction and operation of this facility should 
not cause major disturbances to the properties 
of bedrock that are important for the long-term 
safety. In addition, it should be possible to use the 
ONKALO	 later	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 repository.	 This	
means that the construction of the facility must 
comply with the rules and requirements applicable 
for nuclear facilities.
The original design and plans for the under-
ground facility were reported at the level of detail 
needed for a construction permit in 2003. Since 
then a number of changes have been made in the 
layout	of	the	ONKALO	access	tunnel,	and	the	num-
ber of access shafts has been increased from one to 
three. Also the layout and the depth of the auxil-
iary rooms at the main characterisation level have 
been updated to match with the current needs. The 
present design of the facility is shown in Fig. A.
The main characterisation level is located at 
the depth of –420 metres, but some of the auxiliary 
rooms are deeper down at the depth of –437 metres. 
The excavation work will be completed by early 
2012 and the rest of the construction work should 
be ready in 2014. The total underground volume of 
the	ONKALO	will	 be	 approximately	 365	 000	m³,	
the combined length of tunnels and shafts being 
9.8 km. The access tunnel from the surface to the 
repository level consists of approximately 4.6 km of 
tunnelling with an inclination of 1:10. The shafts 
are excavated until the lower level. The personnel 
shaft will be equipped with a man-cage for person-
nel transport. Connecting tunnels from the access 
tunnel to the personnel shaft at every 1 to 1.5 km 
will make it easier to ventilate and evacuate the 
ONKALO	 facility.	 The	 engineering	 design	 of	 the	
ONKALO	is	continuing	on-line.
Site investigations
The main goal of the present site investigations 
phase is to confirm the conclusions of surface-based 
investigations on the suitability of the Olkiluoto 
site for geological disposal through underground 
investigations carried out at the disposal depth. 
Further, on the basis of the detailed investiga-
tions suitable volumes of rock can be identified 
for the repository panels, tunnels and deposition 
holes. Major activities are now focused on the un-
derground	characterization	facility,	ONKALO,	but	
surface investigations are still continued as well. A 
total of 55 deep cored drillholes have been drilled 
Figure A. ONKALO layout in 2011 Figure by Esa Parviainen/Saanio & Riekkola Oy.
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at the site until summer 2010 (see Figure B). The 
drillhole lengths vary from 300 to 1000 metres.
Three new investigation trenches were exca-
vated in the eastern and central part of the island 
during 2008–2010 in order to get a continuous 
sampling profile of the bedrock and to validate the 
bedrock model, specially lithology and deformation 
zones, and for data aquisition for model updates. 
Surface outcrop mappings are almost completed.
By autumn 2010, 17 pilot holes were drilled 
within	 the	 ONKALO;	 15	 of	 them	 in	 the	 access	
tunnel in order to check the rock quality and the 
exact location of modelled hydrological zones in 
advance of the excavation, and two of them in the 
demonstration facilities to characterize the loca-
tion, for detailed scale modelling purposes and for 
demonstration of rock suitability criteria (RSC). 
In all drillholes, extensive geophysical, geological 
and hydrological loggings were carried out, and 
single-hole and other interpretations have been 
done. Consequently, the data have been used in site 
descriptive and detailed scale modelling. Detailed 
geological	 mapping	 of	 the	 ONKALO	 tunnel	 is	
systematically being carried out approximately 
one hundred metres behind the excavated tunnel 
front.
A seismic reflection survey was carried out 
in	 the	Olkiluoto	 area	 in	 July	 2008	 (Kukkonen	 et	
al. 2010).  The survey was a part of the project 
HIRE (High Resolution Reflection Seismics for Ore 
Exploration 2007–2010) of the Geological Survey 
of	Finland	(gTK).	Its	results	with	3D	seismic	cam-
paigns carried out in the central and eastern parts 
of the site in 2006 and 2007 have been important 
input for geological modelling work.
A total of five investigation niches have been 
excavated	in	ONKALO	for	special	experiments	and	
characterization efforts (Aalto et al. 2009). Work 
in all niches is ongoing in 2010. The first inves-
tigation niche is for bentonite studies, the aim of 
which is to test and demonstrate the functional-
ity of instruments, define applicable methods for 
installation of the bentonite buffer and prepare 
for further demonstrations in the repository level 
(see Figure C). In the second niche, the properties 
of excavation damage zone (EDZ) are studied. The 
latest experiments in this niche have addressed 
the new fracturing and hydraulic connections pos-
sibly created by the EDZ. Also the third niche 
was originally constructed for EDZ study, but was 
later modified and enlarged for rock mechanics 
investigations, especially for the Posiva Spalling 
 
Figure B. Olkiluoto investigation site and surface based deep investigation holes drilled until 2010.
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Experiment (POSE). Three large holes, represent-
ing canister holes, were bored in the niche for in 
situ studies of rock spalling caused by hole geom-
etry, stress field and rising temperature. In addi-
tion to niches, rock mechanics studies have been 
carried out on several levels in a vertical shaft and 
in the access tunnel. The fourth investigation niche 
is excavated for detailed hydrogeological investi-
gation project. The purpose of the study is to get 
understanding of small-scale hydrogeological char-
acteristics of bedrock close to repository level; the 
niche is located at the depth of approximately 370 
metres (below sea level). Investigations are based 
on single-hole interpretations and cross-hole mea-
surements of hydraulic connections. The fifth niche 
is planned for investigation of retention properties 
of intact rock. The niche is located at the repository 
level, roughly at the depth of 420 metres.
The Olkiluoto Modelling Task Force (OMTF) 
coordinates the geoscientific modelling work in 
Olkiluoto. Its purpose is to produce a geological, 
hydrogeological, geochemical and rock mechanics 
description of the Olkiluoto investigation site. The 
latest comprehensive site description was reported 
in 2008. The next site report, which is going to be 
part of the reporting for construction licence appli-
cation, will be published during 2011.
A new version of the geological model of 
Olkiluoto was published in 2010 (Aaltonen et al. 
2010b). It includes sub-models of ductile deforma-
tion, lithology (Figure D), alteration, brittle de-
formation and fracture network model. Extensive 
sets of geophysical data and interpretations have 
been used in construction of geological 3D models. 
Concurrently with the reporting, modelling tasks 
were continued and an updated model is included 
in the site description report 2011. The modelling 
of surface hydrology has concentrated on determin-
ing	the	effect	of	ONKALO	construction	and	on	pa-
leohydrogeological simulations. In 2010, extensive 
updating work of the hydrogeological structure 
model was started. Hydrogeological discrete frac-
ture network modelling has been continued. The 
aim of the hydrogeology-related modelling work is 
to produce input for ground water flow modelling, 
which is an important basis of the long-term safety 
studies needed for the construction licence applica-
tion. One goal for geological and hydrogeological 
model updates in the last years has been to extend 
the site understanding to cover also the eastern 
area of Olkiluoto.
The hydrogeochemistry section of the site de-
scription report draws on the paleohydrogeochemi-
cal model that describes the evolution of ground 
water chemistry as affected by geological processes 
and climate changes. The salinity model describes 
the present distribution of saline waters in the 
bedrock, and is important also for modelling the 
ground water flow. Geomicrobiological studies have 
been carried out at Olkiluoto for more than ten 
years, and results from them are now being sum-
marized. Microbes have a significant role, e.g., for 
the redox conditions.
The rock mechanics model has been updated in 
2010 with new data connected to the existed block 
model (Remes et al. 2009). In addition, integrated 
modelling of stress field and brittle geological 
structures has been started. Its aim is to investi-
gate the effect of fault zones on grade and orienta-
tion of stress field.
Long-term	 effects	 of	 ONKALO	 construction	
are being observed in the Olkiluoto Monitoring 
Programme (OMO; Posiva 2003). The programme 
includes monitoring of rock mechanical, hydro-
Figure C. Dilling of a test hole to the first investigation 
niche for the BENTO experiment.
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logical, hydrogeochemical and environmental pro-
cesses	 in	 the	vicinity	 of	 the	ONKALO.	Particular	
attention is given to changes in characteristics that 
may have implications for long-term safety, for in-
stance, changes in groundwater salinity at reposi-
tory depth. The programme will be updated before 
starting the construction of the actual repository.
The Rock Suitability Criteria (RSC) programme 
defines the criteria for classification of bedrock 
volumes in different scales as to their suitability 
for hosting repository panels, disposal tunnels and 
canister holes, respectively. The first version of 
the criteria was published in 2009, and the de-
velopment has continued in 2010 with the aim of 
demonstrating their applicability in 2011–2012 
for practical use in the repository construction 
(Hellä et al. 2009). Special emphasis has been in 
practical testing of the criteria underground in the 
ONKALO	access	 tunnel	and	the	POSE	investiga-
tion niche. The experience obtained is taken into 
account in further development of the criteria.
Development of the engineered 
barrier system
Spent fuel will be stored in water pools for some 
decades and thereafter transferred to the encap-
sulation facility at Olkiluoto. Spent fuel will be en-
capsulated in copper-iron canisters each containing 
12 BWR or PWR fuel assemblies from currently 
operating power plants or 4 PWR fuel assemblies 
from the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which is currently under 
construction. The canister design consists of a cast 
iron insert as a load-bearing element and an outer 
container of oxygen-free copper to provide a shield 
against corrosion. The canisters will be emplaced in 
an underground facility that consists of auxiliary 
rooms and a network of tunnels, which will be con-
structed at the depth of 400 to 450 m in crystalline 
bedrock. The annulus between the canister and the 
rock wall will be filled with compacted bentonite. 
A schematic picture of canisters in deposition tun-
nels is shown in Figure E.
The canister development work has been con-
Figure D. Distribution of rock units in Olkiluoto according to geological model version 2.0. View to the NE. The red 
rock units are pegmatitic granite, the yellow tonalitic gneisses and the blue mica gneisses. Empty space repre-
sents varying migmatites. (Aaltonen et al. 2010)
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ducted on issues concerning canister design, can-
ister manufacturing, canister sealing and canister 
inspection. The canister design work has been 
focused on gathering up all factors affecting the de-
sign, the design requirements and the studies ad-
dressing that the design requirements are fulfilled. 
The report Structural Design of Disposal Canister 
has been drafted. The report compiles studies on 
natural phenomena, theoretical models and analy-
ses, measurements, practical tests, manufacturing 
trials and material studies that have been done 
for several years. The so-called production line 
report will describe the whole life-time of the can-
ister from design requirements until it has been 
installed into the deposition hole. The description 
is used as the starting point (initial state) for the 
long-term safety assessment.
The copper overpack of the canister, which var-
ies for different fuel types only in length, can be 
manufactured by several methods. The present 
methods under development are extrusion and 
pierce	&	draw.	by	these	methods	Posiva,	together	
with	SKb,	has	during	the	three	past	years	manu-
factured 13 full-size copper canisters. The prop-
erties of the manufactured canisters have been 
studied by non-destructive tests and it has been 
shown that canisters that fulfil their requirements 
can be manufactured by these methods. Similarly, 
14 nodular cast iron inserts for the disposal canis-
ters have been cast in several foundries in Finland, 
Sweden	 and	germany	 for	 Posiva	 and	 SKb	 joint-
ly. The manufacturing methods, requirements for 
manufacturing and results of manufacturing trials 
are described in a summary report (Nolvi 2009).
The reference sealing method for the Posiva 
canister is the high-power electron beam welding. 
The method is an industrial welding method for 
steel and copper components but the wall thick-
ness of the disposal canister brings its challenge 
to the sealing of the canister. Posiva has conducted 
an extensive development programme mainly aim-
ing at finding suitable process parameters and 
construction for the lid weld. The tests have been 
performed with full-size lids assembled to a short 
tube representing the canister body. The properties 
of the welds such as corrosion resistance, ductility 
and intactness have been studied by non-destruc-
tive testing methods and by metallographic, de-
structive studies. The development work has been 
summarized	in	(Meuronen	&	Salonen,	2010).
To prove that the canister to be disposed is ini-
tially intact, non-destructive testing of the canister 
components and the lid weld has been developed 
focusing mainly on the radiography for volumetric 
inspection, and on phased-array ultrasonic method 
for more detailed detection and sizing of possible 
defects. In addition, eddy current has been devel-
oped to detect surface or near-surface defects and 
visual testing for surface defects. The reliability 
of the NDT methods has been studied jointly with 
SKb	by	verifying	them	with	metallographic	exami-
nations. The non-destructive testing methods, their 
requirements and experience gained with them are 
described in (Pitkänen 2010).
The bentonite buffer that surrounds the can-
ister is emplaced in the deposition hole in form 
of compacted blocks. The buffer design basis and 
the design have been updated based on the latest 
studies and defined in more detail than earlier 
(Juvankoski	 2009,	 Juvankoski	 &	 Marcos	 2009).	
The gap between the buffer and the host rock will 
be filled with bentonite pellets. A small scale buf-
fer	 test	 has	 been	 prepared	 in	ONKALO	 focusing	
on the test set-up to gain experience on building a 
buffer test.
For the buffer block manufacturing uniaxial 
and isostatic compaction technologies have been 
developed (Laaksonen 2009 a, Laaksonen 2009 b). 
Block manufacturing trials have been performed 
with various types of bentonite. The latest trials 
for producing large buffer blocks have been done 
with the isostatic method. Blocks with homogenous 
density and moisture content have been produced 
achieving the density requirements that have been 
set for them.
Figure E. A disposal tunnel with canisters surrounded 
by the bentonite buffer.
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As a part of the 7th Framework Programme 
of the European Commission a project named 
“LUCOEx”	has	been	 started	by	a	 consortium	be-
tween	 SKb,	 Posiva,	 ANDRA	 and	 NAgRA.	 The	
project includes a work package led by Posiva that 
focuses on developing buffer emplacement issues.
After all the canisters and buffer components 
within a deposition tunnel have been emplaced, 
the deposition tunnel will be backfilled and the 
tunnel will be sealed. Posiva’s plan is to backfill 
the tunnels with pre-compacted clay blocks using 
bentonite pellets for the voids between the blocks 
and the host rock. The tunnels will be sealed with 
a concrete plug at the mouth of the tunnel. During 
the last three years several laboratory and field 
tests have been performed to study geotechni-
cal properties such as hydraulic conductivity and 
swelling pressure of various backfill materials 
(Hansen 2009). For assessing the mechanical in-
teraction between the buffer and the backfill, a 
mechanical model is being developed.
The manufacturing of backfill blocks by uni-
axial pressing has been developed and blocks with 
required properties have been produced. The plug 
that will be cast at the mouth of a deposition tun-
nel has been designed and plug materials have 
been studied.
The closure of the access tunnels and shafts is 
based on a compartment solution: the access routes 
are divided in parts according to depth and prevail-
ing hydraulic conditions and different plugs and 
backfill materials are used for each part according 
to its characteristics.
Facility design
Preliminary designs now exist for both the encap-
sulation facility and the underground geological 
repository. In the encapsulation facility the spent 
fuel elements are transferred from the transport 
containers to disposal canisters, a lid is welded to 
the canister body and the welding is machined and 
inspected, after which the canisters are ready for 
disposal (Figure F). According to reference plans 
the encapsulation facility is located at the reposi-
tory site, and, therefore, the disposal canisters can 
be transferred by lift to the underground reposi-
tory.
Preliminary designs and layout plans have also 
been made for the repository. The layout designs 
are based on the outcome of the rock suitability 
and classification work that indicates the suitable 
rock volumes for the deposition tunnels in the 
Olkiluoto area. However, the final decisions on 
the locations of tunnels and deposition holes will 
Figure F. Encapsulation of spent fuel elements for geological disposal.
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be made on the basis of detailed geological and 
geophysical information that will become available 
only after the central tunnels have been excavated. 
A schematic picture of how the repository could 
look like is shown in Figure G.
In parallel with the technical design work and 
planning of the operational practices of the facil-
ity work has been done to assess the operational 
safety of the facilities. The safety analyses will be 
reported in the context of the application for the 
construction licence in 2012.
Assessment of long-term safety
A safety case is being drafted with the aim of 
showing that the repository will satisfy the re-
quirements for long-term safety. The main compo-
nents of the safety case consist of an assessment of 
performance of the repository system in different 
future scenarios and an analysis of the likelihood 
and consequences of any releases of radioactive 
substances from the repository. The assessment 
starts from the initial state of the repository as 
described	 in	 the	 “production	 line	 reports”	 of	 the	
engineered barrier system and the near-field host 
rock, and then goes on to studying the possible 
courses of development that the repository system 
can be subject to in the future. The assessment of 
the future evolution is based on scientific knowl-
edge and data gathered both from Olkiluoto and 
from different laboratory experiments and techni-
cal tests through more than 25 years. For quantita-
tive assessment models based on scientific theories 
are used.
The safety case work continues according to 
the	 framework	 defined	 first	 in	 2005	 (Vieno	 &	
Ikonen 2005). The effects of the repository on hu-
man health and the environment are estimated by 
systematically collecting and updating the infor-
mation relevant to long-term safety in a portfolio 
of	 reports,	 referred	 to	 as	 “Safety	 Case”	 portfolio.	
The safety case report portfolio was updated in 
2008 (Posiva 2008-05), but further modifications 
were still made in 2010 in response to comments 
received	 from	 the	 regulator,	 STUK.	 The	 present	
safety case portfolio is presented in Figure H. The 
main purpose of the recent updates is to increase 
the traceability and transparency of the handling 
of requirements, data production and modelling 
processes.
The main components of safety case portfolio 
can be briefly described as follows:
The initial state of the geosphere and bio-
Figure G. A schematic presentation of the layout of the underground rock characterization facility and the net-
work of disposal tunnels.
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Site Description 
Synthesis
Description of the overall methodology of analysis, bringing together all the lines of arguments for 
safety, and the statement of confidence.
TURVA-2012
Understanding of the present state and past evolution of the site.
Biosphere Description
Understanding of the initial state and evolution of the surface system.
Performance targets for the repository system
Design Basis 
Production Lines
Initial state of the EBS and the underground openings
Description of the Disposal System 
Features, Events and Processes
Summary of the initial state of the repository and surface system
Performance Assessment
Analysis of the performance of the repository system under the most likely line of evolution and 
evaluation of the fulfillment of performance targets. 
Formulation of Scenarios
Description of climate and disposal system evolution and definition of scenarios
General description of features, events and processes affecting the disposal system 
Base Scenario Variant Scenarios
Most likely lines of evolution
Models and  Data
Models and data used in the performance assessment and in the analysis of scenarios
        
Unlikely events and processes
Disturbance  and Supplementary Scenarios
Radionuclide releases transport and Biosphere Assessment
Base, Variant, Disturbance and Supplementary Scenarios for the Repository and Surface System
Analysis of releases and consequence analysis/ Evaluation of compliance with long-term safety 
constraints.
,
consequences
Main documents
Main supporting documents
Supporting evidence incl. natural and anthropogenic analogues
Complementary Considerations
Figure H. Posiva’s Safety Case Portfolio in 2010.
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sphere, as well as ongoing evolutionary processes, 
such as land uplift, groundwater flow and mix-
ing of groundwater types, are determined by site 
investigations and compiled in the site descrip-
tive models of the geosphere and the biosphere. 
These have been presented in the Olkiluoto Site 
Description (Andersson et al. 2009) and in the 
Olkiluoto Biosphere Description (Haapanen et al. 
2009), and will be updated as the site characterisa-
tion proceeds.
The Description of the Disposal System Report 
summarises the information on the waste form, the 
engineered barrier system and the Olkiluoto site. 
More detailed descriptions are given in technical 
and scientific reports on various components of 
the disposal system, including the site descriptive 
model of Olkiluoto and the description of biosphere 
conditions. Background analyses related to future 
climatic conditions are also performed and report-
ed (Pimenoff et al. 2011).
In the new safety case portfolio, the biosphere 
data and models are handled in the Models and 
Data Report and its supporting reports. However, 
the expression biosphere assessment will be re-
tained. In the present report (Hjerpe et al. 2010), 
it refers to the description of the current biosphere 
and its evolution, landscape modelling, and the as-
sessment of radiological consequences.
The Design Basis Report focuses on the long-
term safety aspects of the design, leaving the plant 
design basis to be discussed elsewhere. The aim of 
this report is to gather all relevant loads and in-
teractions which the final disposal plant designers 
need to take into account when designing the dis-
posal systems and layouts for the construction and 
operating licence applications. The fulfillment of 
the requirements, the performance assessment, is 
analyzed in the Performance Assessment Report for 
each engineered barrier system (EBS) component. 
Design basis in the context of this report concerns 
the specification of the loads that the barriers must 
withstand, material restrictions and acceptance 
criteria which are relevant in the Base Scenario 
and its extensions (corresponding to the most like-
ly lines of future development of the repository) in 
the Posiva Safety Case. The design basis presented 
in this report represents a data-freeze of Posiva’s 
requirements management system VAHA.
The features, events and processes affecting the 
evolution of the repository will be described in the 
Process Report supported by a FEP lists or database 
background report. The previous Process reports 
have already been published in 2004 (Rasilainen 
et al. 2004) and in 2007 (Miller et al. 2007). The 
evolution of the repository and the scenarios for 
analysis in the safety assessment will be described 
in the Formulations of Scenarios Report.
The Models and Data Report documenting the 
data and their interpretation (including modelling) 
in the context of the safety case has a key role for 
ensuring the overall quality of the assessment. 
The Models and Data Report will be the main link 
between the safety case and the EBS design and 
development as well as between the safety case 
and the Olkiluoto site investigations and biosphere 
descriptions. The report will explain the most sig-
nificant data used in the actual assessment. It will 
consist of a discussion of those parameters, data 
and underlying assumptions that are considered 
important for the results of the safety assessment 
calculations and the conclusions of the safety case 
as a whole. The scope and contents of the first 
Models and Data Report (Posiva 2010-01) is based 
on earlier safety assessments, but the report will 
later be revised to reflect new knowledge and les-
sons learned during the safety case process.
The scenarios to be analysed quantitatively 
will address both the expected evolution of the 
repository and disruptive events, as required by 
guide	yVL	8.4.	The	assessment	of	the	releases	of	
radionuclides and the radiological consequences of 
these releases will be presented in the Analysis of 
Scenarios Report.
The Complementary Considerations Report 
(earlier Complementary Evaluations) is carried 
over from the earlier Safety Case Plan 2005. An 
example of such report was produced as a part of 
the	KbS-3h	safety	assessment	(Neall	et al. 2007). 
Finally, the whole safety case, including the main 
results, will be described in a Synthesis (former 
Summary) Report. This report will provide the 
main input to the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report.
The engineered barriers constitute an impor-
tant factor in ensuring the long-term safety in 
Posiva’s safety concept. Posiva’s safety concept 
states that long-term safety is primarily based on 
the long-term containment of radionuclides by the 
engineered barrier system consisting of a canister 
and a buffer designed to protect the canister. The 
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performance studies have therefore been focused 
on establishing the behaviour of the copper can-
ister and its protective bentonite buffer and on 
examining the harmful processes. The studies are 
dealt with in Posiva’s own investigations and in 
studies conducted as international joint projects 
and	bilateral	studies	with	SKb.
Posiva has participated in several international 
projects related to the bentonite studies during 
the past four years, such as LOT (Long-Term 
Test of Buffer Material), ABM (Alternative Buffer 
Materials), FEBEx (Full-scale Engineered Barriers 
Experiment)	 NF-PRO,	 ECOCLAy	 II,	 LASgIT	
(Large Scale Gas Injection Test), EBS Task Force 
and THERESA. Posiva has also launched a specific 
research programme that aims at developing new 
expertise in bentonite matters in Finland. The pur-
pose is to raise both the experimental and the theo-
retical and modelling capabilities to address the 
uncertainties and issues concerning the buffer and 
backfill processes. Experimental studies will be 
combined with theoretical research into the THMC 
(thermo-hydro-mechanico-chemical) behaviour of 
bentonite by establishing a dedicated facility for 
clay research. The purpose is to gather sufficient 
knowledge and expertise to demonstrate the per-
formance of the buffer and backfill in the Safety 
Case and to provide the basic information for the 
manufacturing and installation work for both the 
KbS-3V	and	the	KbS-3h	concepts.
Studies	on	UO2 dissolution and solubility have 
continued	 in	 cooperation	with	 SKb	 (Ollila	 2008).	
The state of the art report published in 2002 
concerning the copper corrosion under expected 
repository	conditions	has	been	updated	with	SKb	
(King	et	al.	2011).
Studies into migration phenomena have contin-
ued in domestic and international projects, such 
as in the Task Force for Groundwater Flow and 
Solute Transport arranged by Äspö Hard Rock 
Laboratory. Posiva has also taken part in the work 
of	 the	 the	NEA’s	“Sorption	Forum”	project	and	 in	
the TDB (Thermodynamic Data Base) project. A 
new	code	(“MARFA”)	has	been	developed	for	the	ra-
dionuclide	transport	in	far-field	together	with	SKb.	
The aim is to obtain the state-of-the-art computer 
code for use in the safety assessment projects. The 
work is carried out at the Southwest Research 
Institute.	 Posiva	 has	 also	 participated	 in	 EU	 ‘s	
Seventh Framework Programme project ReCosy, 
in which the main objectives are the understand-
ing of redox phenomena controlling the long-term 
release/retention	of	radionuclides	in	nuclear	waste	
disposal and providing tools to apply the result to 
Performance	Assessment/Safety	Case.
The effects of permafrost and glaciation on long-
term safety of disposal system have been studied 
in	cooperation	with	SKb	and	NWMO	in	the	gAP	
project (Greenland Analogue Project). The project 
will last until 2013, but some preliminary results 
have been published as Posiva working reports 
(Aaltonen et al. 2010, Nielsen et al. 2010). The proj-
ect ‘Weichselian climate variability in Scandinavia 
based on a unique sediment sequence preserved 
at Sokli’ continued, aiming at a detailed climate 
reconstruction from two different time intervals of 
the Weichselian Period based on the Sokli sediment 
samples from the Finnish Lapland. The results of 
the	project	have	been	published	in	SKb	TR-09-16.
Posiva participated in PAMINA (Performance 
Assessment Methodologies in Application to Guide 
the Development of the Safety Case) project, 
which	 was	 included	 in	 the	 EU’s	 6th Framework 
Programme. The aim was to improve and harmon-
ise methodologies and tools for demonstrating the 
safety of deep geological disposal of long-lived ra-
dioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in different 
geological environments.
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L.3 List of spent fuel storages and inventory of spent fuel
Loviisa NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)/ storage capacity
Mass (tU) Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in Loviisa 1 reactor building 33.8/57 270/481
Pool storage in Loviisa 2 reactor building 23.7/58 197/485
Basket type pool storage at the NPP 57.6/57 480/480
Rack type pool storage at the NPP 384.8/433 3206/4265
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 500.0/605 4153/5711
Total effective* storage capacity 620 5157
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)/ storage capacity
Mass (tU) Fuel assemblies
Pool storage in, Olkiluoto 1 reactor building 73/256 447/1520
Pool storage in Olkiluoto 2 reactor building 70/263 433/1560
Separate storage facility at the NPP site 1110/1204 6556/7146
Total inventory/storage capacity (gross) 1253.4/1749 7438/10216
Total effective* storage capacity 1554.6 9226
FiR 1 research reactor
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Mass (kgU) Fuel elements
Spent fuel racks in the reactor pool 1.81 10
Well under the floor of the reactor hall 2.37 13
Total inventory 4.19 23
* In the effective capacity the reserve capacity for exceptional unloading of the entire reactor core to storage pool, for storage pool repairs and space for dummy 
elements are excluded (cf. Table D.1 in section D.32.1).
L.4 List of radioactive waste management facilities 
and inventory of radioactive waste
Loviisa NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Storage room for LLW inside the NPP 234.7 0.20
Storage room for ILW inside the NPP 26.6 not measured
Tank storage for wet LILW 1276** 16.8 
Storages for activated metal waste 36.7 high (not measured)
On-site storage hall for VLLW 239.0 low
Olkiluoto NPP
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Buffer storage rooms inside the NPP 116 4.3
On-site storages for scrap metal 1100 low
Storages for activated metal waste 53 high
Spent oil candidate for clearance 0.0 low
Interim storage for state owned waste 50.5 22.4
FiR 1 research reactor
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Waste storage in the laboratory building 6 0.002
STUK’s waste storage
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Storage room in STUK’s building 0.8 0.51 
Storage for state owned waste
Storage
Inventory (end of 2010)
Volume (m³) Activity (TBq)
Rock cavern attached to the Olkiluoto disposal 
facility
53.9 20.7
** Tank storage for wet LILW includes sediment matter on the bottom of the tanks estimated to be about 60 m³.
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L.5 List of laws, regulations, guides 
and other relevant documents
Most of the regulations can be found in English at 
http://www.edilex.fi/stuklex/en/.
Law, decrees and general safety 
related regulations
•	 Nuclear	Energy	Act	(990/1987)	revised	in	2008
•	 Nuclear	 Energy	 Decree	 (161/1988)	 revised	 in	
2008
•	 government	Decree	on	the	State	Nuclear	Waste	
Management	Fund	(161/2004)	ealier	162/1988
•	 Act	on	Third	Party	Liability	(484/1972)	(revised	
version of the Act enters in force on January 1, 
2012)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	Third	 Party	
Liability	(486/1972)
•	 Radiation	Act	(592/1991)
•	 Radiation	Decree	(1512/1991)
•	 Act	 on	 the	 Finnish	 Centre	 for	 Radiation	 and	
Nuclear	Safety	(1069/1983)
•	 Decree	 on	 the	 Radiation	 and	 Nuclear	 Safety	
Authority	(618/1997)
•	 Decree	 on	 Advisory	 Commission	 on	 Nuclear	
Safety	(164/1988)
•	 Act	 on	 the	Environmental	 Impact	Assessment	
Procedure	(468/1994)
•	 Decree	 on	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	
Procedure	(713/2006)
•	 Act	on	the	Openness	of	government	Activities	
(621/1999)
•	 Act	on	Rescue	Services	(561/1999)
•	 Decree	on	Rescue	Services	(857/1999)
•	 Decree	of	Ministry	of	Interior	Concerning	Plan-
ning for Nuclear or Radiological Emergences 
and for Informing the Public about Radiation 
hazards	(774/2001)
•	 Act	 on	 Transport	 of	 Dangerous	 goods	
(719/1994)
•	 Decision-in	 Principle	 of	 10th	 November	 1983	
by the Government on the Objectives to be Ob-
served in Carrying out Research, Surveys and 
Planning in the Field of Nuclear Waste Man-
agement, Nuclear Law Bulletin, No 33 (1984) 
pp. 42-44
•	 Decision	of	the	government	on	Financial	Provi-
sion for the Costs of Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment	(165/1988)
•	 government	 Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Nucle-
ar	 Power	 Plants	 (733/2008)	 (Earlier	 Decision	
395/1991)	
•	 government	Decree	on	the	Security	in	the	Use	
of	Nuclear	Energy	(734/2008)	(Earlier	Decision	
396/1991)	
•	 government	Decree	on	Emergency	Response	Ar-
rangements	at	Nuclear	Power	Plants	(735/2008)	
(Earlier	Decision	397/1991)	
•	 government	Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Disposal	
of	Nuclear	Waste	(736/2008)	(Earlier	Decisions	
398/1991	and	478/1991)
Relevant EU Directives and Regulations
•	 Council	Directive	 96/29/EURATOM	of	 13	May	
1996 on the protection of the health of workers 
and general public against the dangers arising 
from ionizing radiation
•	 Council	Directive	97/43/EURATOM	of	30	June	
1997 on health protection of individuals against 
dangers of ionizing radiation in relation of 
medical exposure, and repealing Directive 
84/466EURATOM
•	 Council	Directive	 92/3/EURATOM	 of	 3	 Febru-
ary 1992 on the supervision and control of ship-
ments of radioactive waste between Member 
States and into and out of the Community
•	 Council	 Directive	 2003/122/EURATOM	 of	 22	
December 2003 on the control of high-activity 
sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources
•	 Council	 Directive	 2006/117/EURATOM	 of	 20	
November 2006 on the supervision and control 
of shipments of radioactive waste and spent 
fuel
•	 Council	 Regulation	 93/1493/EURATOM	 of	 8	
June 1993 on shipments of radioactive sub-
stances between Member States
•	 Council	 Directive	 2009/71/EURATOM	 of	 25	
June 2009 on the nuclear safety of nuclear in-
stallations
•	 Council	 Decision	 87/600/EURATOM	 of	 14	De-
cember 1987 on Community arrangements for 
the early exchange of information in the event 
of a radiological emergency
102
STUK-B 138 SECTION L Annexes
Guides issued by STUK (only Guides 
relevant to this report included)
•	 yVL	 1.0	 Safety	 criteria	 for	 design	 of	 nuclear	
power plants, 12 January 1996
•	 yVL	1.1	Regulatory	control	of	safety	at	nuclear	
facilities, 10 February 2006
•	 yVL	 1.4	Management	 systems	 for	 nuclear	 fa-
cilities, 9 January 2008
•	 yVL	 1.5	 Reporting	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 op-
eration to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, 8 September 2003
•	 yVL	1.7	Functions	important	to	nuclear	power	
plant safety, and training and qualification of 
personnel, 28 December 1992
•	 yVL	1.8	Repairs,	modifications	and	preventive	
maintenance at nuclear facilities, 2 October 
1986
•	 yVL	1.9	Quality	assurance	during	operation	of	
nuclear power plants, 13 November 1991
•	 yVL	 1.10	 Requirements	 for	 siting	 a	 nuclear	
power plant, 11 July 2000
•	 yVL	1.11	Nuclear	power	plant	operating	experi-
ence feedback, 22 December 1994
•	 yVL	2.5	The	commissioning	of	a	nuclear	power	
plant, 29 September 2003
•	 yVL	 2.6	 Seismic	 events	 and	 nuclear	 power	
plants, 19 December 2001
•	 yVL	6.1	Control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	other	nucle-
ar materials in the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 19 June 1991
•	 yVL	6.3	Regulatory	control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	
control rods, 28 May 2003
•	 yVL	6.5	Transport	of	nuclear	material	and	nu-
clear waste, 4 April 2005
•	 yVL	6.8	Storage	and	handling	of	nuclear	 fuel,	
27 October 2003
•	 yVL	 7.1	 Limitation	 of	 public	 exposure	 in	 the	
environment of and limitation of radioactive 
releases from nuclear power plants, 22. March 
2006
•	 yVL	 7.4	 Nuclear	 power	 plant	 emergency	 pre-
paredness, 9 January 2002
•	 yVL	7.9	Radiation	protection	of	nuclear	power	
plant workers, 21 January 2002
•	 yVL	7.10	Monitoring	of	occupational	exposure	
at nuclear power plants, 20 January 2002
•	 yVL	7.18	Radiation	safety	aspects	in	the	design	
of a nuclear power plant, 26 September 2003
•	 yVL	8.1	Disposal	of	low	and	intermediate	level	
waste from the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 20 September 2003
•	 yVL	8.2	Premises	for	removal	of	nuclear	waste	
from regulatory control, 25 March 2002
•	 yVL	 8.3	 Treatment	 and	 storage	 of	 low	 and	
intermediate level waste at a nuclear power 
plant, 29 June 2005
•	 yVL	8.4	Long-term	safety	 of	disposal	 of	 spent	
nuclear fuel, 23 May 2001
•	 yVL	8.5	Operational	safety	of	a	disposal	facility	
for spent nuclear fuel, 23 December 2002
•	 ST	 1.1	 Safety	 of	 Radiation	 Practices,	 23	 May	
2005
•	 ST	1.4	Radiation	User’s	Organization,	16	April	
2004
•	 ST	1.5	Exemption	of	the	Use	of	Radiation	from	
the Safety Licence and Reporting Obligation, 1 
July 1999
•	 ST	 1.8.	 Qualifications	 of	 Persons	 Working	 in	
Radiation	 User’s	 Organization	 and	 Radiation	
Protection Training Required for Competence, 
16 April 2004
•	 ST	5.1	Radiation	Safety	of	Sealed	Sources	and	
Equipment Containing Them, 7 November 
2007
•	 ST	 6.2	 Radioactive	 Wastes	 and	 Discharges,	
1 July 1999
•	 ST	 12.2	 Radioactivity	 of	 Construction	Materi-
als, Fuel Peat and Peat Ash, 8 October 2003
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B  Plant and system design 
B.1  Design of the safety systems of a nuclear facility 
B.2  Classification of systems, structures and 
equipment of a nuclear facility 
B.3  Safety assessment a NPP 
B.4  Nuclear fuel and reactor 
B.5  Reactor coolant circuit of a NPP 
B.6  Containment of a NPP 
B.7  Preparing for the internal and external 
threats to a nuclear facility 
B.8  Fire protection of a nuclear facility
Structure of the new YVL guides
A  Safety management of a nuclear facility 
A.1  Regulatory control of the safe use of nuclear energy 
A.2  Siting of a nuclear facility 
A.3  Management systems of a nuclear facility 
A.4  Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
A.5  Construction of a NPP 
A.6  Operation and accident management of a NPP 
A.7  Risk management of a NPP 
A.8  Ageing management of a nuclear facility 
A.9  Reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility 
A.10  Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility 
A.11  Security arrangements of a nuclear facility
E  Structures and equipment of a nuclear facility
  
E.1  Inspection, testing and certifying organisations
E.2  Manufacture and use of nuclear fuel
E.3  Pressure vessels and pipings of a nuclear facility 
E.4  Verification of strength of pressure equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.5  In-service inspections of pressure equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.6  Buildings and structures of a nuclear facility 
E.7  Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
E.8  Valve units of a nuclear facility
E.9  Pump units of a nuclear facility
E.10  Emergency power supply of a nuclear facility 
E.11  Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
D  Nuclear materials and waste 
D.1  Regulatory control of nuclear non-proliferation 
D.2  Transport of nuclear materials and waste 
D.3  Handling and storage of nuclear fuel 
D.4  Handling of low- and intermediate-level waste and decom-
missioning of a nuclear facility 
D.5  Final disposal of nuclear waste 
D.6  Production of uranium and torium 
C  Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment 
C.1  Structural radiation safety and radiation monitoring 
of a nuclear facility 
C.2  Radiation protection and dose control of the personnel 
of a nuclear facility 
C.3  Control and measuring of radioactive releases 
to the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.4  Radiological control of the environment of a nuclear facility 
C.5  Emergency preparedness arrangements of a NPP
 
Figure L.5.1. The structure of the new YVL guides by the end of September 2011.
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L.6 References to official 
national and international 
reports related to safety
•	 The	Final	Disposal	 Facility	 for	 Spent	Nuclear	
Fuel, Environmental Impact Assessment Re-
port, Posiva Oy, 1999.
•	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 Report	 on	
Expanding the Capacity of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Repository, Posiva Oy, 2008.
•	 Vieno,	 T.,	 Nordman,	 h.,	 Safety	 Assessment	 of	
Spent	 Fuel	 Disposal	 in	 hästholmen,	 Kivetty,	
Olkiluoto and Romuvaara, TILA-99, POSIVA 
99-07, March 1999.
•	 Ruokola	E	(ed.).	Posiva’s	Application	for	a	Deci-
sion-in Principle Concerning a Disposal Facility 
for	Spent	Nuclear	Fuel.	STUK’s	Statement	and	
Preliminary	 Safety	 Appraisal,	 STUK-b-yTO	
198, March 2000.
•	 Posiva’s	 Application	 for	 a	 Decision	 in	 Princi-
ple	 on	 Spent	 Fuel	 from	 the	 Olkiluoto	 4	 Unit,	
STUK’s	Statement	and	Preliminary	Safety	Ap-
praisal, May 2009.
•	 Posiva’s	Application	for	a	Decision	in	Principle	
on	Spent	Fuel	from	the	Loviisa	3	Unit,	STUK’s	
Statement and Preliminary Safety Appraisal, 
October 2009.
•	 Nuclear	 Waste	 Management	 of	 the	 Olkiluoto	
and Loviisa Power Plants: Programme for Re-
search, Development and Technical Design for 
2007–2009,	 TKS-2006,	 Posiva	 Oy,	 November	
2006.
•	 Statement	of	Position	by	the	Finnish	Radiation	
and Nuclear Safety Authority Regarding the 
Construction	of	the	Third	Unit	at	Olkiluoto	Nu-
clear Power Plant, January 2005.
•	 Plan	 for	 Oversight	 of	 the	 Underground	 Rock	
Characterization	 Facility	 at	 Olkiluoto,	 STUK,	
May 2005.
•	 Regulatory	 Control	 of	 Nuclear	 Safety	 in	 Fin-
land,	Annual	 Report	 2004,	 STUK-b-yTO	 239,	
April 2005.
•	 Kainulainen	E	 (ed.).	Regulatory	 control	 of	nu-
clear safety in Finland. Annual report 2005. 
STUK-b-yTO	249.	STUK,	helsinki	2006.
•	 STUK-b	 79	 Kainulainen	 E	 (ed.).	 Regulatory	
control of nuclear energy in Finland. Annual 
report	2006.	STUK,	helsinki	2007.
•	 Kainulainen	E	 (ed.).	Regulatory	 control	 of	nu-
clear safety in Finland. Annual report 2007. 
STUK-b	92.	STUK,	helsinki	2008.
•	 STUK-b	 89	 Kainulainen	 E	 (ed.).	 Regulatory	
control of nuclear energy in Finland. Annual 
report	2007.	STUK,	helsinki	2008.
•	 Kainulainen	E	 (ed.).	Regulatory	 control	 of	nu-
clear safety in Finland. Annual report 2008. 
STUK-b	105.	STUK,	helsinki	2009.
•	 Kainulainen	 E	 (ed.).	 Regulatory	 oversight	 of	
nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2009. 
STUK-b	118.	STUK,	helsinki	2010.
•	 Erja	Kainulainen	(ed.).	Regulatory	oversight	of	
nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2010. 
STUK-b	134.	STUK,	helsinki	2011.
•	 Radiation	 Practices,	 Annual	 Report	 2004,	
STUK-b-STO	59,	May	2005.
•	 Compliance	with	the	Obligations	of	the	Conven-
tion on Nuclear Safety, Finnish National Report 
as Referred to in Article 5 of the Convention on 
Nuclear	Safety,	STUK-b-yTO	177,	Sept.	1998.
•	 Finnish	Report	on	Nuclear	Safety,	Finnish	Sec-
ond National Report as Referred to in Article 5 
of	the	Convention	on	Nuclear	Safety,	STUK-b-
yTO	210,	September	2001.
•	 Finnish	Report	on	Nuclear	Safety,	Finnish	3rd	
National Report as Referred to in Article 5 of 
the	 Convention	 on	 Nuclear	 Safety,	 STUK-b-
yTO	234,	September	2004.
•	 STUK-b	 80	 Finnish	 report	 on	 nuclear	 safety.	
Finnish 4th national report as referred to in 
Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
STUK,	helsinki	2007.
•	 Finnish	 report	 on	 nuclear	 safety.	 Finnish	 5th	
national report as referred to in Article 5 of the 
Convention	 on	 Nuclear	 Safety.	 STUK-b	 120.	
STUK,	helsinki	2010.
•	 Finnish	Report	on	the	Safety	of	Spent	Fuel	and	
Radioactive Waste Management, Finnish na-
tional Report as Referred to in Article 32 of the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
and	Radioactive	Waste	Management,	STUK-b-
yTO	223,	helsinki	2003.
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management. 2nd Finnish National Re-
port as referred to in Article 32 of the Conven-
tion.	STUK-b-yTO	243.	STUK,	helsinki	2005.
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management. 3rd Finnish National Re-
port as referred to in Article 32 of the Conven-
tion.	STUK-b	96.	STUK,	helsinki	2008.
STUK-B 138
105
SECTION L Annexes
•	 Compliance	 with	 the	 general	 Regulations	 for	
the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (Govern-
ment	 Decision	 395/1991),	 the	 Loviisa	 plant,	
STUK-b-yTO	179,	September	1998
•	 Compliance	 with	 the	 general	 Regulations	 for	
the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (Govern-
ment	 Decision	 395/1991),	 the	 Olkiluoto	 plant,	
STUK-b-yTO	180,	September	1998
•	 Statement	Issued	by	the	Radiation	and	Nuclear	
Safety Authority Concerning the Construction 
of	 the	 Olkiluoto	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	 Unit	 3,	
Annex 1: Safety Assessment of the Olkiluoto 3 
Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	Unit	 for	 the	 Issuance	 of	
Construction Licence, Helsinki, January 2005.
•	 STUK-b	 81	 Safety	 assessment	 of	 the	 Loviisa	
nuclear power plant. Statement regarding the 
licence application by Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy concerning the operation of the Loviisa nu-
clear	power	plant.	STUK,	helsinki	2007.
L.7 References to reports of 
international review missions 
performed at the request of 
the Contracting Party
•	 Technical	Notes	of	the	International	Regulatory	
Review Team (IRRT) Mission to Finland, 12–13 
March 2000, IAEA, Vienna, 2000.
•	 Regulatory	 Review	 Team	 (IRRT),	 Follow-Up	
Mission to Finland, 31 August – 9 September 
2003,	 IAEA/NSNI/IRRT/03/03,	 IAEA,	 Vienna,	
2003.
•	 Evaluation	of	the	Finnish	Nuclear	Waste	Man-
agement Programme, Report of the WATRP 
Review	 Team	 /	 International	 Atomic	 Energy	
Agency, Waste Management Assessment and 
Review Programme, Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, Helsinki, 1994.
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Installations,	
Finland (Olkiluoto), OSART Mission (Opera-
tional	Safety	Review	Team),	IAEA-NENS-86/2,	
IAEA, Vienna, September 1986.
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Installations,	
Finland (Loviisa), OSART Mission (Operational 
Safety Review Team) 5–23. November 1990.
•	 Integrated	Safety	Assessment	 of	Research	Re-
actors (INSARR), Report to the Government of 
Finland,	NSNI/INSARR/1999-2,	 IAEA,	Vienna,	
August 1999.
•	 Operational	 Safety	 of	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plant,	
Finland (Loviisa), OSART Mission (Opera-
tional	Safety	Review	Team),	 IAEA-NSNI/OSA-
RT/07/139,	5–21	March	2007.
L.8 Spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management policy
Responsibilities
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that 
generators of nuclear waste are responsible for all 
nuclear waste management measures and their 
appropriate preparation, and are also responsible 
for the expenses arisen. The state has the sec-
ondary responsibility in case that any producer of 
nuclear waste is incapable of fulfilling its nuclear 
waste management obligation (Nuclear Energy 
Act, Sections 31 and 32). When the licensee’s waste 
management obligation has ceased because the fi-
nal disposal of nuclear waste has been carried out 
in an approved manner, the ownership right to the 
nuclear waste is transferred to the State, which 
shall be responsible thereafter for the nuclear 
waste (Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 32-34).
Radiation Act (Section 50) provides that the 
organization engaged in radiation practice is re-
quired to take any measures to render harm-
less radioactive wastes arising from its operation. 
Rendering radioactive waste harmless means any 
measure needed to treat, isolate or dispose of the 
waste, or to restrict its use so that it does not en-
danger human health or the environment. Also, the 
responsible party utilizing natural resources con-
taining radioactive substances shall ensure that 
radioactive waste poses no hazard to health or to 
the environment, both during the operations and 
on their conclusion. The state has the secondary 
responsibility in case that a producer of radioac-
tive waste is incapable of fulfilling its management 
obligation (Radiation Act, Section 51).
Political decision-making and 
public consultation
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 11), 
construction of a nuclear facility of considerable 
general significance shall require a Government’s 
Decision-in Principle (DiP) on that the construction 
project is in line with the overall good of society. 
106
STUK-B 138 SECTION L Annexes
Such facilities include major nuclear waste manage-
ment facilities. Before making the DiP referred to in 
Section 11, the Government shall ascertain that the 
municipality where the nuclear facility is planned 
to be located, is in favour of the facility (Section 14 
of the Nuclear Energy Act). The Government DiP 
shall be forwarded, without delay, to Parliament for 
perusal. Parliament may reverse the DiP as such or 
may decide that it remains in force as such (Section 
15 of the Nuclear Energy Act).
Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 24) provides 
that an application for a DiP shall be appended 
by an assessment report drawn up according to 
the Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure as well as a description on the design 
criteria that will be observed by the licence-ap-
plicant to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden on the environment. The envi-
ronmental impact assessment procedure is a con-
sultative process facilitating public involvement 
and information transfer to the affected people. It 
considers a wide scope of potential impacts, such as 
human health and comfort, natural environment 
and biodiversity, municipal structures and the use 
of natural resources
Spent fuel and nuclear waste 
management principles
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 
6a) nuclear waste generated in Finland shall be 
handled, stored and permanently disposed of in 
Finland. Respectively, nuclear waste generated 
elsewhere than in Finland, shall not be handled, 
stored or permanently disposed of in Finland. 
There are only minor exemptions to these princi-
ples, notably the nuclear waste arising from the re-
search reactor (Section 6a of Nuclear Energy Act). 
As stipulated in Section 7 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the spent fuel from a research reactor in 
Finland can be handled, stored and disposed of out-
side Finland, if justified on grounds of safety or due 
to a significant economic or other weighty reason.
The principles of the nuclear waste management 
were originally set in the Finnish Government’s 
policy decision of 1983 and later in the decisions 
by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(MEE). These decisions set also a long-term sched-
ule for the implementation of nuclear waste man-
agement including the site selection and start of 
the operation of the spent fuel disposal facility.
Principles for decommissioning 
of nuclear facilities
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7g) requires that pro-
visions for decommissioning of a nuclear facility 
shall be taken into account in its design. The de-
commissioning plan shall be updated regularly, at 
six years intervals, as prescribed in the Act (Section 
28). After permanent shut-down of the facility, it 
shall be decommissioned in accordance with a plan 
approved	by	STUK.	The	dismantling	of	the	facility	
and other actions related to decommissioning shall 
not be unjustifiably postponed.
Management principles for 
other radioactive waste
According to the Radiation Act (Section 31b), when 
requesting a safety licence for the use of a high-ac-
tivity sealed source, accounts of rendering harmless 
of any disused sources, including the arrangements 
for their return to the manufacturer or suppli-
er, or their surrender to a recognised installation. 
Radiation Decree (Section 24b) specifies that the 
Radiation	 and	 Nuclear	 Safety	 Authority	 (STUK)	
shall discharge the function of rendering radioac-
tive waste harmless where there is no recognised 
facility of the kind referred in the Radiation Act. 
STUK	may	agree	with	the	custodian	of	the	waste	
that custody of the waste will be permanently as-
signed to the government in return for a non-recur-
rent compensation charge.
Safety principles and control
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7a) prescribes that the 
safety of the use of nuclear energy (including waste 
management activities) shall be as high as rea-
sonable achievable. To further enhance safety, all 
actions justified by operational experiences, safety 
research and the progress in science and technolo-
gy shall be taken. Additionally, nuclear waste shall 
be managed so that no radiation exposure will 
occur after disposal that would exceed the levels 
considered acceptable during the implementation 
of disposal. Disposal of nuclear waste in a perma-
nent manner shall be planned with due regard 
to safety and that ensuring long-term safety does 
not depend on the surveillance of the disposal site 
(Section 7h of the Nuclear Energy Act).
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55) designates 
STUK	as	the	regulatory	body	for	the	control	of	the	
safe	use	of	nuclear	energy.	STUK’s	regulatory	tasks	
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include judgement of safety in authorization proc-
esses, issuance of detailed safety requirements and 
control of compliance with the safety requirements 
and licence conditions. Respectively, the Radiation 
Act (Section 6) states that compliance with the Act 
and with the provisions and regulations issued 
pursuant	 thereto	 shall	 be	 supervised	 by	 STUK.	
The Act (Section 16) states that safety licences 
shall	be	granted	by	STUK	upon	application.
Costs and funding
Nuclear Energy Act (Chapter 7) addresses financial 
provision for nuclear waste management. The basic 
goals of the financing system for radioactive waste 
management and decommissioning are to ensure 
that funds for future waste management are col-
lected to ensure that assets are available even 
in case of insolvency of the waste generator. The 
NPP operators include the costs of waste manage-
ment, including those arising from decommission-
ing of the NPPs, in the price of nuclear electricity. 
Initially, the nuclear power companies had internal 
funds for that purpose, but by virtue of entry into 
force of the Nuclear Energy Act, the State Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund was established under 
the former Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
in 1988. To ensure that the financial liability is 
covered, the nuclear power companies and the op-
erator of the research reactor are every third year 
obliged to present cost estimates for the future 
management of nuclear wastes and take care that 
the required amount of money is set aside to the 
State Nuclear Waste Management Fund. In order 
to provide for the insolvency of the nuclear utili-
ties, they shall provide securities to the State for 
the part of financial liability which is not covered 
by the Fund. Also in case of the research reactor, 
the operator is responsible for the planning and 
implementation for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear 
waste management. In the case of the research 
reactor the State provided initially the necessary 
provision to the State Fund.
The Radiation Act (Section 19), provides for 
furnishing the financial security of radioactive 
waste management for non-nuclear practices as 
follows: to ensure that the licensee meets the costs 
incurred in rendering radioactive waste harmless 
and in carrying out any decontamination measures 
that may be needed in the environment, it shall 
furnish security if the operations produce or are 
liable to produce radioactive waste that cannot be 
rendered harmless without substantial cost.
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